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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, a number of well-publicized data leaks have revealed the secret offshore 
holdings of high-net-worth individuals and multinational taxpayers, leading to a sea change in 
cross-border tax enforcement.  Spurred by leaked data, tax authorities have prosecuted offshore 
tax cheats, attempted to recoup lost revenues, enacted new laws, and signed international 
agreements that promote “sunshine” and exchange of financial information between countries.
The conventional wisdom is that data leaks enable tax authorities to detect and punish 
offshore tax evasion more effectively, and that leaks are therefore socially and 
economically beneficial.  This Article argues, however, that the conventional wisdom is 
too simplistic.  Leak-driven lawmaking has clear benefits, but it also carries distinctive risks, 
including agenda setting by third parties with specific interests and the leaks’ capacity 
to trigger nonrational responses.  Even where leak-driven lawmaking is beneficial overall, it is 
important to appreciate its risks when determining how to utilize and respond to leaks.
This Article is the first to thoroughly examine both the important beneficial effects of tax 
leaks, and their risks.  It provides suggestions and cautions for making and enforcing tax 
law, after a leak, in order to best tap into the benefits of leaks while managing their pitfalls.
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INTRODUCTION 
A steady drip of data leaks has begun to exert an extraordinary influence 
on how international tax laws and policies are made.1  Yet, tax scholars have 
so far failed to appreciate the profound impacts―and in particular the 
serious pitfalls―of such leak-driven lawmaking. 
These well-publicized leaks of tax data, which have emerged over the last 
decade, have revealed the secret offshore financial holdings of high-net-worth 
individuals and the tax evasion and minimization practices of various 
taxpayers, financial institutions, and tax havens.  The leaks have had a 
significant impact.  Tax authorities have traditionally encountered difficulties 
in obtaining information about hidden offshore wealth and complex offshore 
tax-minimization structures employed by multinationals.  Leaks have proven 
to be an incredibly useful tool in correcting these informational asymmetries 
between tax authorities and taxpayers.  Spurred by leaked data, countries have 
prosecuted taxpayers, sanctioned tax advisors, recouped revenues from 
offshore tax cheats, and enacted new laws that create greater transparency 
and exchange of financial information in cross-border tax matters.2  There 
have also been significant developments in coordinated global action to 
increase cross-border transparency and information exchange. 
To take a prominent example, in 2008, leaked information about 
improprieties at Switzerland’s UBS bank alerted the United States to the 
extensive use by American taxpayers of secret offshore bank accounts to hide 
assets and evade taxes.3  The UBS leak led the United States to prosecute these 
tax cheats and to develop voluntary disclosure programs to recoup revenue.  
  
1. See generally INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, http://www.icij.org 
[http://perma.cc/2SFL-4GP2] (noting various leaks); Allison Christians, Lux Leaks: 
Revealing the Law, One Plain Brown Envelope at a Time, 76 TAX NOTES INT’L 1123, 
1123–25 (2014); see also Stuart Gibson, Drip, Drip, Drip . . . , 84 TAX NOTES INT’L 115 
(2016) (“The system that keeps individual and corporate tax and financial information 
secret has sprung a leak—more accurately, a series of leaks.  They began in Switzerland, 
spread to nearby Luxembourg, crossed the ocean to Panama, and most recently popped 
up in the Bahamas.”). 
2. See generally Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
304, 306–12 (2012); Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 212–22 
(2016); Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 
2018).  
3. See Randall Jackson, Former UBS Banker Indicted in Tax Evasion Case, 50 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 519, 520 (2008); Randall Jackson, Swiss Bank Official Detained by U.S. Authorities, 
50 TAX NOTES INT’L 473, 473–74 (2008). 
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It also prompted the enactment of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
provisions of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010 
(commonly referred to as FATCA).4  This major piece of legislation increased 
disclosure obligations and penalties for all American taxpayers with offshore 
assets and instituted a new mandatory information reporting regime for 
foreign financial institutions (FFIs) holding assets of U.S. taxpayers.5 
More recently, the so-called “Panama Papers” leak illuminated how the 
world’s wealthy use Panama and other havens to hide wealth offshore.6  The 
fallout is still unfolding, but the consequences to date have included criminal 
and civil investigations, denials and dismissals by Vladimir Putin, censorship 
by China, and a global movement towards greater offshore tax transparency.7 
The UBS and Panama Papers leaks are just two examples.  Others 
include the Paradise Papers leak, the LuxLeaks scandal, the British Havens 
and Bahamas leaks, and client data leaks concerning LGT, HSBC, and Julius 
Baer banks.8  Thus, it is clear that tax leaks are recurrent rather than one-off 
events.  They show no sign of abating, and they have started to play an 
undeniable role in the development of international tax law and policy.9 
  
4. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501–535, 124 
Stat. 71, 97-115 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474 (2012)). 
5. Id. 
6. See Reid K. Weisbord, A Catharsis for U.S. Trust Law: American Reflections on the 
Panama Papers, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 95–97 (2016); James O’Donovan, 
Hannes F. Wagner & Stefan Zeume, The Value of Offshore Secrets: Evidence From the 
Panama Papers (May 29, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2771095 [https://perma.cc/4JSE-FNTB].  See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, 
Following the Money: Lessons From the Panama Papers, Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 
PA. ST. L. REV. 807 (2017). 
7. On Vladimir’s denials and dismissals, see Alec Luhn & Luke Harding, Putin Dismisses Panama 
Papers as an Attempt to Destabilise Russia, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2016, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/07/putin-dismisses-panama-papers-as-an-
attempt-to-destabilise-russia [http://perma.cc/2DR9-LJNE].  On censorship in China, see 
Tom Phillips, China Steps Up Panama Papers Censorship After Leaders’ Relatives Named, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2016, 10:18 AM), http://www.theguardian.com /world/2016/apr/07/china-
ramps-up-panama-papers-censorship-after-leaders-relatives-named [http://perma.cc/7PSB-
MGTX].  On offshore tax transparency, see Robert Booth, Holly Watt & David Pegg, David 
Cameron Admits He Profited From Father’s Panama Offshore Trust, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2016, 
3:07 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/07/david-cameron-admits-he-
profited-fathers-offshore-fund-panama-papers [http://perma.cc/2H55-AXT2]. 
8. See infra Subpart I.B. 
9. Leaks are not the only drivers of international tax law and policy.  For example, we 
cannot prove that the UBS leak was the only factor that caused the enactment of the 
2010 FATCA legislation in the United States.  See infra Subpart III.C.  However, the 
causal links that we assert between leaks and developments in international tax law are 
regularly acknowledged by lawmakers, government officials, and tax professionals, so 
their existence is uncontested.  See, e.g., Marina Walker Guevara, ICIJ Releases Offshore 
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Despite their prominence, the effects of data leaks on the actions of 
governments, taxpayers, and international organizations are not well-studied.  
The tax policy literature has not considered the question of how leaks drive 
tax law, nor has the literature considered whether leak-propelled legal change 
may carry underappreciated risks.10  This dearth of analysis is also true of the 
broader legal literature.11  Recent convulsive political events have drawn 
generalized attention to both the benefits and the potentially adverse 
consequences of data leaks and hacks.  However, their distinctive effects on 
law and the process of legal change have not been comprehensively 
examined.12 
This Article is the first to thoroughly analyze both the important 
beneficial effects of tax leaks and their risks.  The conventional wisdom 
among commentators is that data leaks enable tax authorities to understand 
offshore tax evasion and enforce tax compliance more effectively, and are 
  
Leaks Database Revealing Names Behind Secret Companies, Trusts, INT’L CONSORTIUM 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (June 14, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://www.icij.org/offshore/icij-
releases-offshore-leaks-database-revealing-names-behind-secret-companies-trusts 
[http://perma.cc/H4DN-XTZW] (characterizing  European Union (EU) Commissioner 
Algirdas Semeta’s view that the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’s 
(ICIJ) offshore leaks investigation “transformed tax politics and amplified political will 
to tackle the problem of tax evasion” and directly quoting the Commissioner’s claim 
that “Offshore Leaks could be identified as the most significant trigger behind these 
developments”); Andrew Rettman, EU Commissioner: Offshore Leaks Transformed Tax 
Politics, EU OBSERVER (June 5, 2013, 9:49 AM), http://euobserver.com/economic 
/120382 [http://perma.cc/W9NF-BH83]. 
10. The few existing case studies of discrete tax leaks do not address these questions.  See, e.g., 
Arthur J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven Secrecy, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 483 (2016); Omri 
Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 
(2017).  And while some tax scholars have examined the impacts of laws made in the aftermath 
of tax leaks, they have focused on the laws themselves, not on how those laws are driven by 
leaks.  See, e.g., Allison Christians, A Global Perspective on Citizenship Taxation, 38 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 193 (2017); Dhammika Dharmapala, Cross-Border Tax Evasion Under a Unilateral 
FATCA Regime 2 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 5863, 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2778453 [https://perma.cc/8L2L-K6P2]. 
11. The existing non-tax literature on leaks largely deals with leaks and hacks of 
government information and is thus inappropos to tax leaks, which are largely—though 
not exclusively—leaks of private taxpayer information.  It also does not examine the 
effects of those leaks on systematic legal change.  See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks 
and the Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448 
(2012); Margaret B. Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1387 (2015); 
David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones 
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013). 
12. David P. Fidler, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Snowden Leaks, in THE SNOWDEN READER 52, 
55–63 (David P. Fidler ed., 2015) (evaluating the impacts of the Snowden leaks on U.S. 
foreign policy); see supra note 10. 
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thus socially and economically beneficial.13  This Article argues that the 
conventional wisdom is too simplistic.  In addition to its clear benefits, leak-
driven lawmaking carries significant risks, most pertinently (1) the risk of agenda 
setting by third parties with specific interests, and (2) the risks associated with 
leaks’ capacity to trigger nonrational responses.  It is therefore possible that in 
some cases leak-driven lawmaking may do more harm than good.  Even 
where leak-driven lawmaking is beneficial overall, it is important to 
appreciate its risks when determining how to utilize and respond to leaks. 
This Article focuses on the effects of leaks on tax policy, but leaks are not 
purely a tax phenomenon.  Leaks occurring outside the tax world, and the 
responses and developments they have triggered, provide stark evidence of 
the potentially negative impact of leaked data on politics, market behavior, 
and policy outcomes.  It is naïve to think that these impacts could not occur in 
tax law and policymaking as well. 
In Part I, we describe the current landscape of tax leaks and discuss their 
key characteristics and significance.  We then investigate in Part II the benefits 
and the potential downsides of relying on leaks to drive tax policy.  We show that 
data leaks can be a valuable source of information to governments and can 
function as a “free audit,”14 and that leaks can pressure governments, 
taxpayers, and elites to undertake systematic legal reform.  We argue, 
however, that there are also distinctive hazards to relying on data leaks—
which are exogenously generated and highly salient—in detecting cross-
border abuses and in making tax policy. 
In Part III, we illustrate these risks with three examples of how data leaks 
and responses to them have occurred in the real world.  We examine (1) 
agenda-setting behaviors by leakers and media organizations such as 
WikiLeaks and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
(ICIJ), which may be seeking to direct public reactions and policy outcomes 
  
13. See, e.g., Murray Griffin, No More Tax Secrets as Authorities Share Panama Papers’ 
Data, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L TAX (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.bna.com/no-tax-
secrets-n57982083079 [http://perma.cc/EU2D-2PUQ] (describing how data leaks 
and hacks help tax authorities discover offshore secrets and enforce compliance); 
The 2009 Person of the Year, 126 TAX NOTES 7, 8 (2010) (naming leaker Bradley 
Birkenfeld 2009 Person of the Year for his role in cracking bank secrecy).  Tax 
authorities have effectively embraced this conventional wisdom by using and seeking 
out leaked data, using such data to generate more information, and even (in the case of 
Germany) purchasing leaked data from various sources.  See infra notes 30–31. 
14. Relatedly, information received from IRS information return matching programs 
(which compare taxpayer-provided data with other sources of information) has been 
characterized as “an invisible audit.”  Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the 
Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. 971, 975 (2003). 
540 65 UCLA L. REV. 532 (2018) 
	
according to their own goals; (2) inefficiencies in data transmission between 
and within countries (such as those occurring between the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the IRS amid the negotiation and signing of the HSBC 
deferred prosecution agreement) and how this may be particularly 
problematic in the context of leaks; and (3) potentially controversial 
legislative responses to leaks (such as the U.S.’s FATCA legislation).15  There 
can be no guarantee that leaker and intermediary behavior, pathways of data 
transmission, levels of accuracy of leaked data, and government responses to 
leaks will not shift in more problematic directions in the future. 
Based on our analysis, we provide in Part IV suggestions and cautions 
for formulating law and policy after a leak, in order to best utilize the 
strengths of leak-driven lawmaking while managing its downsides.  We 
suggest that it is important for governments, international organizations, and 
other policymakers to be sophisticated consumers of leaked data, to avoid 
irrational responses, and to be clear about the enforcement “first principles” 
to which they are committed.  Finally, we flag four open questions concerning 
the future impact of leaks on international tax law: (1) whether early rounds 
of leak-driven policy responses will become entrenched; (2) whether 
transparency will win out over privacy, both in tax and more generally; (3) 
whether the market for leaked data will develop competitive (as opposed to 
monopolistic) characteristics; and (4) whether there may be unanticipated 
shifts in the content, transmission, and responses to leaked data in the future.  
The answers to these questions are still unfolding, and they will determine the 
role data leaks play in international tax policy going forward. 
This Article’s analysis offers a firm theoretical handle by which to 
evaluate the dynamics of how tax law and policy take shape in the aftermath 
of a data leak.  Our analysis also has application beyond tax law, even though 
parts of our analysis are tax specific.  As recent experiences with Edward 
Snowden, Chelsea Manning, WikiLeaks, and “TrumpLeaks” demonstrate, 
leaks are playing an increasingly important role in influencing public opinion 
and thereby setting the direction of law and policy.  In light of the continuing 
(and likely growing) significance of leaks and hacks in a variety of political 
and legal contexts,16 understanding the upsides and downsides of leak-driven 
lawmaking has never been more crucial. 
  
15. See infra Part III. 
16. Justina Crabtree, The Tools Helping Facilitate Leaks From Trump’s White House, CNBC (Feb. 
13, 2017, 6:22 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/09/the-tools-helping-facilitate-leaks-
from-trumps-white-house.html [http://perma.cc/HDG3-NYK8]; see, e.g., John Herrman, 
The Media’s Risky Love Affair With Leaks, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 6, 2017), 
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF TAX LEAKS 
Broadly, a leak of tax data refers to a significant, unauthorized release 
of private taxpayer information through channels other than established 
protocols (such as protocols for treaty-based information exchange 
between countries).  The leaked data usually comprises information about a 
cluster of taxpayers or activities, and describes activities pertaining to a 
secretive practice or jurisdiction.  The data is usually obtained either from banks 
and law firms or from government authorities (such as corporate registries) 
and then released.  A leak tends to be regarded as significant when it provides 
information about a behavior, jurisdiction, or strategy about which tax 
authorities have limited information and have been unable to obtain data 
through regular channels of international cooperation. 
The leaked data is usually released by someone not acting in an official 
or institutional capacity, such as a former-employee-turned-whistleblower, a 
hacker, or a different anonymous source.17  The leaker18 may share the data 
with tax authorities, other government agencies, or the press.  Regardless of 




17. Until the Panama Papers episode, most tax leaks were by employees or former 
employees.  See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Stitches for Snitches: Lawyers as 
Whistleblowers, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1455 (2017) (considering the case of a lawyer who 
blew the whistle on his former employer’s misconduct).  The Panama Papers is the first 
tax leak widely believed to have resulted from a hack of a law firm’s computer systems.  
See Pierluigi Paganini, Panama Papers—How Hackers Breached the Mossack Fonseca 
Firm, INFOSEC INST. (Apr. 20, 2016), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/ panama-
papers-how-hackers-breached-the-mossack-fonseca-firm/#gref [http://perma.cc/ YF3F-
LHLX]. 
18. We use the term “leaker” loosely to encompass whistleblowers, data thieves, hackers, 
and others who engage in unauthorized data releases.  The statutory term 
“whistleblower” typically refers to someone who calls attention to illegal activity, often 
by presenting information to management or enforcement agencies under some 
framework of regulatory protection.  See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 
Pub. L. No. 101-12, § 2(a)(1), 103 Stat. 16, 16 (cross referencing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) 
(2012)).  Former assistant attorney general for the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Tax 
Division, Kathryn Keneally, has contrasted whistleblowers and leakers, noting that both 
help tax enforcement but information from the former can be kept confidential during 
an investigation.  Nathan J. Richman, Panama Papers Raise Publicity for U.S. Tax 
Enforcement Efforts, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 461, 461 (2016).  She notes that despite the 
inability to keep information obtained via leakers confidential, “you want a certain 
amount of disclosure out there, because from a tax system point of view you want people 
to come forward into voluntary compliance, get right with the government, and be good 
taxpayers going forward.”  Id. 
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the public either through the press or through government announcements, 
or both. 
In this Part, we discuss the emergence of tax leaks.  We first discuss why 
leaks have become a significant feature of the cross-border tax landscape 
(I.A).  We then describe the important leaks that have occurred to date (I.B) 
and summarize principal observations that can be derived from these leaks 
(I.C).  Our goal is not to build an absolute typology of leaks but rather to 
identify their key characteristics and how these characteristics vary.19 
A. Understanding the Emergence of Tax Leaks 
Large-scale leaks of offshore tax data have occurred since roughly 2008, 
but cross-border tax structuring and evasion have existed for much longer.  
Thus, leaks are a relatively recent addition to the international tax landscape, 
prompting the question of why they are just surfacing now.  An important 
reason is technology and the centralization of data repositories, which make 
data easier to obtain, share, and disseminate to governments, the press, or the 
public.  Another key factor contributing to the rise of tax leaks is the growing 
importance of cross-border transactions in tax law and policy. 
1. Ease of Obtaining, Transferring, and Disseminating Data 
In the age of centralized and computerized data storage, it has become 
easier for disgruntled employees, hackers, and other data thieves to obtain 
tax-related data from banks, law firms, and other sources and to leak it.  There 
is more potential for data theft and hacks when the data is available in 
electronic format that is easy to download and disseminate.   
In addition to being easier to download or steal, data available in 
electronic format is easier to transfer to governments, regulatory 
authorities, or the press.20  Large quantities of data can be emailed, 
anonymously mailed, or dropped off in the form of a CD or hard drive.  This 
ease of transfer has been a game changer in enabling high-impact data leaks. 
  
19. Some privacy and technology scholars have attempted to articulate a taxonomy of data 
leaks and hacks.  See, e.g., Kwoka, supra note 11, at 1394–1402; Pozen, supra note 11, at 
532–34.  Those non-tax frameworks do not translate comfortably into tax, because tax 
leaks and data dumps largely pertain to private taxpayers, not government secrets. 
20. Relatedly, the vulnerability of electronic data may prompt a shift towards more low-tech 
data storage methods.  See generally Kristen E. Eichensehr, Giving Up on Cybersecurity, 
64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 320 (2016) (proposing that governments, businesses and 
individuals will tactically lessen their digital dependence due to cybersecurity concerns). 
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The advent of the internet has also made it easier to disseminate leaked 
data to the public and generate publicity about its existence.  As discussed in 
Part III, journalists, NGOs, and other actors can now write commentary 
online that highlights tax abuses, publicizes identifying information about 
taxpayers, facilitators, and offshore entities, and puts pressure on public 
officials. 
Given these technological developments, it is likely that leaks of tax data 
will continue to occur going forward.  However, the actual volume will 
depend on the extent to which custodians can find better ways to safeguard 
electronic data. 
2. The Growing Significance of Cross-Border Transactions 
Technology aside, the growing importance of cross-border transactions 
also helps explain the emergence of tax leaks. 
From the 1980s onward, there was notable growth in business expansion 
across borders.21  Several key factors contributed to this growth, including (1) 
the liberalization of currency and exchange controls in many countries;22 (2) the 
liberalization of foreign direct investment and trade (for example, through 
tariff reductions, quota eliminations, and reduced restrictions on foreign 
direct investment);23 and (3) innovations that spurred and supported the 
  
21. Eswar Prasad et al., Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some 
Empirical Evidence, in INDIA’S AND CHINA’S RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH REFORM AND 
GROWTH 201, 201–28 (Wanda Tseng & David Cowen eds., 2005); see Diane M. Ring, 
Corporate Migrations and Tax Transparency and Disclosure, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 175 
(2017). 
22. See Ring, supra note 21, at 179; Daisuke Ikemoto, Re-examining the Removal of 
Exchange Control by the Thatcher Government in 1979 (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2016/Removal%20of%20ex
change%20control%20by%20the%20Thatcher%20Government_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
MSD6-K4L3]; see also ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL 
FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990S 25–80 (1994) (reviewing Bretton Woods, 
the role of capital controls and their implications); Oussama Kanaan, Tanzania’s 
Experience With Trade Liberalization, FIN. & DEV., June 2000, at 30, 33; Rei Masunaga, 
The Deregulation Process of Foreign Exchange Control in Capital Transactions in Post-
War Japan (Jan. 1997),http://www.jcif.or.jp/pdf/9701E.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMC4-
JCGJ] (discussing Japan’s liberalization steps undertaken in the 1980s). 
23. See, e.g., S.M. SHAFAEDDIN, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: STRUCTURAL CHANGE OR DE-
INDUSTRIALIZATION? (2005), http://unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20053_en.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/FL3W-YBUV] (evaluating the impact of “[t]he process of trade liberalization 
and market-oriented economic reform that had started in many developing countries in 
[the] early 1980s [and that] intensified in the 1990s”); Trade Liberalization: Why So 
Much Controversy?, in ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S—LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF 
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knowledge-based economy (such as microprocessors, communications, 
biotech, lighter materials, and a shift to intellectual factors of production).24  
Thus, although active cross-border commerce had thrived for centuries, the 
regulatory and technological changes that gathered steam in the 1980s 
fostered a new level of cross-border business investment, engagement, and 
commerce. 
Accompanying this cross-border business expansion was a 
corresponding rise in the importance of cross-border taxation for both 
businesses and countries over the next decades.  On the business side, the 
benefits of international tax planning—both legitimate tax minimization, as 
well as less legitimate tax avoidance using hybrid entities, structured 
transactions, and other techniques—began to attract serious attention and 
resources within companies.  Governments and tax authorities in turn 
questioned their ability to effectively audit multinationals, grappling with the 
adequacy of existing substantive and procedural rules and the risk of tax base 
erosion through corporate tax avoidance strategies.25  International tax and cross-
border tax planning thus secured an increasingly high profile among not only 
multinationals, tax authorities, and tax advisors, but also among legislators and 
the public.26  Thus, the backdrop against which tax leaks began to occur was 
  
REFORM 131, 132, 134 Box 5.1 (2005) (“Reforms in the 1980s and 1990s were the origin 
of a strong expansion in international trade.”). 
24. Ring, supra note 21, at 181; see also Raj Aggarwal, Technology and Globalization as 
Mutual Reinforcers in Business: Reorienting Strategic Thinking for the New Millennium, 
39 MGMT. INT’L REV., no. 2, 1999, at 83, 84; Nicholas A. Ashford, Ralph P. Hall & 
Kyriakos Pierrakakis, Globalization: Technology, Trade Regimes, Capital Flows, and 
International Economy, in TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALIZATION, AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 183 (Nicholas A. Ashford & Ralph P. Hall eds., 2011). 
25. For example, in the 1990s, the United States overhauled its transfer pricing regulations, 
introduced the Advance Pricing Agreement program and served as a major influence on 
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) transfer pricing 
guidelines.  See, e.g., WILLIAM W. CHIP, ROBERT E. CULBERTSON & SAMUEL M. MARUCA, 
TRANSFER PRICING: OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, pt.I.G. (BNA Tax Mgmt. 
Portfolio No. 6936-1st, 2017); SAMUEL M. MARUCA, IRS, ANNOUNCEMENT AND REPORT 
CONCERNING ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS 2 (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
apa/2011apmastatutoryreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5XZ-HUNT].  Additionally, in 
1998, the OECD released its report and recommendations regarding harmful tax 
competition.  OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 25–35 
(1998),http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/publications 
/harmful-tax-competition-emerging-global-issue.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N8L-ZQHX]. 
26. See, e.g., Henry Tricks, Business Fears Over Global Competitiveness, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2005, at 7 (reviewing business reaction to Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s efforts to 
curtail tax avoidance); see also John Plender, Counting the Cost of Globalization: How 
Companies Keep Taxes Low and Stay Within the Law, FIN. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at 15 
(assessing the ongoing challenge faced by tax authorities in combating cross-border tax 
arbitrage); Jonathan Weisman, Patriotism Raining on Tax Paradise; Lawmakers Are 
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one in which tax authorities, legislatures, the media, and the public were 
increasingly primed to appreciate information about international 
transactions and commerce and, correspondingly, cross-border tax 
minimization, avoidance, and evasion.27 
B. Significant Leaks of Tax Data 
Since 2008, there have been several significant leaks of tax data.  We 
describe the key ones here in roughly chronological order, noting their main 
impacts on international tax law and policy.28 
1. The UBS and LGT Leaks 
Two whistleblower leaks in 2008 upended the landscape of U.S. offshore 
tax enforcement, revealing the secret foreign bank accounts used by U.S. and 
other taxpayers to hide assets offshore and evade taxes.  One arose in 
Liechtenstein, when LGT, a leading bank, was found to have actively helped 
United States clients and others evade taxes by maintaining secret 
Liechtenstein bank accounts and using other structures to disguise asset 
transfers and hide the beneficial ownership of Liechtenstein assets.29  The leak 
occurred in 2008 when Heinrich Kieber, a former employee of an LGT 
subsidiary, stole confidential bank client data concerning 1400 offshore 
  
Chafing at Firms That Exist Offshore Only on Paper, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2002, at E01 
(discussing the degree to which U.S. businesses saw “patriotism” as a constraint on their 
international tax planning). 
27. Perceptions about the role of financial institutions and big businesses in the 2008 
financial crisis may also have given rise to heightened interest in leaked information.  
28. These leaks we describe are unlikely to be the only leaks of tax data.  For example, a 2017 leak 
to the German  newspaper, Der Spiegel, contained documents and information about 
Malta companies and their shareholders and shed light on Malta’s financial service 
industry.  See Daphne Caruana Galizia, Breaking Across Europe/Malta Files: The Tidal 
Wave Has Hit the “Panama of Europe”, RUNNING COMMENTARY (May 20, 2017, 2:35 
AM), https://daphnecaruanagalizia.com/2017/05/breaking-across-europemalta-files-
tidal-wave-hit-panama-europe [https://perma.cc/PY5B-G4BV]; Malta Files, EUROPEAN 
INVESTIGATIVE COLLABORATIONS, https://eic.network/projects/malta-files [https://perma.cc/ 
TDZ3-Q8L9].  
29. See STAFF OF  PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON TAX 
HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter 2008 SENATE 
REPORT]; see also Randall Jackson, Bank Sells Trust Businesses in Wake of Tax Scandal, 
53 TAX NOTES INT’L 951, 951 (2009). For a fuller study of the UBS and LGT leaks and 
their impact on offshore tax compliance initiatives in the United States, see Oei, supra 
note 2. 
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clients and sold copies to foreign governments.30  In January 2008, following 
Germany’s purchase of the data and high profile tax investigations, the leak 
became widely known to the public.31  Other countries began investigating 
their own taxpayers,32 and in February 2008, the United States announced 
that it too was pursuing more than 100 U.S. taxpayers in connection with 
Liechtenstein accounts.33  The LGT leak led to the eventual signing of a Tax 
Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) between the United States and 
Liechtenstein in December 2008, which allowed the United States to request 
information relating to 2009 and later years.34 
The second, more significant leak involved UBS Bank in Switzerland.  Bradley 
Birkenfeld, a former UBS banker, blew the whistle by sharing information about 
UBS clients with the U.S. DOJ, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the IRS, and the U.S. Senate.35  Birkenfeld himself was arrested and charged by 
federal prosecutors on one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, 
and was ultimately sentenced to 40 months in prison.36  As a result of the 
publicity surrounding the arrest, the leak became widely known to the 
  
30. See 2008 SENATE REPORT, supra note 29, at 2; Randall Jackson, Germany Recovers 
Millions Through Liechtenstein Tax Investigations, 58 TAX NOTES INT’L 113, 113 (2010); 
Lynnley Browning, Banking Scandal Unfolds Like a Thriller, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/business/worldbusiness/15kieber.html. 
31. 2008 SENATE REPORT, supra note 29, at 2 (citing LGT press release and N.Y. Times 
report). 
32. Randall Jackson, More Tax Cheats in Doghouse Over Liechtenstein Tax Evasion, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Mar. 31, 2008 (citing investigations by the United Kingdom, 
Italy, and France).  Almost a dozen countries, including Australia, France, Italy, Spain, 
and  the United Kingdom, announced plans to investigate taxpayers with Liechtenstein 
accounts.  2008 SENATE REPORT, supra note 29, at 2. 
33. IRS News Release IR-2008-26 (Feb. 26, 2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-08-
026.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GD6-XWZD]. 
34. Joann M. Weiner, The New TIEA: A Christmas Gift to Liechtenstein, 52 TAX NOTES INT’L 831, 
832 (2008).  Liechtenstein subsequently signed Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) 
with the United Kingdom (August 2009), Germany (September 2009), France (September 
2009), the Netherlands (November 2009), Belgium (November 2009), and Sweden, Denmark, 
and Norway (all December 2010), among other countries.  See Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (TIEAs), OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/ 
taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm [https://perma.cc/C74R-6NTT]. 
35. BRADLEY C. BIRKENFELD, LUCIFER’S BANKER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW I DESTROYED 
SWISS BANK SECRECY (2016) (presenting Birkenfeld’s own account of the UBS scandal); 
William Byrnes, Background and Current Status of FATCA and CRS (Sept. 2017 
Edition), in LEXISNEXIS GUIDE TO FATCA & CRS COMPLIANCE § 1.03[1] (Tex. A&M 
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-75, 2017) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3045459; Oei, supra note 2. 
36. David D. Stewart, Former UBS Banker Sentenced to 40 Months in Prison, 124 TAX NOTES 
747 (2009); see also Motion for Sentence Reduction and Sentencing Memorandum, 
United States v. Birkenfeld, No. 08-60099-CR-ZLOCH (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2009). 
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public.37  Ironically, Birkenfeld was subsequently awarded a $104 million 
whistleblower award by the IRS.38 
While it is difficult to know exactly what information Birkenfeld shared 
with the United States, he claimed in a district court sentencing 
memorandum to have provided (1) information about UBS’s misconduct in 
conducting cross-border banking; (2) the names of bankers and offices that 
were involved; (3) data about the volume and size of customer accounts; (4) 
details about UBS’s failure to abide by the “qualified intermediary” rules; and 
(5) internal documents, emails, and memos.39 
The UBS and LGT leaks had significant consequences in the United 
States, leading to Senate hearings and the issuance of a Senate report about tax 
havens and offshore banks.40  The consequences to UBS were dramatic: On 
February 28, 2009, UBS entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) 
with the DOJ and agreed to pay $780 million to the United States,41 including 
interest and penalties, and to surrender a small number of client names.42  
Ultimately, through serving a John Doe summons and subsequent 
negotiations, the IRS and DOJ obtained the names of approximately 4000 
Americans who hid assets using UBS accounts, a small fraction of the 
52,000 names it had originally tried to obtain.43  The United States used this 
  
37. Lynnley Browning, Ex-Banker From UBS Is Indicted in Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/business/worldbusiness/14tax.html; see 
also Bradley Birkenfeld, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR., http://www.whistleblowers.org 
/meet-the-whistleblowers/934-bradley-birkenfeld [https://perma.cc/9U3U-L743]. 
38. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2012).  Birkenfeld was partially motivated by the whistleblower 
reward.  See Ken Stier, Why Is the UBS Whistle-Blower Headed to Prison?, TIME (Oct. 6, 
2009), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1928897,00.html. 
39. Motion for Sentence Reduction and Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 36, at 6. 
40. 2008 SENATE REPORT, supra note 29, at 4–14. For a fuller discussion of these 
consequences, see Oei, supra note 2. 
41. Of this amount, $380 million represented disgorgement of profits.  The remainder 
represented unpaid withholding taxes, interest, penalties, and restitution for unpaid taxes.  
See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033-CR-
COHN (S.D. Fla. 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tax/legacy/2009 
/02/19/UBS_Signed_ Deferred_Prosecution_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XUZ-46BU]. 
42. Id. at 3.  As of July 2017, UBS is set to stand trial in France for money laundering and tax 
fraud covering the period 2004 to 2012.  The anticipated trial follows failed settlement 
talks in which UBS rejected the opportunity to pay a €1.1 billion fine under a deferred 
prosecution agreement.  Reportedly, UBS objected to the amount, which was higher 
than what it had paid to the United States ($780 million), and higher than what it had 
paid to Germany in 2014 (€300 million).  Teri Sprackland, UBS to Stand Trial After 
French Settlement Talks Fail, 85 TAX NOTES INT’L 1136, 1136 (2017). 
43. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on 
the Request for Information From the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of 
America Regarding UBS AG, a Corporation Established Under the Laws of the Swiss 
Confederation, Switz.-U.S., Aug. 19, 2009, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/us-
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data to prosecute tax offenders, push others to voluntarily report their 
offshore holdings in exchange for criminal amnesty, and develop a program 
to sanction Swiss banks by entering into deferred and nonprosecution 
agreements with offending banks.44 
Perhaps most significantly, the UBS and LGT leaks ultimately led to the 
enactment of the United States’s FATCA legislation of 2010.45  They also played a 
role in shaping subsequent developments in the automatic exchange of 
information more globally (including mini-FATCAs in other countries and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Common 
Reporting Standard (CRS) and automatic exchange of information projects).  
These developments represented a sea change in cross-border transparency 
regarding American and other taxpayers’ foreign financial assets.46  As further 
discussed in Subpart III.C, FATCA now requires information reporting by both 
foreign financial institutions and U.S. taxpayers with foreign financial holdings.47 
2. The HSBC Suisse Leak 
The HSBC Suisse leak (SwissLeaks) episode is another example of a leak 
by a bank employee.  Beginning around 2006, Hervé Falciani, a computer 
systems engineer at HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) S.A. (HSBC Suisse) obtained 
  
swiss_government_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A5A-J4JL]; Order Authorizing IRS to 
File John Doe Summons, In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, No. 08-21864-MC-
LENARD/GARBER (S.D. Fla. July 1, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive 
/tax/UBS_Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAF2-NHVZ]; IRS News Release IR-2009-75 (Aug. 
19, 2009), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-09-075.pdf [https://perma.cc/58QB-BH7K]; 
UBS to Disclose Over 4,000 Client Names, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 19, 2009, 10:21 AM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/ubs-to-disclose-over-4000-client-names 
[https://perma.cc/U2CQ-7HJT]. 
44. See Lynnley Browning, Wealthy Americans Under Scrutiny in UBS Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/business/worldbusiness/06tax.html; Offshore 
Compliance Initiative, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/tax/offshore-compliance-
initiative [https://perma.cc/2E54-NYHD] (listing convictions, guilty pleas, and agreements 
entered into under the DOJ’s Swiss Bank Program for resolutions of offshore tax evasion issues 
with Swiss Banks); see also infra Subpart III.C. 
45. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010) (codified 
at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474 (2012)).  This statute is commonly referred to as “FATCA.” 
For a fuller discussion of FATCA, see Oei, supra note 2 (outlining FATCA’s provisions 
in Subpart II.A.3); Byrnes, supra note 35.  
46. See generally Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, Exporting FATCA, 142 TAX NOTES 1245, 
1246–48 (2014); Grinberg, supra note 2; Itai Grinberg, Taxing Capital Income in 
Emerging Countries: Will FATCA Open the Door?, 5 WORLD TAX J. 325, 327 (2013); 
Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. 
L. REV. 529, 530–31 (2012). 
47. See infra Subpart III.C. 
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and extracted a large quantity of client data from HSBC Suisse.  Falciani fled 
to France, and France ultimately gained possession of the information.  The 
data revealed that HSBC Suisse had helped clients conceal bank accounts 
from tax authorities, had promoted structures that enabled clients to avoid 
European Union (EU) taxes, and had allowed large cash withdrawals from 
accounts without inquiry.48 
Switzerland then requested that France extradite Falciani.  France 
instead began to investigate the data.49  In March 2015, the French financial 
state prosecutor requested that parent company HSBC Holdings PLC 
(HSBC) be tried criminally on tax evasion charges,50 and in April 2015, HSBC 
filed an appeal to have the charges dropped.51  The French Appeals Court 
rejected HSBC’s appeal in February 2016.52  French prosecutors subsequently 
indicated that HSBC should stand trial on tax evasion charges.53 
France also prosecuted some high-profile individuals, leading to an 
increase in voluntary disclosures of offshore accounts.54  Meanwhile, 
Falciani, an Italian-French dual citizen, was tried in absentia in Switzerland 
and convicted of aggravated industrial espionage in November 2015, 
though he was acquitted on charges of data theft and violating Swiss bank 
secrecy laws.55  He faces a five-year prison term if he ever returns to 
Switzerland.56 
  
48. See David Leigh et al., Cash Pilgrims and Bricks of Money: HSBC Swiss Bank Operated Like 
Cash Machine for Rich Clients, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/09/hsbc-files-swiss-bank-cash-machine-
rich-clients [https://perma.cc/9ZLF-FXVK]; David Leigh et al., HSBC Files Show How Swiss 
Bank Helped Clients Dodge Taxes and Hide Millions, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2015, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/08/hsbc-files-expose-swiss-bank-clients-
dodge-taxes-hide-millions [https://perma.cc/5B2A-KGYP] [hereinafter Leigh et al., HSBC 
Files Show]. 
49. See David Leigh et al., HSBC Files Timeline: From Swiss Bank Leak to Fallout, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 13, 2015, 8:19 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/ feb/11/hsbc-
files-timeline-from-swiss-bank-leak-to-fallout [https://perma.cc/4PEY-UAAP]. 
50. Angelique Chrisafis & Sean Farrell, HSBC’s Swiss Private Bank: French Prosecutor 
Formally Requests Trial, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2015, 7:54 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/13/hsbc-swiss-private-bank-
criminal-trial-request-france [https://perma.cc/YW7U-GQVJ]. 
51. Stephanie Soong Johnston, HSBC Loses Appeal in French Tax Evasion Probe, 81 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 486, 486 (2016). 
52. Id. 
53. Noemie Bisserbe, French Prosecutors Say HSBC Should Stand Trial for Alleged Tax 
Fraud, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2016, 8:33 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/french-
prosecutors-say-hsbc-should-stand-trial-for-alleged-tax-fraud-1478168745. 
54. Stuart Gibson, Four Pioneers in Tax Transparency, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 965, 965 (2015). 
55. William Hoke, Hervé Falciani—The SwissLeaks Whistleblower, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 972, 
972 (2015) [hereinafter Hoke, SwissLeaks]; William Hoke, Swiss Court Convicts Falciani 
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As examined more extensively in Subpart III.B, the HSBC Suisse data 
was ultimately shared with other jurisdictions and portions of it were made 
public by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), 
which then led to further dissemination.57  Many countries ultimately took 
action in one form or another against the tax evaders and the bank.58  
Switzerland itself fined HSBC for money laundering but did not file tax 
evasion charges, as tax evasion is not a crime in Switzerland.59 
Although the HSBC Suisse leak occurred in 2008, its consequences 
continue to reverberate to this day.  Subsequent data leaks, including the 
Panama Papers leak, have provided tax authorities with additional 
information about the activities of HSBC and have led to further 
investigations of the bank.60 
3. The Julius Baer Leak 
The story of the Julius Baer leak is slightly difficult to pin down, and its 
ultimate effects are rather inchoate.  Former bank employee Rudolf Elmer took 
internal bank and client documents with him when he was fired in 2002.61  Elmer 
had worked in Switzerland and later the Cayman Islands, where he was chief 
  
in HSBC Leak, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 799, 799 (2015) [hereinafter Hoke, Swiss Court 
Convicts].  
56. Simon Neville, Hervé Falciani: HSBC Tax Leaker Gets Five-Year Sentence in Absentia, 
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 28, 2015, 12:33 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news 
/business/news/herve-falciani-hsbc-tax-leaker-gets-five-year-sentence-in-absentia-
a6752401.html [https://perma.cc/DR5N-Z26C]. 
57. Margaret Burow, Secret Documents Reveal Billions Held in Swiss Accounts, 77 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 555, 555 (2015); Leigh et al., HSBC Files Show, supra note 48; see infra 
Subpart III.B.  For background on the ICIJ, see William E. Buzenberg, Anatomy of a 
Global Investigation: Collaborative, Data-Driven, Without Borders, HARV. KENNEDY 
SCH.: SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA, POL. & PUB. POL’Y (July 6, 2015, 4:30 PM), 
https://shorensteincenter.org/anatomy-of-a-global-investigation-william-buzenberg 
[https://perma.cc/NM8Q-EU68].  
58. See infra Subpart III.B.4; see, e.g., William Hoke, Belgium Accuses HSBC of Tax Fraud, 
76 TAX NOTES INT’L 652, 652 (2014); Teri Sprackland, Italian High Court Allows Use of 
Stolen HSBC Data in Tax Cases, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 998, 998 (2015).  But not all 
countries actively investigated.  See, e.g., Stephanie Soong Johnston, HSBC Not Under 
Investigation for Tax Evasion, HMRC Says, 81 TAX NOTES INT’L 230, 230 (2016); see also 
infra Subpart III.B.3.b (discussing Greece). 
59. Teri Sprackland, Geneva Prosecutor Drops HSBC Case, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 1014, 1014 
(2015). 
60. See William Hoke, HSBC Receives Worldwide Requests After Panama Papers, 83 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 496, 496–97 (2016). 
61. William Hoke, Whistleblower Elmer Guilty of Violating Swiss Bank Secrecy Law, 77 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 324, 324 (2015). 
Leak-Driven Law 551 
	
	
operating officer of the bank’s Grand Cayman office at the time he was fired.62  The 
precise nature of Elmer’s motivations is disputed: Elmer claims that he was 
crusading against tax evasion; Julius Baer instead claims that Elmer was upset over 
not receiving a promotion and about (eventually) being fired, and had leaked the 
data in retaliation. 
Elmer reportedly tried to get prosecutors and tax authorities in various 
countries to pay attention to his data but failed.63  He then posted some of 
the data to WikiLeaks in 2008,64 and also gave data to German tax 
authorities.65  The WikiLeaks posting set off a battle between WikiLeaks and 
Julius Baer: The bank initially obtained an injunction requiring the WikiLeaks 
domain registrar to disable and lock the wikileaks.org domain name.66  However, 
this was not effective in removing the data from the internet, and the judge 
subsequently dissolved the injunction.67 
The New York Times reported that Elmer had given the documents, 
which pertained to “more than 100 trusts, dozens of companies and hedge 
funds and more than 1,300 individuals, from 1997 through 2002,” to the 
IRS, a Senate subcommittee investigating tax evasion, and investigators for 
the Manhattan district attorney.68  Although the effects of Elmer’s 
disclosures are unclear, we do know that on February 4, 2016, the DOJ 
entered into a DPA with Julius Baer requiring it to pay $547 million.69  It 
also secured the guilty pleas of two Julius Baer bankers.70 
  
62. Lynnley Browning, Swiss Banker Blows Whistle on Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/business/19whistle.html; Tax Gap 
Reporting Team, Isles of Plenty, GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2009, 7:01 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/feb/13/tax-gap-cayman-islands 
[https://perma.cc/P3FE-P93T]. 
63. David D. Stewart, Julius Baer Whistleblower Ambivalent Toward Reward, 58 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 1014, 1015 (2010). 
64. See Julian Assange & Daniel Schmitt, Bank Julius Baer vs. Wikileaks, WIKILEAKS (Jan. 23, 2008), 
https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Bank_Julius_Baer_vs._Wikileaks [https://perma.cc/K5K7-HE76]. 
65. Stewart, supra note 63, at 1015. 
66. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show 
Cause re Preliminary Injuction, Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd. v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 
2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. CV08-0824 JSW), 2008 WL 538830. 
67. Id.; see also Philipp Gollner, Judge Reverses Ruling in Julius Baer Leak Case, REUTERS (Feb. 29, 
2008, 3:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-baer-idUSN2927431720080229 
[https://perma.cc/V3W6-HJLG] (detailing Judge White’s decision to reverse prior ruling). 
68. Browning, supra note 62. 
69. Criminal Charges Filed Against Bank Julius Baer of Switzerland With Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement Requiring Payment of $547 Million, as Well as Guilty Pleas of Two Julius Baer 




552 65 UCLA L. REV. 532 (2018) 
	
On January 19, 2011, Elmer was convicted by a Zurich court of 
attempted blackmail, threats to Baer employees, and breach of bank secrecy 
laws and was handed a suspended fine of CHF 7200 along with CHF 4000 of 
court costs.  Just two days earlier, on January 17, 2011, Elmer had held a press 
conference with Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, at which he turned 
over two CDs, which he claimed held data on 2000 wealthy bank clients from 
at least three different banks.71  After returning home from the first trial, 
Elmer was rearrested on charges that he had provided confidential 
information to WikiLeaks.72  However, Elmer subsequently testified in 
December 2014 that the CDs had no data on them.73  Elmer was found guilty 
of delivering Baer’s confidential financial information to WikiLeaks and 
given a suspended fine of CHF 45,000.74  In 2016, a Zurich court found him 
guilty of forgery and threatening his former employer and not guilty of 
violating Swiss bank secrecy laws.75  In short, Elmer suffered nontrivial 
personal consequences as a result of leaking the data. 
The Julius Baer data was stolen before the UBS/LGT scandals unfolded 
but the release of information to WikiLeaks and subsequent events occurred 
around the same time as or later than these other leaks.  Thus, there was a 
long time lag between the theft of the Baer data and its dissemination and 
consequences.  As one commentator notes, the Baer leak was the first leak to 
the general public (via WikiLeaks) rather than to a government agency.76  The 
  
71. Marie Sapirie, WikiLeaks Obtains Swiss Bank Account Data, 61 TAX NOTES INT’L 263, 
263 (2011). 
72. David D. Stewart, Swiss Banker Rearrested for Violating Bank Secrecy, 61 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 353, 353 (2011). 
73. William Hoke, Former Bank Employee on Trial for Violating Swiss Secrecy Law, 76 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 994, 994 (2014).  Notably, U.S. lawyers interviewed by Tax Notes warned 
U.S. clients that they might want to enter the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program 
(OVDP) in case their data had been leaked by Elmer.  See Sapirie, supra note 71, at 263–
64; see also Marie Sapirie, WikiLeaks Announcement Points to Importance of 
Whistleblowers, 130 TAX NOTES 363, 363 (2011). 
74. Hoke, supra note 61, at 324; see also Browning, supra note 62. 
75. He was found not to have violated bank secrecy laws because he was an employee of Baer’s 
Cayman subsidiary.  Matthew Allen, ‘Whistleblower’ Rudolf Elmer Given Suspended Sentence, 
SWI SWISSINFO.CH (Aug. 23, 2016, 2:28 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/breaking-
news_whistleblower-rudolf-elmer-given-suspended-sentence/42392846 
[https://perma.cc/S3NH-BJGC].  The decision is on appeal to the Swiss Federal Court.  See 
Prosecutor to Appeal Whistleblower Elmer Verdict, SWI SWISSINFO.CH (Nov. 25, 2016, 4:39 
PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/bank-secrecy_prosecutor-to-appeal-whistlerblower-
elmer-verdict/42707464 [https://perma.cc/KD7G-ZVWE]. 
76. Reflecting on the novelty of the Baer leak, Scott Michel of Caplin & Drysdale said:  
What’s extraordinary about this is that the disclosure is going to be a 
public event . . . .  Up until now, there have been private bankers who have 
provided information to the IRS, and information has come through the 
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leak’s actual effect on structural, legislative, and policy change is unclear, 
although there is some indication that Switzerland may have sought to 
tighten its bank secrecy laws in response to the leak.77 
4. The British Havens Leak 
The British Havens tax leak actually consisted of two different leaks.  The 
first was announced by the ICIJ in April 2013.78  A few years earlier, the ICIJ 
had obtained a hard drive79 containing more than 2.5 million documents 
detailing the secret offshore financial information of over 70,000 taxpayers 
and over 120,000 offshore entities in the British Virgin Islands, Singapore, the 
Cayman Islands, and the Cook Islands.80  This data had come from the files of 
two offshore service providers: Singapore-based Portcullis TrustNet and 
British Virgin Islands-based Commonwealth Trust Ltd.81  The ICIJ then 
  
voluntary disclosure program, but all of that has been conducted in a 
confidential environment. 
 Sapirie, supra note 71, at 264. 
77. In September 2014, the Swiss parliament considered a bill that would impose greater 
restrictions on whistleblowers.  Tom Miles, Switzerland Prepares to Tighten Screws on 
Whistleblowers, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2014, 11:03 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/ 
switzerland-whistleblower-idINL6N0RK4JG20140919 [https://perma.cc/A74W-YZSM].  
The subsequent May, however, the Swiss National Council “referred the draft . . . back 
to the Federal Council for revision” seeking more protections for whistleblowers.  
Yasmine Motarjemi & Alison Glick, Switzerland Could Now Lead the World on 
Whistleblowing Rules, LE NEWS (May 15, 2015), http://lenews.ch/2015/05/15/ 
switzerland-could-now-lead-the-world-on-whistleblowing-rules [https://perma.cc/NZ 
B8-VSWP]; see also Whistleblowing in Switzerland: Rough Terrain, ECONOMIST (Dec. 5, 
2015), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21679456-two-court-cases-illustrate-
struggles-employees-who-allege-wrongdoing-rough-terrain [https://perma.cc/4FYN-
BEAQ] (describing the “meandering” path of proposed whistleblower legislation). 
78. See Duncan Campbell, How ICIJ’s Project Team Analyzed the Offshore Files, INT’L 
CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2013, 7:00 PM), https://www.icij.org 
/offshore/how-icijs-project-team-analyzed-offshore-files [https://perma.cc/9GSG-F79U]. 
79. Mysterious Mail to Australian Journalist Triggers Global Tax Haven Expose, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-
business/mysterious-mail-to-australian-journalist-triggers-global-tax-haven-expose-
20130404-2hak3.html [https://perma.cc/T5ND-G5CN].  The hard drive had been sent 
to Australian reporter, Gerard Ryle, before he became ICIJ director in 2011.  Ryle 
attempted to work with the data but technical difficulties impeded his access.  Upon 
joining the ICIJ, he organized a group of over 80 journalists from various countries, 
which spent 15 months investigating the data.  Id. 
80. Cockfield, supra note 10, at 484–85; Campbell, supra note 78. 
81. Cockfield, supra note 10, at 519; Arthur J. Cockfield, Breaking Bad: What Does the First 
Major Tax Haven Leak Tell Us?, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 691, 692 (2016). 
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released a database containing information about the ownership of over 
100,000 offshore tax haven entities and trusts.82 
The second leak occurred in July 2014, when the records of 20,000 
individuals from the files of the Jersey Channel Islands branch of Kleinwort 
Benson, a London private banking and wealth management firm, were leaked 
to the ICIJ.83  ICIJ allowed The Guardian to analyze the names of the clients, 
and The Guardian then published a series of articles detailing the identities of 
several prominent celebrities, politicians, British political donors, and other 
elites with offshore dealings whose names had appeared in the Jersey files.84 
The ICIJ also compiled a list of “impacts and responses” stemming from 
these leaks.  The list includes: new commitments by Europe and the OECD to 
crack down on offshore tax evasion and undertake automatic information 
exchange of tax data (potentially ending bank secrecy); actions by tax authorities 
of various countries to investigate and punish offshore tax violations and 
challenge offshore havens; and new pushes for public registries of individual 
beneficial owners of offshore companies and trusts.85 
  
82. Guevara, supra note 9. 
83. Michael Hennigan, More Than 20,000 Client Names of Jersey Tax Haven Bank Leaked, 
FINFACTS IR. (July 9, 2014, 8:02 AM), http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/ 
article_1027927.shtml [https://perma.cc/2A5H-L8RU]. 
84. See David Leigh, Offshore Secrets of the UK’s Wealthy Political Donors, GUARDIAN (July 
8, 2014, 3:44 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jul/08/offshore-secrets-
wealthy-political-donors [https://perma.cc/BB9W-NKTS]; David Leigh, James Ball & 
Leila Haddou, Offshore Tax Dealings: Celebrities and Sportsmen in Leaked Jersey Files, 
GUARDIAN (July 9, 2014, 10:46 AM) https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/jul/09/offshore-tax-dealings-celebrities-sportsmen-leaked-jersey-files 
[https://perma.cc/C6MC-ME7P]; David Leigh, James Ball & Leila Haddou, Top Tory 
Has Family Link With Offshore Banker Who Gave Party £800,000, GUARDIAN (July 8, 
2014, 3:47 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jul/08/andrea-leadsom-
family-links-offshore-bank-donations-tories [https://perma.cc/VQ6V-JC6F]; David 
Leigh, Tycoons Bruce Gyngell and Edward Lumley Set Up Offshore Tax Empires, 
GUARDIAN (July 10, 2014, 8:10 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014 
/jul/11/tycoons-bruce-gyngell-and-edward-lumley-set-up-offshore-tax-empires 
[https://perma.cc/Y53S-93D2]. 
85. See Kimberley Porteous et al.,  Release of Offshore Records Draws Worldwide Response, INT’L 
CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 5, 2013), https://www.icij.org 
/blog/2013/04/release-offshore-records-draws-worldwide-response [https://perma.cc/9VX8-
KM9K]; see also Authorities Announce Tax Haven Investigation, INT’L CONSORTIUM 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (May 9, 2013), https://www.icij.org/blog/2013/05 /authorities-
announce-tax-haven-investigation [https://perma.cc/WC4M-5V62] (reporting U.S., U.K., and 
Australian tax authorities’ announcements of tax haven investigations based on leaked 
documents). 




The Luxembourg tax leak (LuxLeaks) scandal also occurred due to an 
employee whistleblower.86  However, unlike the other leaks, LuxLeaks 
concerned corporate tax avoidance using cross-border tax structuring, rather 
than individual evasion, and illuminated the actions of a nation 
(Luxembourg), rather than of private actors. 
In October 2010, Antoine Deltour, a French citizen and 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers employee, copied a set of Luxembourg tax rulings 
(covering 2008–2010) from PwC computers upon quitting his job.87  The theft 
was first publicized by French journalist Edouard Perrin in a TV 
documentary aired in 2012.88  However, the full impact of the scandal was not 
felt until the ICIJ, working with Perrin, published a set of about 500 
Luxembourg tax rulings regarding more than 300 multinational enterprise 
(MNE) taxpayers in November 2014.89 
The leaked material exposed the tax rulings practices of Luxembourg 
and highlighted the country’s role in facilitating the tax avoidance and 
minimization strategies of MNEs worldwide.90  As a result of the leak, the 
European Commission (EC) focused its attention on the rulings practices of 
Luxembourg and other member states.91  In October 2015, EU member states 
unanimously agreed to automatically exchange information on cross-border 
tax rulings every six months.92  Relatedly, in June 2015, the EC launched a 
  
86. Marian, supra note 10, at 6. 
87. Teri Sprackland, Antoine Deltour—The LuxLeaks Whistleblower, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 
967, 967–68 (2015). 
88. Teri Sprackland, French Journalist Charged With Theft for Role in LuxLeaks, 78 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 351, 351 (2015). 
89. See Luxembourg Leaks: Global Companies’ Secrets Exposed, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE 
JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks [https://perma.cc/TR4R-J6AX].  
Raphael Halet, another PwC employee, stole a smaller cache of documents from PwC 
(sixteen corporate tax returns), which were obtained by Perrin.  See Marian, supra note 
10, at 8; Simon Marks, The Silent Man of LuxLeaks Fights Back, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2016, 
6:07 PM), http://www.politico.eu/article/silent-man-of-luxleaks-fights-back-raphael-
halet [https://perma.cc/ZW77-PT8J]. 
90. Marian, supra note 10, at 6. 
91. European Comm’n Press Release IP/15/4610, Combatting Corp. Tax Avoidance: Comm’n 
Presents Tax Transparency Package (Mar. 18, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
15-4610_en.htm [https://perma.cc/P523-3HCR].  This council directive took effect in January 
2016.  Id. 
92. European Comm’n Press Release IP/15/5780, Tax Transparency: Comm’n Welcomes 
Agreement Reached by Member States on the Automatic Exch. of Info. on Tax Rulings 
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5780_en.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
P4UA-UPVZ].  There have also been bilateral agreements between states—for example, 
556 65 UCLA L. REV. 532 (2018) 
	
consultation on corporate tax transparency, examining whether requiring 
MNEs to disclose more information about taxes paid (via public, country-by-
country reporting (CbC) and/or public disclosure of tax rulings) would 
reduce tax avoidance and aggressive tax structuring by MNEs.93 
Parallel developments emerged in the European Parliament.  During 
2015, the European Parliament created two special committees on tax rulings 
(TAXE 1 and TAXE 2) charged with investigating rulings practices.94  In their 
respective reports, the committees recommended heightened tax 
transparency, a common EU-wide corporate tax base,95 proportional 
financial liability for financial institutions that facilitate tax haven 
transactions, creation of a beneficial ownership register, and a proposed 
framework for whistleblower protection.96  In July 2015, the Members of the 
European Parliament voted in favor of a directive requiring CbC reporting of 
taxes paid.97  Two years later, in July 2017, the European Parliament adopted a 
  
between Germany and the Netherlands.  Teri Sprackland, Germany, Netherlands Agree to 
Share Tax Rulings, 79 TAX NOTES INT’L 203, 204 (2015). 
93. European Comm’n Press Release IP/15/5156, Comm’n Launches Pub. Consultation on Corp. 
Tax Transparency (June 17, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5156_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/FLB9-42YU]; Public Consultation on Further Corporate Tax Transparency, 
EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/further-corporate-tax-
transparency/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/KD5F-TYUZ] (last updated Jan. 18, 2017); see 
also Teri Sprackland, European Parliament Backs CbC Reporting Measure, 79 TAX NOTES INT’L 
117, 117 (2015). 
94. See Decision on Setting-up of a Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar 
in Nature or Effect (TAXE 2), EUR. PARL. DOC. (B8-1335/2015) (2015),  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-
0420+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN [https://perma.cc/RM5H-RNX3]; Marian, 
supra note 10, at 6; Teri Sprackland, Finance Minister Defends Country Before EU Tax Panel, 78 
TAX NOTES INT’L 717, 717 (2015); see also Latest News, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Dec. 18, 2015, 1:29 
PM), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/taxe/home.html [https://perma.cc/FC4U-
4DRB]; Latest News, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Sept. 11, 2016, 9:07 AM), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/tax2/home.html [https://perma.cc/52KG-
YML6]. 
95. See Alexander Lewis, MEPs Seek Legislation on TAXE Committee Recommendations, 80 
TAX NOTES INT’L 805 (2015); see also Resolution of 25 November 2015 on Tax Rulings 
and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect, EUR. PAR. DOC. (A8-0317/2015) (2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+ P8-TA-
2015-0408+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN [https://perma.cc/ZP59-U6DD].  The 
final report was approved by the European Parliament.  Id. 
96. Resolution of 6 July 2016 on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect, EUR. 
PARL. DOC. (A8-0223/2016) (2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0310+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN 
[https://perma.cc/CG5G-ZMUG].  Like those of the TAXE 1 committee, the TAXE 2 
recommendations were in response to LuxLeaks and also to the subsequent Panama Papers 
leak.  Id. (referencing LuxLeaks and Panama Papers as background). 
97. Sprackland, supra note 93. 
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position in favor of public CbC reporting for large corporations.98  The 
LuxLeaks scandal has been identified as a factor in creating support for the 
CbC requirements99 and inspiring the hope that transparency will lessen 
reliance on leaks for enforcement.100 
Substantive developments aside, the LuxLeaks scandal created 
consequences for specific taxpayers and other actors.  The leak raised 
uncomfortable questions for Jean-Claude Juncker, the EC President, who was 
Luxembourg’s finance minister during the period the rulings were issued.101  
There were also consequences for the whistleblowers.  In December 2014, 
Luxembourg charged Deltour with theft, breach of confidentiality, trade 
secrets violation, and fraudulent access to automated data processing systems.  
The journalist Perrin was charged in April 2015 for theft, complicity in theft, 
whitewashing (laundering), and accessing protected databases.102  Raphael 
Halet, another PwC employee who had stolen a smaller set of PwC 
documents, was charged as well.  Perrin was eventually acquitted while 
Deltour and Halet received 12- and 9-month suspended sentences and were 
fined €1500 and €1000 respectively.103  Upon appeal, Deltour and Halet had 
their sentences reduced to six and zero months, respectively, and Perrin’s 
acquittal was affirmed.104  In January 2018, Luxembourg’s highest court 
  
98. Elodie Lamer, European Parliament Establishes Position on Public CbC Reporting, 87 
TAX NOTES INT’L 113, 113 (2017).  The proposal, which envisions an exemption period 
for commercially sensitive information, would require covered companies to publicly 
disclose number of employees, net turnover, stated capital, profit/loss before income 
tax, income tax paid, accumulated earnings, and “potential preferential tax treatment” 
from which they may benefit.  Id. 
99. Stephanie Soong Johnston, EU Parliamentary Committee Backs CbC Reporting Measure, 
78 TAX NOTES INT’L 525, 525–26 (2015) (quoting a Jones Day Brussels lawyer). 
100. See European Parliament Committee Sets the Tone for Europe’s Debate on Multinational 
Transparency, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (May 7, 2015), http://www.transparency.org/news 
/pressrelease/european_parliament_committee_sets_the_tone_for_europes_debate_on_
multinati [https://perma.cc/F2KZ-A35T] (“Up until now, we’ve had to rely on leaks, 
whistleblowers, and secret documents to learn if a multinational is engaging in aggressive 
tax planning and profit shifting . . . .  But today’s vote brings the transparency Europe 
needs closer to reality.”). 
101. See, e.g., Stuart Gibson, The Luxembourg Fox in the European Henhouse, 85 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 123, 123 (2017) (discussing potential erosion of support for Juncker); Teri 
Sprackland, Leaked Docs Show Juncker Obstructed EU Tax Reforms, 85 TAX NOTES INT’L 
137, 137 (2017) (describing renewed allegations faced by Juncker); see also Marian, 
supra note 10, at 6–8, 53 (despite defending its role, Luxembourg ultimately revised its 
rulings process). 
102. Sprackland, supra note 88. 
103. Teri Sprackland, Luxembourg Prosecutor Requests Retrial in LuxLeaks Case, 83 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 483, 483–84 (2016). 
104. Will Fitzgibbon, LuxLeaks Trial Continues as Whistleblowers Fight Conviction, INT’L 
CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Dec. 22, 2016, 12:30 PM), 
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overturned Deltour’s sentence and fine, and ordered a new trial.105  These 
events have led Members of the European Parliament, as well as journalists 
and other commentators, to push for more whistleblower protections.106  The 
European Parliament awarded Deltour its European Citizen Award in 
2015.107  Thus, like the reactions of Switzerland and France to the HSBC leak, 
and the United States and Switzerland to the UBS leak, the reactions of 
Luxembourg and the European Parliament reflect competing perspectives on 
the desirability of leaks.108 
6. The Panama Papers 
Unlike the leaks previously described, the Panama Papers episode 
originated not from an employee whistleblower but from an anonymous data 
source.109  In 2014, that source contacted and gave the data to Bastian 
Obermayer, a journalist at German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung.110  
  
https://www.icij.org/blog/2016/12/luxleaks-trial-continues-whistleblowers-fight-
conviction [https://perma.cc/895F-KJ62]; Pierre Sorlut, LuxLeaks Whistleblowers Get 
Reduced Sentences on Appeal, LUXEMBURGER WORT (Mar. 15, 2017, 3:31 PM), 
https://www.wort.lu/en/luxembourg/luxembourg-court-luxleaks-whistleblowers-get-
reduced-sentences-on-appeal-58c95045a5e74263e13ac089 [https://perma.cc/3PPC-
CRD2].  Deltour and Halet still had to pay the monetary fines.  Id. 
105. Teri Sprackland, LuxLeaks Whistleblower Wins Appeal, Retrial Ordered, 89 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 224 (2018). 
106. Stephanie Soong Johnston, EU Lawmakers Push for More Tax Whistleblower Protection, 
78 TAX NOTES INT’L 437, 437–38 (2015); Stephanie Soong Johnston, EU Must Protect 
Whistleblowers, Say LuxLeaks Journalists, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 592, 592–93 (2015); David 
Pegg, MEPs Offer Support to Convicted LuxLeaks Whistleblowers, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 
2016, 12:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/sep/08/ meps-support-
convicted-luxleaks-whistleblowers-luxembourg [https://perma.cc/WFX9-6EDG]; Teri 
Sprackland, European Parliament Votes for EU-Wide Whistleblower Protection, 85 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 706, 706–07 (2017). 
107. Sprackland, supra note 87, at 967. 
108. In July 2017, Luxembourg (and Belgium) expressed opposition to a European 
Commission (EC) proposal to require that financial intermediaries disclosure certain 
tax planning schemes.  Elodie Lamer, Moscovici Lashes Out at Belgium, Luxembourg for 
Resisting Transparency, 87 TAX NOTES INT’L 200, 200 (2017).  Interestingly, the EC 
president at this time is none other than Jean-Claude Juncker, who was president of 
Luxembourg during the period of the LuxLeaks transactions.  Miles Dean, Juncker Plans 
New Tax Transparency Rules From January 2019, BLOOMBERG BNA, TAX PLANNING 
INT’L: EUR. TAX SERV., June 2017, at 2, 3. 
109. See William Hoke, ‘John Doe’ Explains Reasons for Leaking Panama Papers, 151 TAX 
NOTES 832, 832 (2016). 
110. Paul Farhi, ‘Hello.  This Is John Doe’: The Mysterious Message That Launched the Panama 
Papers, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/hello-this-
is-john-doe-the-mysterious-message-that-launched-the-panama-papers/2016/04/06/59305838-
fc0c-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html?utm_term=.4b01c166004d [https://perma.cc/75B7-
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Süddeutsche Zeitung in turn sought the assistance of the ICIJ and other news 
organizations in analyzing the data.111  The ICIJ announced the leak on April 
3, 2016 and released a database of names and entities implicated on May 9, 
2016.112  According to the ICIJ, more than 370 journalists from 76 countries 
reviewed and organized the data before it was released.113 
The leaked data, comprising 11.5 million records, covered almost 40 
years of data and records from Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca 
(spanning 1977–2015).114  More than 214,000 offshore entities were identified 
with connections to individuals in over 200 countries and territories.115  
Several major banks have been implicated as working with Mossack Fonseca 
in creating these offshore entities, including HSBC, UBS, Credit Suisse, and 
Deutsche Bank.116  The Panama leak implicated many elites, including 140 
  
GSAQ]; see Alex Spence, Journalist at Center of Panama Leaks: ‘Nobody Hiding Offshore is 
Safe’, POLITICO (Apr. 5, 2016, 12:17 PM), http://www.politico.eu/blogs/on-
media/2016/04/journalist-at-center-of-panama-leaks-nobody-hiding-offshore-is-safe 
[https://perma.cc/Y54C-R44E]; see also BASTIAN OBERMAYER & FREDERIK OBERMAIER, THE 
PANAMA PAPERS: BREAKING THE STORY OF HOW THE RICH & POWERFUL HIDE THEIR MONEY 33 
(2016) (profiling the journalists’ first-hand account of the Panama Papers investigation). 
111. Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption, 
INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2016), 
https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-panama-papers-global-overview.html 
[https://perma.cc/8JDM-5MBZ] [hereinafter Giant Leak]. 
112. See Offshore Leaks Database, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, 
https://offshoreleaks.icij.org [https://perma.cc/4AS5-4TL8]. 
113. Giant Leak, supra note 111; see also About This Project, INT’L CONSORTIUM 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2016), https://panamapapers.icij.org/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/WVP7-MJKG] (providing the names of journalists and their home 
countries). 
114. Giant Leak, supra note 111; About This Project, supra note 113. In the aftermath of the 
Panama Papers, Mossack Fonseca has announced that it will shut down. Will 
Fitzgibbon, Panama Papers Law Firm Mossack Fonseca Closes its Doors, INT’L 
CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.icij.org 
/investigations/panama-papers/panama-papers-law-firm-mossack-fonseca-closes-
doors/.   
115. Giant Leak, supra note 111; About This Project, supra note 113; see also William Hoke & 
Stephanie Soong Johnston, Panama Papers Expose Thousands of Offshore Accounts, 82 
TAX NOTES INT’L 103, 103 (2016) (describing the widespread global impact of the 
Panama Papers).  The leak revealed bank accounts and entities in 21 offshore 
jurisdictions.  Giant Leak, supra note 111. 
116. For example:  
[M]ore than 500 banks, their subsidiaries and branches have worked with Mossack 
Fonseca since the 1970s to help clients manage offshore companies. . . .  In all, the 
files indicate Mossack Fonseca worked with more than 14,000 banks, law firms, 
company incorporators and other middlemen to set up companies, foundations 
and trusts for customers, the records show. 
 Giant Leak, supra note 111; see also, e.g., Hamish Boland-Rudder & Martha M. Hamilton, NY 
Regulator Demands Details of Banks’ Panama Dealings, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE 
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politicians and public officials.117  For example, it revealed links between 
offshore entities and the families of the Chinese and Ukrainian Presidents, Xi 
Jinping and Petro Poroshenko, and the U.K. and Pakistani Prime Ministers, 
David Cameron and Nawaz Sharif.118  It illuminated the offshore holdings 
and transactions of individual and business associates of Vladimir Putin, the 
Russian president.119  The leak also revealed the Argentine President, 
Mauricio Macri, as a director and vice president of a Bahamas company and 
the Icelandic Prime Minister, Sigmundur Davio Gunnlaugsson, as owner of 
an undeclared offshore entity holding $4 million in bonds.120 
Although the Panama leak occurred relatively recently, already we are 
seeing divergent responses.121  Australia, France, the Netherlands, Canada, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Indonesia, Denmark, 
Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, and Thailand have announced 
their intention to investigate or have begun investigating.122  In Iceland, Prime 
Minister Gunnlaugsson resigned in the face of post-leak pressure.123  The 
Prime Minister of Pakistan’s family came under investigation by the Joint 
Investigation Team under the authority of the Supreme Court of Pakistan for 
  
JOURNALISTS (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.icij.org/blog/2016/04/ny-regulator-demands-
details-banks-panama-dealings [https://perma.cc/22NN-EDH5] (noting investigation by the 
New York Department of Financial Services and data requests directed at various banks, 
including Deutsche Bank AG). 
117. Giant Leak, supra note 111; see also Offshore Links of More than 140 Politicians and 
Officials Exposed, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2016), 
https://www.icij.org/blog/2016/04/offshore-links-more-140-politicians-and-officials-
exposed/.   
118. See Hoke & Johnston, supra note 115, at 103–04; see also Panama Papers: Pakistan PM 
Nawaz Sharif to Face Investigators, BBC NEWS (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.bbc.com 
/news/world-asia-36092356 [https://perma.cc/WZH7-GPNN]. 
119. Hoke & Johnston, supra note 115. 
120. Id. at 104; Alexander Lewis, Iceland’s Prime Minister Won’t Resign Over Panama Papers, 
82 TAX NOTES INT’L 107, 107 (2016). 
121. See Ryan Finley, Governments’ Reactions to Panama Papers Vary Widely, 82 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 110, 110–11 (2016); see also PETRUS MARAIS & TERRY PESCE, KPMG, THE PANAMA 
PAPERS: A KPMG SURVEY OF INITIAL RESPONSES BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2016), 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/10/the-panama-papers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7F8P-QUP6]. 
122. See Stuart Gibson, Unleashing a Panamanian Tsunami, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 101, 101 
(2016); Ariel S. Greenblum, The Panama Papers Underscore Need for Transparency, 151 
TAX NOTES 133, 133 (2016); William Hoke, Canada Gains Access to Thousands of 
Panama Papers Files, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 621, 621 (2016); Stephanie Soong Johnston, 
Danish Tax Authority to Purchase Leaked Panama Papers Data, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 924, 
924 (2016). 
123. Steven Erlanger, Stephen Castle & Rick Gladstone, Iceland’s Prime Minister Steps Down 
Amid Panama Papers Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/europe/panama-papers-iceland.html?_r=0. 
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undisclosed offshore assets and money laundering.124  France has added 
Panama back to its list of tax havens, having removed it in 2012.125  The 
European Parliament has set up an inquiry committee charged with 
investigating whether there have been violations of EU law and what 
legislative solutions to recommend.126  The committee made 
recommendations, which were ultimately adopted by the EU Parliament.127 
Meanwhile, China has begun censorship of internet mentions of its elites 
implicated in the leak, while Russia has denied wrongdoing by Putin’s 
associates.128  Panama itself has gone on the defensive but has also taken steps 
in the direction of tax transparency, for example by signing the Multilateral 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and 
agreeing to commit to the OECD’s common reporting standard on 
information exchange.129  Panama convened a commission to review the 
  
124. F.M. Shakil, D-Day for Sharif Family: Report Due on Money Laundering, ASIA TIMES 
(July 8, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://www.atimes.com/article/d-day-sharif-family-report-
due-money-laundering.  In July 2017, Prime Minister Sharif resigned after the Supreme 
Court disqualified him from office.  See, e.g., Salman Masood, Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan’s 
Prime Minister, Is Toppled by Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/world/asia/pakistan-prime-minister-nawaz-
sharif-removed.html; Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif Resigns After Panama Papers Verdict, 
BBC NEWS (July 28, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40750671 
[https://perma.cc/G39N-AGNW]. Sharif was subsequently indicted by an anti-
corruption court. Martha M. Hamilton, Former Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif, Family 
Members Indicted, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/former-pakistan-pm-nawaz-sharif-
family-members-indicted/.  
125. William Hoke, France Reinstates Panama to List of Noncooperative Countries, 82 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 104, 104 (2016). 
126. 2016 O.J. (L 166) 10. 
127. MEPs Back Sweeping Recommendations of Special Inquiry into Tax Crimes, EUR. 
PARLIAMENT (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20171207IPR89759/meps-back-sweeping-recommendations-of-special-inquiry-
into-tax-crimes. With respect to the work of the committee, see generally Amanda 
Athanasiou, EU’s Panama Papers Committee Seeks Input on Draft Report, WORLDWIDE 
TAX DAILY, July 18, 2017 (describing the “year-long” investigation of the committee and 
its resulting draft report); Teri Sprackland, Panama Papers Panel Concludes Contentious 
Interviews in Malta, 85 TAX NOTES INT’L 790 (2017) (reporting on European Parliament 
Panama Papers panel’s closed-door meeting in Malta); Teri Sprackland, Panama Papers 
Panel Gets Limited Response From Member States, 85 TAX NOTES INT’L 705 (2017) 
(describing the continuing efforts of the European Parliament’s Committee of Inquiry 
into Money Laundering, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion to secure information from 
member states).  
128. See Finley, supra note 121, at 111; Gibson, supra note 122. 
129. Stephanie Soong Johnston, Panama Commits to OECD Standard on Information 
Exchange, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 616, 616 (2016) [hereinafter Johnston, OECD Standard]; 
Stephanie Soong Johnston, Panama Takes Another Step on Tax Transparency, 83 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 278, 278 (2016). 
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transparency of its financial and legal system;130 the commission issued its 
final report and recommendations in November 2016.131 
Substantively, the Panama leak has also focused attention on the 
importance of transparency regarding beneficial ownership of offshore 
entities.132  Various countries have turned their attention to these issues, with 
some (such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Ireland) announcing steps to register the beneficial ownership of offshore 
trusts and other entities.133  Within the United States, the leak has drawn 
attention to Wyoming and Nevada, which do not require disclosure of a 
corporation’s beneficial ownership and therefore raise questions about the 
United States’s potential status as a tax haven.134  The G-5 countries have 
agreed in the leak’s wake to develop a global multilateral system for automatic 
exchange of beneficial ownership information.  In 2016, the EC adopted a 
proposal for full public access to beneficial ownership registries for certain 
legal entities.135  The EC announced proposals for and ultimately reached 
agreement on new transparency rules aimed at intermediaries (such as tax 
  
130. William Hoke, Commission Tells Panama to Beef up Transparency Measures, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Nov. 28, 2016, 2016 WTD 228-5 (LEXIS). 
131. ALBERTO ALEMÁN ZUBIETA ET AL., COMM. OF INDEP. EXPERTS, FINAL REPORT (2016), 
https://www.presidencia.gob.pa/tmp/file/1503/INDEPENDENT%20EXPERT%20COM
MITTEE.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV2P-CQNV]. 
132. See J.P. Finet & William Hoke, Obama Addresses Tax Avoidance by Targeting Shell Companies, 
151 TAX NOTES 834, 835 (2016); cf. Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Disclosure of 
Beneficial Ownership After the Panama Papers (Lex Res. Topics in Corp. L. & Econ, Working 
Paper No. 2016-3, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2777152 
[https://perma.cc/UZ5G-KVKB] (discussing disclosure of beneficial ownership after the 
Panama Papers). 
133. See William Hoke, Government to Review Trust Disclosures, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 242 
(2016); Stephanie Soong Johnston, More Countries Commit to Public Beneficial 
Ownership Registries, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 649 (2016); Stephanie Soong Johnston, South 
Africa Commits to Public Beneficial Ownership Registry, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 653 (2016); 
Alexander Lewis, Independent Inquiry Urges Foreign Trust Disclosure Rules Update, 83 
TAX NOTES INT’L 34 (2016); Alexander Lewis, U.K. Setting up Panama Papers Task 
Force, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 249 (2016); Teri Sprackland, German Transparency Registry 
Proposal Derided as ‘Joke’, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 154 (2016). 
134. Amy Hamilton, Panama Papers Include Nevada and Wyoming Among Tax Havens, 82 
TAX NOTES INT’L 114, 114–15 (2016); see also Jonathan Curry & Kat Lucero, Wyden Asks 
Nevada, Wyoming to Turn Over Shell Company Info, 151 TAX NOTES 836 (2016) 
(describing the efforts of U.S. Senate Finance Committee ranking minority member 
Senator Wyden to secure information from the secretaries of state of Nevada and 
Wyoming regarding businesses with links to the Panama law firm Mossack Fonseca & 
Co.). 
135. Stephanie Soong Johnston, Netherlands to Propose Public Beneficial Ownership Registry 
in Autumn, 87 TAX NOTES INT’L 214, 214–15 (2017); Alexander Lewis, EU Adopts Public 
Registries of Beneficial Ownership Information, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 100, 100 (2016). 
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advisors, accountants, and lawyers) that require them to report potentially 
aggressive tax planning schemes they design and promote.136  The EC 
identified “recent media leaks such as the Panama Papers” as drivers behind 
these suggested reforms. 
7. The Bahamas Leak 
In September 2016, several months after the Panama Papers leak, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung received a cache of 1.3 million files from the Bahamas 
corporate registry and shared it with the ICIJ.137  Süddeutsche Zeitung, the 
ICIJ, and other news organizations then published the details on the ICIJ 
website, thereby making publicly available a database of offshore 
companies.138  The database included the names of directors and owners of 
more than 175,000 companies, trusts, and foundations that were registered 
in the Bahamas between 1990 and early 2016.139  Like the British Havens 
leaks, the Bahamas leak contained information about the activities of 
politicians and other elites. 
The ICIJ combined the Bahamas data with data from the Panama Papers 
and BVI leaks to create “one of the largest public databases of offshore entities 
in history.”140  While not all the entities in the Bahamas database are involved 
in illegal conduct, the ICIJ and other news sources appear to view their 
mission as the elimination of offshore financial and corporate secrecy 
regardless of actual wrongdoing.141 
  
136. Dean, supra note 108, at 2–3 (internal quotations omitted); Corporate Tax Avoidance: 
Agreement Reached on Tax Intermediaries, EUR. COUNCIL, COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION 
(Mar. 13, 2018, 12:00 PM), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2018/03/13/corporate-tax-avoidance-agreement-reached-on-tax-
intermediaries/. 
137. Bahamas Files: New Leak Exposes Offshore ‘Tax Haven’ Dealings of Politicians, 
Companies, RT NEWS (Sept. 23, 2016, 1:49 PM), https://www.rt.com/news/360217-
bahamas-files-offshore-leak [https://perma.cc/ZPY7-WYY5]; Juliette Garside, Bahamas 
Files Leaks Expose Politicians’ Offshore Links, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2016, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/sep/21/leaked-bahamas-files-expose-
politicians-offshore-links [https://perma.cc/58JB-PBGP]. 
138. Will Fitzgibbon, ICIJ Publishes Leaked Bahamas Info to Offshore Database, INT’L 





141. Id. (“There is much evidence to suggest that where you have secrecy in the offshore 
world you have the potential for wrong doing.  So let’s eliminate the secrecy.”); Offshore 
Leaks Database—About, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, 
https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/pages/about [https://perma.cc/MH8B-7NN4] (presenting 
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The Bahamas leak has triggered strong reactions.  The European 
Parliament has advocated sanctions against the Bahamas along with close 
examination of tax havens and those who use them.142  In particular, the EC 
and members of the European Parliament have called for scrutiny and 
sanctions of politicians linked to offshore havens, such as Neelie Kroes, a 
former Dutch minister and Europe’s former commissioner for 
competition.143  Some members of the European Parliament have urged 
authorities to act more forcefully to end offshore corporate secrecy.144  The 
OECD has expressed concern that the Bahamas would not be able to meet its 
commitments to information exchange under the common reporting 
standard.145  Meanwhile, Bahamian officials have defended their country and 
denounced the leaks, while also launching a review of Bahamas’s tax policies 
and data security.146  Other countries, including Mexico, have expressed an 
intention to investigate taxpayers linked to Bahamian entities.147 
8. The Paradise Papers 
The most recent release of leaked data occurred in November 2017.  This 
“Paradise Papers” leak comprised 13.4 million documents covering the years 
  
a disclaimer noting that there are legal uses for offshore entities and that inclusion of 
individuals or entities in the ICIJ database is not a suggestion of wrongoing); see also 
infra Subpart III.A (discussing some of the agendas and priorities embraced by these 
press actors). 
142. Will Fitzgibbon & Emilia Díaz-Struck, Bahamas Leaks Prompts Swift Reaction, Outrage 
in Europe, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Sept. 22, 2016, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.icij.org/blog/2016/09/bahamas-leaks-prompts-swift-reaction-outrage-
europe [https://perma.cc/N3HW-859E]; Will Fitzgibbon & Cecile S. Gallego, ‘There Is a 
Need for Action’: Europe Debates Bahamas Leaks, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE 
JOURNALISTS (Oct. 7, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.icij.org/blog/2016/10/there-need-
action-europe-debates-bahamas-leaks [https://perma.cc/V6KP-XUUJ]. 
143. Fitzgibbon & Díaz-Struck, supra note 142.  Kroes was discovered to have been listed as a 
director of Mint Holdings, a Bahamas registered entity from 2000 to 2009.  Kroes 
claimed that she failed to declare her directorship because the company was never 
operational.  Juliette Garside, Ex-EU Commissioner Neelie Kroes Failed to Declare 
Directorship of Offshore Firm, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2016, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/sep/21/ex-eu-commissioner-neelie-kroes-
failed-to-declare-directorship-of-offshore-firm [https://perma.cc/SHD4-QA3B]. 
144. See Fitzgibbon & Gallego, supra note 142. 
145. Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD Concerned About the Bahamas on Information 
Exchange, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 1127, 1127 (2016). 
146. Fitzgibbon & Gallego, supra note 142. 
147. Fitzgibbon & Díaz-Struck, supra note 142; William Hoke, Mexico to Investigate 
Taxpayers Included in Bahamas Leaks, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 1118, 1118 (2016). 
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1950–2016.148  The bulk of the documents (approximately 6.8 million) came 
from Appleby, an offshore law firm founded in Bermuda.149  An additional 6 
million documents were from corporate registries in about 19 jurisdictions, 
mostly in the Caribbean.150  The remaining documents came from Asiaciti 
Trust, a Singapore-based trust and corporate service provider.  The 
documents were received by German newspaper Süddeustche Zeitung from 
an unknown source, and Appleby has suggested that the data was obtained 
through a hack.151 
As with the earlier Panama Papers leak, Süddeustche Zeitung sought the 
assistance of the ICIJ in reviewing, organizing and ultimately publishing a portion 
of the data.152  The leak was first announced on November 5, 2017 by the ICIJ153 
and was disseminated through a series of news articles prepared by ICIJ and its 
media partners highlighting specific stories drawn from the data.154  
Approximately two weeks later, on November 17, 2017, the ICIJ issued the 
first public release of the Paradise Papers data.155 
The Paradise Papers data has revealed information about both 
individual holdings in offshore entities as well as tax, investment, and 
business planning strategies pursued by multinational entities.  For example, 
the offshore holdings of political figures identified in the leak include those of 
  
148. Emelia Díaz-Struck, ICIJ Releases Paradise Papers Data From Appleby, INT’L CONSORTIUM 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-
papers/icij-releases-paradise-papers-data-appleby [https://perma.cc/7JCF-W5WN]. 
149. Id.; Paradise Papers: Everything You Need to Know About the Leak, BBC NEWS (Nov 10, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-41880153 [https://perma.cc/7DB4-WWT5]. 
150. See sources cited supra note 149. 
151. Appleby reported in October 2017 that it had been the victim of a hack and that its client 
information was now held by the ICIJ.  See Jake Bernstein, Opinion, The Paradise Papers 
Hacking and the Consequences of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/opinion/paradise-papers-hacking-privacy.html.  
The hack apparently occurred in 2016.  See, e.g., Camilla Hodgson, Panama Papers 2?  
The Financial Secrets of the Super-Rich May Be About to Be Leaked After an Offshore 
Law Firm Was Hacked, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 25, 2017, 5:53 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/financial-secrets-of-super-rich-stolen-offshore-appleby-
2017-10. 
152. Apparently, by late February 2017, the ICIJ and its connected team of journalists 
worldwide had begun reviewing the leaked materials.  Michael Forsythe, Scouring the 
Paradise Papers, With the Help of Almost 400 New Friends, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/insider/paradise-papers-appleby-leak-icij.html. 
153. About the Paradise Papers Investigation, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Nov. 
5, 2017), https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/about [https://perma.cc/PQ3H-
UFD9]. 
154. See, e.g., Forsythe, supra note 152; Mike McIntire et al., Commerce Secretary’s Offshore Ties to 
Putin ‘Cronies’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/ 
world/wilbur-ross-russia.html. 
155. Díaz-Struck, supra note 148. 
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Jean-Claude Bastos156 (asset manager for Angola’s sovereign wealth fund), 
Stephen Bronfman (close advisor to Canadian Prime Minister Justin 
Troudeau);157 and U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross.158  The data 
revealed that Ross had connections to a shipping company with links to 
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s son-in-law.159  The Paradise Papers 
materials, which include emails, board minutes, tax-restructuring plans, and 
contracts, have also drawn attention to a variety of multinationals including 
global mining firm Glencore PLC,160 Apple, Inc.,161 and Nike.162  The 
underlying conduct identified in the materials ranges from potential tax 
avoidance to possible corruption.163  In the aftermath of the leak, some 
commenters have raised questions about whether much of the conduct 
highlighted in this leak is best understood as tax planning that is legal.164  If so, 
then the questions raised by this leak may be ones of tax system design and 
  
156. See, e.g., Anna Meisel & David Grossman, Paradise Papers: Tycoon Made $41m From 
‘People’s Fund’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
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CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.icij.org 
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161. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker & Simon Bowers, After a Tax Crackdown, Apple Found a New Shelter for 
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-
jersey.html?action=click&contentCollection=World&module=Trending&version=Full&regio
n=Marginalia&pgtype=article. 
162. See, e.g., The Paradise Papers Shed New Light on Offshore Finance, ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 
2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21731165-data-leak-
will-increase-pressure-clamp-down-tax-avoidance-paradise. 
163. See, e.g., Sasha Chavkin, Arrest Warrants, Investigations, and More as World Responds to 
Paradise Papers, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.icij.org/blog/2017/888/paradise-papers-response-arrest-investigation-
audit [https://perma.cc/Y8DY-UU97]. 
164. See, e.g., Trevor Johnson, Fake News in Paradise, 88 TAX NOTES INT’L 795, 798 (2017); 
Jeremy Cape, The Paradise Papers Aren’t the Smoking Gun for Offshore Reform, LAWYER 
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.thelawyer.com/paradise-papers-arent-smoking-gun-
offshore-reform; Rasmus Corlin Christensen, Law and Morality in the Paradise Papers, 
POL. ECON. INT’L TAX’N (Nov. 14, 2017), https://phdskat.org/2017/11/14/law-and-
morality-in-the-paradise-papers/ [https://perma.cc/59PG-5UFQ]; Maya Forstater, 
Making Sense of the Paradise Papers, HIYA MAYA (Nov. 15, 2017), 
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strategic tax planning, rather than evasion or illegality, and it would be 
important to distinguish among the different types of conduct. 
Various responses to the leak have emerged across the globe.  Some 
countries have announced plans to investigate potential tax avoidance or 
other improprieties suggested by the released data.  These include Jersey,165 
Canada,166 Indonesia,167 India,168 and Singapore.169  The Netherlands will 
reexamine 4000 advance tax rulings it had previously provided to foreign 
companies following the revelation of a Proctor & Gamble tax ruling that did 
not follow regulations.170  The United Kingdom, in anticipation of 
investigations, has asked the ICIJ for the Paradise Papers data.171  Beyond the 
national level, members of the European Parliament condemned the EU 
Council and finance ministers for failure to pursue tax reform and argued for 
a new committee to examine the Paradise Papers.172  Additionally, African 
Finance Ministers relaunched their support for increased tax transparency 
and for their work with the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes.173 
Reaching beyond income taxation, the EC released new rules designed 
to curtail large-scale VAT fraud.  As Commissioner for Economic and 
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[https://perma.cc/FN6M-DRYT]. 
171. See, e.g., Stephanie Soong Johnston, Paradise Papers Leaks Prompt Action From Tax 
Authorities, 88 TAX NOTES INT’L 625 (2017) (noting HM Revenue & Custom’s “urgent[]” 
request to ICIJ for the Paradise Papers). 
172. See, e.g., Teri Sprackland, EU Parliament Members Condemn Council’s Inaction on Tax 
Reforms, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Nov. 15, 2017, 2017 WTD 220-8 (LEXIS). 
173. African Ministers Discuss Tax Evasion at OECD Global Forum Meeting, WORLDWIDE 
TAX DAILY, Nov. 15, 2017, 2017 WTD 221-16 (LEXIS). 
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Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs Pierre Moscovici noted, “The 
Paradise Papers have again shown how some are taking advantage of lax 
application of EU VAT rules to get away with paying less VAT than others.”174  
Moscovici also urged the EU to act quickly on proposed rules requiring tax 
advisers to disclose certain tax-planning activities developed for clients, citing 
the Paradise Papers as evidence of the need for such legislation.175  Given the 
scope and range of actors and data revealed in the Paradise Papers leak, the 
repercussions are likely to continue to develop. 
C. Some Initial Observations 
Drawing upon the discussion in Subpart I.B, it is possible to identify 
some notable characteristics of tax leaks.  Our goal here is not to build a 
watertight typology but simply to identify some key descriptive parameters of 
these leaks, in order to appreciate their value and limitations.176 
1. Types of Information Leaked 
First, leaks can reveal several different types of important 
information. 
Information about specific taxpayers.  Some leaks provide information 
about the identities of specific taxpayers and their offshore holdings.  This 
provides tax authorities with easy enforcement targets.  For example, the UBS 
and LGT leaks identified specific Americans with offshore accounts and 
enabled the United States to target those taxpayers for prosecution.  The same 
was true with respect to the HSBC leak and French prosecutors. 
  
174. EU Commission Proposes New Measures to Combat VAT Fraud, WORLDWIDE TAX 
DAILY, Nov. 30, 2017, 2017 WTD 230-18 (LEXIS). 
175. See, e.g., Francesco Guarascio, EU’s Moscovici Urges Fast Action Against Tax “Vampires” 
After Paradise Papers, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-
tax-paradisepapers/eus-moscovici-urges-fast-action-against-tax-vampires-after-
paradise-papers-idUSKBN1DE0UN [https://perma.cc/T7YY-XXSJ]. The EC reached 
agreement on these rules in March 2018. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
176. In the non-tax literature on government data leaks, others have tried to build leak 
typologies. For example, that literature has identified the seniority of the leaker within 
the government as a key factor in categorizing leaks.  See, e.g., Kwoka, supra note 11, at 
1394–1402; Pozen, supra note 11, at 521–44. That analysis informs our study of tax leaks 
only on the margin, because tax leaks are usually leaks of private information by private 
actors, rather than leaks by governments of government data.  See also supra note 19. Cf. 
Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach 
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing how courts should take risk and 
anxiety into consideration in recognizing harms caused by certain data breaches by 
companies). 
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Information about facilitators and practices.  Leaks may also identify key 
facilitators of suspect transactions or practices and may reveal information 
about their strategies and activities.  For example, banks such as UBS, HSBC, 
and Credit Suisse, and law firms such as Mossack Fonseca and Appleby, have 
been identified as facilitators of offshore avoidance. 
Information about governments.  Leaks can also provide information 
about the policies, priorities, and practices of governments and their 
positions on tax minimization or evasion.  For example, LuxLeaks 
highlighted the rulings practices of Luxembourg in facilitating MNE tax 
planning.  The Bahamas and Panama leaks revealed these jurisdictions to be 
enablers of offshore secrecy.177 
The way a jurisdiction responds to a leak also provides information 
about the tax culture and economic priorities in that jurisdiction.  For 
example, after the HSBC leak, the whistleblower Hervé Falciani faced 
criminal charges and extradition in Switzerland, despite being hailed as a hero 
elsewhere.178  This highlights the differences between Switzerland and other 
countries in their respective approaches towards tax compliance and bank 
secrecy. 
2. Imperfections in the Leaked Information 
Incompleteness.  Leaked information is usually incomplete.179  Leaked 
data does not identify every single taxpayer who is evading taxes using 
offshore structures.  Subsequent information derived from banks or other 
  
177. See generally ‘Bahamas Leaks’ Puts Spotlight on UBS and Credit Suisse, SWI (Sept. 22, 
2016, 8:54 AM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/offshore-files_-bahamas-leaks—puts-
spotlight-on-ubs-and-credit-suisse/42465208 [https://perma.cc/9M84-FHHW]; T.E., 
Credit Suisse: The Limits of Guilt, ECONOMIST: SCHUMPETER (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/05/credit-suisse 
[https://perma.cc/Q262-TZZ8]. 
178. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
179. It is also possible that leaked data may turn out to be false.  Potential falsity of leaked tax 
data was an issue in the recent French presidential election.  See Lauren Carroll, Are the 
Clinton WikiLeaks Emails Doctored, or Are They Authentic?, POLITIFACT (Oct. 23, 2016, 
7:14 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/oct/23/are-clinton-
wikileaks-emails-doctored-or-are-they- [https://perma.cc/ZJ7Y-6MQJ]; Alex Gibney, Can 
We Trust Julian Assange and WikiLeaks?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/opinion/can-we-trust-julian-assange-and-
wikileaks.html.  The falsity issue has also been raised with respect to non-tax data caches.  
See, e.g., Callum Borchers, Rachel Maddow’s Urgent Warning to the Rest of the Media, 
WASH. POST: THE FIX (July 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/07/07/rachel-maddows-urgent-warning-to-the-rest-of-the-
media/?utm_term=.07b6b62476c5 [https://perma.cc/B9UT-VM3K]. 
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facilitators implicated in a leak will also not ensnare every single tax 
wrongdoer.  Therefore, leaks may lead to consequences for some facilitators, 
jurisdictions, and taxpayers but not others.  The incompleteness of leaked 
data may depend on what data the leaker is able and willing to take and 
leak, but it may also depend on what information the press or other 
information intermediaries are willing to share or publish. 
Level of Specificity.  Leaked data may not directly pinpoint the precise tax 
evasion or structuring activity in question.  In some cases, such as the Panama 
Papers, Paradise Papers, and British Havens leaks, the information leaked was 
fairly broad and needed to be investigated in order to specifically identify the 
evasive activity that may have taken place.  As Subpart III.A further describes, 
lack of specificity in leaked data may be exacerbated by the publication 
choices of media organizations and other information consumers.180 
False Positives and Different Levels of Wrongdoing.  Leaked data may also 
contain false positives, that is, names of taxpayers who may not have been 
actually engaged in wrongdoing.181  False positives may include taxpayers 
with legitimate non-tax reasons for having offshore holdings,182 as well as 
taxpayers who engaged in legal tax planning via offshore structuring.183  With 
respect to the Panama Papers and Bahamas leaks, the ICIJ has clarified that 
not all of the conduct and structures identified are illegal, even though they 
might be perceived to be unfair.184  False positives are likely to be a problem 
both in the initial leak and with respect to subsequent initiatives to obtain 
information in light of the initial leak.185 
  
180. See infra Subpart III.A. 
181. False positives are to be distinguished from falsity, in the sense of outright data 
falsification, which is also a possibility.  See, e.g., infra notes 307, 331. 
182. See Marina Walker Guevara, Offshore Leaks Database FAQs, INT’L CONSORTIUM 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (June 14, 2013) https://www.icij.org/blog/2013/06/offshore-
leaks-database-faqs [https://perma.cc/8K4V-E732] (“There are legitimate reasons to use 
offshore companies and trusts.  ICIJ does not intend to suggest or imply that the people 
and companies included in the database have broken the law or otherwise acted 
improperly.”). 
183. Cf. New Bank Leak Shows How Rich Exploit Tax Haven Loopholes, INT’L CONSORTIUM 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (July 8, 2014, 3:45 PM), https://www.icij.org/offshore/new-bank-
leak-shows-how-rich-exploit-tax-haven-loopholes [https://perma.cc/DM2D-GT7T] (“We 
make this information available not because what we found is illegal but because we think most 
people would think it unfair.  Tax havens allow some people to play by different rules.”). 
184. See supra notes 182–183; see also Giant Leak, supra note 111 (“As with many of Mossack 
Fonseca’s clients, there is no evidence that [Jackie] Chan used his companies for 
improper purposes.  Having an offshore company isn’t illegal.  For some international 
business transactions, it’s a logical choice.”). 
185. See generally Luca Gattoni-Celli, ‘False Positives’ in FATCA Data May Hamper 
Enforcement, 153 TAX NOTES 514 (2016) (noting how false positives could limit FATCA 
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Imperfections in leaked data may present particular challenges where 
strong public sentiments have developed in response to high-impact leaks.186  
For example, it is possible that an irate public might not appropriately 
distinguish between illegal tax evasion and legal tax planning, or between 
wrongdoers and innocent persons. 
3. Different Transmission Pathways 
Finally, leaks have different transmission pathways. 
Different points of origin.  Some leaks, such as the UBS, LGT, and 
Luxembourg leaks, were initiated by employees of banks and accounting 
firms who were acting as whistleblowers.  Others, such as the Panama Papers, 
Paradise Papers, British Havens, and Bahamas leaks are a result of data 
obtained from unknown sources (for example, a source that mails a hard 
drive to a newspaper) or an anonymous one (where a media organization 
may know the identity of the source but withholds it).187  We do not know for 
sure why certain leakers choose to stay anonymous, but we can infer that 
there may be heterogeneous motivations among those who choose to leak. 
Some of these leakers may have had access to the data but others may 
have hacked it.  The Panama Papers episode was widely believed to have 
originated from a hack, but many of the other leaks described above were due 
to employee whistleblowers.188 
Different Disseminators.  In some cases, the data was obtained by tax 
authorities and other government agencies.  For example, in the case of the 
UBS and HSBC leaks, the data was obtained by the United States and France 
respectively.189  In other cases, the data was given to newspapers or media 
organizations that then sorted the data and ultimately disseminated it.  This was 
the case with respect to the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers, British Havens, 
  
data’s value to the IRS because FATCA’s structure encourages foreign financial 
institutions to err on the side of overreporting). 
186. See infra Subpart II.C.2. 
187. The British Havens data was mailed by an unknown source.  It is possible that reporting 
media organizations may know the identity of the Panama Papers leaker but have kept it 
confidential.  Caroline Mortimer, Panama Papers: Whistleblower Breaks Silence to 




188. See supra notes 17, 187 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra Subparts I.B.1, I.B.2.  As discussed, however, the HSBC data was subsequently 
published by the ICIJ.  See infra Subpart III.B.4. 
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and Bahamas leaks.  These different modes of transmission may lead to 
different degrees of access and availability, and possibly different impacts.190 
Time Lags in Dissemination.  There is sometimes a significant time lag 
between when leaked data is obtained by the leaker and when it becomes 
available to governments or the public.  The process of using the data and 
taking action against the persons or behavior revealed by the data also takes 
time.  The HSBC and Julius Baer leaks, for example, featured long delays 
between the data theft and its transmission and subsequent impacts.  As 
further discussed in Subpart III.B, these time lags raise questions about how 
the process of information transmission may influence the ultimate impacts 
of a leak and how these impacts are perceived.191 
These initial observations provide a starting point for thinking about the 
dynamics that underlie the content and occurrence of leaks and their 
transmission and reception by tax authorities and the public. 
II. THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF TAX LEAKS 
Tax commentators and policymakers have tended to assume that leaks 
of tax data are socially and economically beneficial for tax enforcement and 
administration, because they provide governments with a “free audit”192 of 
taxpayers, provide information not previously available, deter offshore tax 
evasion, and create impetus for governments to investigate tax misdeeds and 
enact new laws.  We argue, however, that while leaks can certainly generate 
beneficial outcomes in some circumstances, there are also underappreciated 
risks inherent in relying on leaked data to make enforcement and policy 
decisions. 
We first map the landscape in which cross-border tax enforcement and 
administration and taxpayer decisions about tax evasion and compliance take 
  
190. See infra Subpart III.B. 
191. See infra Subpart III.B. 
192. This feature provided the impetus for the new Country-by-Country reporting requirements 
endorsed by the OECD.  OECD, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-
COUNTRY REPORTING, ACTION 13–2015 FINAL REPORT (2015), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315381e.pdf?expires=1484507215&id=id&accname=guest&
checksum=AC38C62B897E23CF374ED32310482BB2 [https://perma.cc/3G2C-P6WM].  The 
provision of such data to tax authorities is expected to help them better allocate audit resources 
by identifying transactions and taxpayers that warrant further scrutiny.  Diane Ring, 
Transparency and Disclosure, in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN 
PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 497, 511–12 (Alexander Trepelkov, 
Harry Tonino & Dominika Halka eds., 2015).  See generally Lederman, supra note 14 
(characterizing third-party reporting as an invisible audit). 
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place.  We explore how the occurrence of a tax leak may yield benefits for tax 
compliance and enforcement by increasing tax authorities’ access to 
information, lowering their enforcement costs, deterring noncompliance, 
and providing the impetus for tax reform.  We then explore the distinctive 
risks that may be raised by reliance on leaked tax data to make legal policy and 
enforcement decisions. 
A. Cross-Border Tax Administration and Enforcement 
Broadly speaking, the cross-border tax enforcement and evasion game 
takes place in an environment of high-tax countries attempting to tax their 
taxpayers,193 low- or no-tax haven countries enabling foreign taxpayers to 
hide assets or structure transactions in a manner that reduces or eliminates 
tax, and taxpayers deciding whether and how much to comply or evade.  
Taxpayers have traditionally been able to evade taxes by stashing assets 
offshore because the information available to the tax authorities of their home 
countries is imperfect: Tax authorities do not know about all offshore 
activities of taxpayers.  On the other hand, taxpayer knowledge is also 
imperfect: In deciding whether to evade or comply, taxpayers have some, but 
not complete, knowledge about what tax authorities know. 
Given the world as described, we might expect taxpayers to weigh the 
probability of detection and the size of the penalty in determining the 
expected cost or benefit of evasion.194  If the net benefits from tax evasion (after 
accounting for structuring and planning costs) exceed the costs (i.e., the tax plus 
interest plus penalty), then the standard model predicts that the taxpayer will 
evade.195 
  
193. By “taxpayers,” we generally mean taxpayers over whom countries impose “residence-
based” tax jurisdiction.  For example, the United States imposes residence-based tax 
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens, permanent residents, and certain long-term U.S. 
residents who meet the so-called “substantial presence” test.  26 U.S.C. § 7701(b) (2012).  
Countries may also impose source-based taxation on income from sources within that 
country.  Id. §§ 871, 881, 882.  For simplicity, we leave aside the question of source-
based tax jurisdiction. 
194. Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 
J. PUB. ECON. 323, 324 (1972); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176 (1968). 
195. See sources cited supra note 194; see also Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and 
Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 262 (2007) (“[E]ven if the 
probability of success on the merits for a given tax position is extremely low, it can be 
socially optimal for [a] taxpayer to engage in [a] transaction [if] expected pre-tax profit 
from the transaction exceeds the expected tax liability.”). 
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Correspondingly, we might expect a country’s tax authority to maximize 
social welfare196 (presumably defined to include the welfare of everyone in that 
country) in administering and enforcing cross-border tax compliance, given 
budget constraints.197  This means tax authorities will strive to set enforcement 
parameters such that the marginal cost per dollar raised equals the marginal social 
benefit of the tax collected.198  Assuming tax rates are fixed, tax authorities will face a 
choice between changing the detection rate (for example, by increasing audits or by 
broadening information reporting or exchange)199 or changing the penalty for tax 
evasion.200  The welfare-maximizing tax authority will generally choose to set 
these enforcement parameters (i.e., audit rates and penalty levels) such that 
the marginal cost of each is the same, and so that overall, the marginal cost of 
enforcement equals the marginal social benefit.201 
In short, the cross-border tax enforcement and evasion landscape is one 
in which countries (both those attempting to tax and the tax havens) make 
decisions about how to enforce and taxpayers make decisions about whether 
  
196. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423, 1447 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
2002) (“In models with heterogeneous citizens, the standard objective function is a 
social welfare function which has as arguments the utility level of each citizen . . . where 
the shape of the social welfare function implicitly determines the social value placed on 
the distribution of utilities as opposed to the sum of utilities.”). 
197. Janet G. McCubbin, Optimal Tax Enforcement: A Review of the Literature and Practical 
Implications, 96 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N & MINUTES ANN. MEETING NAT’L TAX 
ASS’N 16 (2003).  Social welfare, in our Article, is assessed on an individual country basis. 
198. Marginal benefit should be measured in terms of the public goods expenditures.  See id. 
at 16–17; see also Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection 
Agency, 89 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 183, 184 (1987) (“The tax collection agency . . . uses real 
resources to operate, and its size should be expanded to the point where its marginal costs equals 
its properly defined marginal social benefit . . . .”).  The components of marginal costs should be 
defined broadly.  See, e.g., Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 196, at 1447 (“In the presence 
of avoidance and evasion, a broader concept of efficiency cost is needed.”). 
199. See supra notes 194–195; see also Leandra Lederman, Does Enforcement Crowd Out 
Voluntary Tax Compliance? (2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://spea.indiana.edu/ 
doc/research/finance-conference/2017-papers/lederman.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D7T-S963] 
(characterizing information reporting as a kind of audit). 
200. More granularly, the tax authority will want to set parameters so that the marginal cost 
of increasing each enforcement parameter (i.e., detection rate or penalty amount) is the 
same, and the overall marginal cost equals the marginal social benefit.  See McCubbin, 
supra note 197; see also James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Estimating the 
Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance With Experimental Data, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 107, 
108–10 (1992) (identifying other determinants of tax compliance, such as income level 
and level of government expenditure). 
201. Many optimal enforcement models suggest high tax and penalty rates and low audits, because 
audits are costly.  But see Louis Kaplow, Optimal Taxation With Costly Enforcement and 
Evasion (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2996, 1989), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=463448 [https://perma.cc/EW63-GJCS]. 
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to evade or comply given imperfect information, constrained resources, and 
their respective goals.  The question, then, is whether a leak of tax information 
is beneficial to tax authorities in light of this backdrop. 
B. The Benefits of Leaked Information 
In an information-imperfect world in which havens exist, resource-
constrained countries are trying to enforce, and taxpayers are trying to decide 
whether and how much to evade, it is easy to assume that a leak of tax 
information will always be beneficial.  Leaked data can yield a host of benefits 
for enforcement-minded tax authorities. 
1. Leaks as Free Information 
Leaked data may lower a tax authority’s marginal cost of raising revenue 
by gifting a “free audit” of certain taxpayers to the tax authority or, more 
broadly, free information regarding where to allocate enforcement resources.  
Free information effectively lowers the cost of enforcement, allowing the tax 
authority to pursue enforcement against the marginal evader, who was 
previously too costly (or impossible) to investigate. 
Beyond its benefits for enforcement against specific taxpayers, leaked 
data can also provide a clearer picture of levels of cross-border compliance 
and evasion and can illuminate previously unnoticed phenomena.  In this 
way, leaked information can facilitate improvements in international 
enforcement practices more broadly.202  Thus, the informational benefits of a 
leak may extend beyond just the taxpayers or practices about which 
information is leaked. 
A leak may also change the evasion calculus of taxpayers.  A leak of a 
specific taxpayer’s information effectively yields a probability of detection 
of 100 percent with respect to that taxpayer.  Even a threatened leak raises 
the perceived probability of detection.  Furthermore, a single leak may 
  
202. At a more nuanced level, to the extent data leaks can illuminate the tax planning 
behavior of a society’s elite, they can provide an important counterweight to the agendas 
advanced by established interest groups and lobbying factions and could benefit civil 
society and enhance democratic legitimacy.  See generally ANTHONY J. NOWNES, 
INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS: PRESSURE AND POWER (2d ed. 2013) (discussing 
involvement of interest groups in the political system and the potential dangers of such 
interest group activity); CEES PETERS, ON THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 
(2014); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 411 (2005) (exploring impact of interest groups on regulatory democracy). 
576 65 UCLA L. REV. 532 (2018) 
	
iteratively raise the probability of detection for actors whose information has 
not been leaked.  This may occur, for example, if taxpayers who have been caught 
in a leak provide information to tax authorities and such information 
implicates other taxpayers or intermediaries not yet named in the leak.  An 
increased probability of detection raises taxpayers’ expected cost of evasion, 
which should lead to a decline in the evasive behavior. 
2. Highly Salient Leaks as an Impetus for Reform 
Another important feature of leaked information is that it tends to be 
highly salient and trigger strong public reactions.  Under a rational actor 
framework, leaked information should not have different impacts on the public 
than information obtained through more traditional sources, such as aggregated 
statistical data on tax compliance and evasion that is more systematically 
gathered.  However, leaked information is arguably more salient and 
shocking to information consumers than those other types of data.203  This is 
particularly so if the behavior that is the subject of the leak is egregious and if 
the leaked data is well publicized, raising expectations on governments to act.  
This high impact nature of tax leaks may compel governments and taxing 
authorities to take firmer action against cross-border tax evasion, or it may 
provide governments with political cover or impetus to reform substantive 
tax laws and/or tax administration. 
3. Leaked Data’s Distributional Gains 
The combination of the first two benefits of data leaks (free information 
and salience) may also lead to distributional gains.  For example, the 
information obtained through leaks may enable tax authorities to gain 
ground on the abuses of sophisticated taxpayers who may have been 
  
203. The behavioral psychology and behavioral economics literature provide significant 
evidence of the ways in which individuals and governments may make less than rational 
decisions, particularly when confronted with examples viewed as more salient.  See 
generally BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006); 
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in CHOICE AND 
CONSEQUENCE: PERSPECTIVES OF AN ERRANT ECONOMIST 113 (1984) (distinguishing 
between reactions to identified lives and statistical lives); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF 
FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005) (exploring various factors shaping 
public perceptions of risk, including the distinction between perceived and real risk); 
Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time 
Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 351–401 (2002) (noting that 
the degree to which people experience anticipatory utility may vary and may be 
influenced by “visceral” factors). 
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disproportionately able to escape enforcement’s grasp by keeping 
transactions and methods secret, such as those holding undeclared offshore 
assets or enaging in complex offshore structuring.  In particular, public, high-
impact, and unpredictable data leaks may act as a counterweight to powerful 
forces such as lobbyists that have traditionally safeguarded certain taxpayer 
interests. 
C. The Distinctive Risks of Tax Leaks 
Despite the clear benefits of leaked information to tax enforcement, 
reliance on leaked data comes with distinctive risks and potential costs.  These 
costs are in addition to the more general costs that tax authorities and 
taxpayers may incur in the course of tax enforcement.204 
1. The Dangers of Agenda Capture 
Leaks do not happen in a vacuum.  They are exogenously determined, in 
the sense that they are dependent on the threshold decisions of leakers and 
whistleblowers—actors outside the government—to leak information.  Thus, 
leaked data may be manipulated to reflect the personal agendas of those 
individuals.  As described in more detail in Part III, leakers and 
whistleblowers determine when to leak, what and how much information to 
leak, and (importantly) what information to withhold.  The personal agendas 
of these leakers and whistleblowers may shape what information eventually 
ends up in the hands of taxing authorities and when. 
For example, if a leaker or whistleblower has a political axe to grind 
against certain opponents, they may leak tax information to exact political 
consequences on them, rather than for purposes of tax enforcement.205  One 
might argue that such information is nonetheless valuable even if the 
underlying goals are questionable.  However, tax leaks done for political 
  
204. For example, in the course of performing tax enforcement, a tax authority may run into 
unanticipated enforcement costs (for example, costs that may arise in the course of 
filling in incomplete data or gathering necessary information), agency costs (such as 
costs that may arise as a result of employees seeking to advance individual agendas), or 
opportunity costs (that is, costs associated with foregone enforcement opportunities).  
Taxpayers, too, may be expected to incur costs as a result of tax enforcement, such as 
costs in responding to audit requests and costs of defending themselves against 
erroneous accusations. 
205. See infra note 308 and accompanying discussion. 
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purposes carry other risks, such as the possibility of undermining democratic 
values.206 
Another distinctive way in which leaks may be vulnerable to agendas of 
various actors is through the actions of the press and other information 
intermediaries.  How, when, and whether a leak unfolds depends on the 
specific pathways by which leaked data is transmitted to tax authorities and 
the public, and the actions and interests of those who control those pathways.  
Thus, the agendas and interests of such information intermediaries may 
affect how leaked data is conveyed and how it is received. 
In this sense, therefore, leaked data is not just unadulterated free 
information, but may in fact be free information that is particularly 
susceptible to the influences and agendas of leakers, investigative journalists, 
and other information providers and intermediaries.  These agendas may lead 
these actors to put their own spin on leaked data, but in a worst-case scenario, 
may also lead them to falsify data, or selectively withhold data.  In relying on 
leaked data, tax authorities and governments run the risk of being unduly 
influenced by the interests of and framings employed by these actors without 
genuine appreciation of the risks. 
2. The Downsides of Heightened Salience 
Another distinctive downside of relying on leaked data stems from 
precisely the fact that leaks tend to be high profile events.  As discussed, the 
high impact of tax leaks may in some instances be a strength.207  However, this 
feature may also give rise to distinctive hazards. 
Most notably, the potentially high salience of leaked data—
particularly in contrast to other types of more systematically gathered 
data—may trigger reactions by government and the public that may be 
disproportionate or inadvisable given the underlying problem at stake.208  
  
206. It is important not to assume that tax leaks of the type analyzed in this Article are simply 
an international extension of the tips with which the IRS has worked for decades.  Tax 
leaks pose a risk distinctly different from the tips that the IRS has frequently received 
over the years.  Although such tips have often been courtesy of individuals with a certain 
type of agenda, such as ex-spouses, fired workers, and business competitors, the 
potential impact of their agendas on overall government tax enforcement practices and 
decisions was likely limited in scope.  The quantity of data they offered, the number of 
taxpayers on whom they provided data, and their ability to harness global attention and 
public response on a significant scale was much more limited as compared to the 
contemporary tax leaks at issue. 
207. See supra Subpart II.B.2. 
208. See supra note 203. 
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Governments may react more strongly to leaked data than systematically 
obtained data because (a) the leak shows that bad behavior is occurring, 
which may surprise or shock the government; (b) the leak suggests 
government failure and incompetence because it has not previously detected 
this bad behavior, and (c) the public is outraged by the leaked conduct and the 
government’s failure to act.  Likewise, the public may react more strongly to 
leaked data because (a) the leaked information shows that some taxpayers 
have been getting away with bad behavior; (b) the existence of such bad 
behavior maybe perceived to be egregious and shocking; and (c) the failure of 
government authorities to punish or even detect such behavior is also 
perceived to be egregious and shocking. 
As noted, strong reactions may provide impetus for reform that might 
not otherwise exist.209  On the other hand, they may also lead to ill-advised 
legal and enforcement responses.  For example, if a government engages in 
short-term thinking regarding allocation of enforcement resources, 
succumbs to public pressure, or otherwise makes nonrational decisions, then 
poor enforcement choices may take place after a leak.210  In particular, if 
governments are capacity constrained, then a poor enforcement decision 
might mean fewer resources allocated to good choices. 
The possibility of costly, overbroad, or poorly designed laws being enacted 
is not merely theoretical.  Scholars in other fields, including securities regulation, 
financial regulation, and corporate governance, have observed that laws enacted 
in the aftermath of a crisis may be the product of overreaction.211  Both crises and 
  
209. See supra Subpart II.B.2. 
210. See supra Subpart II.C.2. 
211. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance 
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1783 (2011) (adopting Romano’s “quack corporate 
governance” characterization to describe the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)); Saule Omarova 
& Adam Feibelman, Risk, Rules & Institutions: A Process for Reforming Financial 
Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881, 930 (2009) (critiquing government reaction to the 
2008 financial crisis and offering an approach to “redesigning the regulation of [the] 
financial services sector in a coherent and measured way” post-crisis); Larry E. Ribstein, 
Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 97 (2003) (reviewing the negative effects of post-
bubble regulation); Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities 
Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435 (2017) (identifying a trend of Congress delegating significant 
securities regulation post-crisis); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528–29 (2005) (exploring 
how the post-crisis environment led to the “ill-conceived” Sarbanes-Oxley reforms).  
The financial crisis literature addresses suboptimal government policies that were 
contrary to expert recommendations.  In that sense, one might observe that 
governments were even more reactionary in the aftermath of the financial crisis than has 
been observed with respect to tax leaks to date.   
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leaks are highly salient events that may overemphasize the seriousness of the 
crisis or conduct, while giving insufficient weight to the later-occurring costs 
associated with a reactionary or subpar policy response.212  This outcome is 
possible with respect to tax laws as well. 
Of course, there are risks and downsides to any course of enforcement 
action that a tax authority decides to take.  Our point here is that in some 
situations, the high salience of data leaks may exacerbate these generic risks 
and costs by influencing the behaviors of both governments and the public.  
For example, any government enforcement action may be perceived as 
inadequate or ineffectual due to its actual content and execution, but a 
government’s response to a leak may run the particular risk of being 
perceived as such, given the high public salience of leaked data.213  Such 
negative perceptions and public pressures may drive governments to take 
subsequent enforcement actions that are reactionary or poorly advised.  This 
outcome is particularly plausible if highly salient leaked information is 
known to the public.  It may also occur if the public knows merely the 
existence of the leak, even if it does not know the content of the leaked data 
itself. 
In short, data leaks have the potential to trigger strong and possibly 
disproportionate reactions by casting a spotlight on the behaviors and 
enforcement failures that are the subject of a leak.  But they may fail to 
highlight the downsides of taking particular enforcement actions, or the more 
difficult and nuanced policy and resource allocation considerations that 
underlie any enforcement decision.  This is problematic because not all 
government failures to act are necessarily bad decisions.214  Some may be, but 
other failures to act may have occurred for sound tax enforcement or political 
reasons (such as a deliberate choice to focus scarce resources on another 
  
212. Thus, for example, the combination of the 2008 financial crisis and the onslaught of tax 
leaks beginning in 2008 may have heighted the risk of overreaction by regulators. 
213. For example, this may occur if the government decides to do nothing in response or 
takes too long in responding.  See infra Subpart III.B.6. 
214. One scenario in which governments might choose not to prosecute is if tax policy has become 
entrenched as a result of a previous leak.  For example, once a government’s or 
international organization’s policy has been enacted in response to an initial leak, the 
government or organization may be less willing or able to pivot and respond to a later-
occurring leak.  This lack of response may resemble doing nothing and may lead to some of 
the costs just described.  See, e.g., Matt Timms, Luxleaks Scandal Puts Tax Avoidance Under 
the Microscope, EUR. CEO (Mar. 28, 2015), http://www.europeanceo.com/business-and-
management/luxleaks-scandal-puts-tax-avoidance-under-the-microscope [https://perma.cc/ 
49E6-MXM9] (characterizing LuxLeaks as setting the EU agenda by “[leaving] EC officials 
with no option but to ramp up the rhetoric on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance”). 
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area).  Leaks do provide “free information” that may allow authorities to 
detect and punish certain behavior that was previously too costly to chase.  
The downside risk is that given the high salience of leaks and the reactions 
they may trigger, pre-leak government decisions not to act may be judged 
overly negatively, and post-leak enforcement choices may be correspondingly 
misunderstood or pushed in the wrong directions. 
In a rational world, it is easy to assume that leaks of tax data will yield 
welfare benefits, because leaks are essentially free information that lower tax 
authorities’ enforcement costs.  However, the world is not always rational.  
Intermediaries and information arbiters may select, withhold, falsify, or 
otherwise curate data in ways that render the timing of its release or its 
content suspect.  Governments, taxpayers, and other actors may react in 
nonrational ways as a result of the high-impact nature of leaks.  At the end of 
the day, the ultimate welfare effects of a leak will depend on whether these 
factors predominate to distort the provision of and responses to leaked data.  
Even if leaked data does generate a net welfare gain at the end of the day, it is 
important to be aware of the distinctive risks that accompany such leaks, in 
order that the tax authority may make better enforcement and legal design 
choices. 
III. LEAK-DRIVEN LAWMAKING IN THE REAL WORLD 
Part II has shown that there are clear benefits as well as distinctive 
downsides to relying on leaks to drive tax policy and guide enforcement.  Part 
III explores some of these downsides in greater detail by presenting three 
illustrative examples, each highlighting an aspect of how leak-driven 
lawmaking has unfolded in the real world and how the distinctive risks of 
relying on tax leaks may arise in each case.  We examine: (1) the ways in 
which agenda setters have dictated how governments and the public receive, 
access, and respond to leaked data; (2) the delays and inefficiencies that can 
arise in data transmission within and among countries; and (3) reactionary 
laws that may be enacted in response to highly salient data leaks.  We discuss 
how the distinctive risks of leak-driven lawmaking that we identified in Part 
II—third-party agenda setting and the dangers of high salience—play out in 
each of these situations. 
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A. Agenda Setters 
As noted in Part II, agenda setters have played an important role in 
dictating the timing and content of leaks and how they are framed.215  Their 
actions shape how leaked data is received and acted upon by tax authorities 
and governments, and how they are perceived by the public.  We discuss here 
three types of agenda setters that have played a major role in the framing of 
leaked data to date and the risks their existence poses for tax enforcement. 
1. Media Organizations 
The important role played by media organizations in disseminating 
leaked data has scarcely been analyzed in the tax literature to date.  This is 
problematic.  As Subpart I.B illustrates, leakers have in some instances 
provided data to platforms such as WikiLeaks or the ICIJ, rather than to 
governments.  Practically speaking, this means that a few primary media 
organizations have exercised immense control over whether to release or 
withhold data, and when.  Timing and content aside, journalists and media 
organizations have also commanded wide latitude in issuing commentary on 
tax leaks, thereby framing the terms of the debate. 
One media organization that has played a powerful role in framing 
discussions about leaked data is the ICIJ.  The ICIJ is a network of over 200 
journalists in 70 countries that grew out of a project of the Center for Public 
Integrity.216  It has played a significant role in the internet publication of the 
HSBC, Panama Papers, Paradise Papers, LuxLeaks, British Havens, and the 
Bahamas leaks.  ICIJ journalists collaborate on stories that require in-depth 
  
215. See supra Subpart II.C.1. 
216. About the ICIJ, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Feb. 13, 2012, 5:19 PM), 
https://www.icij.org/about [https://perma.cc/VN2V-NTW6]; see also Center Spins Off 
International Arm, CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 27, 2017, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2017/02/27/20746/center-spins-international-arm 
[https://perma.cc/9DVT-VKPV] (describing ICIJ’s origin with the Center for Public 
Integrity).  As of February 24, 2017, the ICIJ became an independent nonprofit news 
organization, separating from its founder, the Center for Public Integrity.  Gerard Ryle, 
After Panama Papers Success, ICIJ Goes Independent, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE 
JOURNALISTS (Feb. 27, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.icij.org/blog/2017/02/after-
panama-papers-success-icij-goes-independent [https://perma.cc/4E7R-X29L] (“[The 
decision] was prompted by a strategic assessment of where we are and where we want to 
go next.  We believe this new structure will allow us to extend our global reach and 
impact even farther and build on the lessons we’ve learned and the successes we’ve 
enjoyed.”). 
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investigative journalism, particularly topics with a global focus.217  The ICIJ is 
a nonprofit organization and provides its information to the public without 
charge.  Its funding comes from a variety of sources, including charitable 
foundations such as the Ford Foundation and Pew Charitable Trusts.218  ICIJ 
stories have been carried by a wide variety of partner newspapers including: 
BBC in the United Kingdom, Le Monde in France, Hong Kong’s South China 
Morning Post, The Irish Times, Süddeutsche Zeitung in Germany, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, and the New York Times. 
A look at how the ICIJ managed the Panama Papers leak offers a window 
onto the power of news organizations to control dissemination and shape the 
legal and policy response to leaks. When the ICIJ published the Panama 
Papers data on May 9, 2016, it described its release on its website as follows: 
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
publishes today a searchable database that strips away the secrecy 
of nearly 214,000 offshore entities created in 21 jurisdictions, from 
Nevada to Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands. 
The data, part of the Panama Papers investigation, is the 
largest ever release of information about offshore companies and 
the people behind them.  This includes, when available, the names 
of the real owners of those opaque structures. 
The database also displays information about more than 
100,000 additional offshore entities ICIJ had already disclosed in 
its 2013 Offshore Leaks investigation. 
ICIJ is publishing the information in the public interest. 
The new data that ICIJ is now making public represents a 
fraction of the Panama Papers, a trove of more than 11.5 million 
leaked files from the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca, 
one of the world’s top creators of hard-to-trace companies, trusts 
and foundations. 
  
217. See About the ICIJ, supra note 216. In 2017, the ICIJ won the Pulitzer Prize for 
Explanatory Reporting, along with McClatchy and Miami Herald, for their work on the 
Panama Papers investigation. The 2017 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Explanatory Reporting, 
PULITZER, http://www.pulitzer.org/winners/international-consortium-investigative-
journalists-mcclatchy-and-miami-herald. 
218. Id.; see also Barbara Raab, Behind the Panama Papers: A Q&A With International 
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ICIJ is not publishing the totality of the leak, and it is not 
disclosing raw documents or personal information en masse.  The 
database contains a great deal of information about company 
owners, proxies and intermediaries in secrecy jurisdictions, but it 
doesn’t disclose bank accounts, email exchanges and financial 
transactions contained in the documents.219 
This description reveals some key information about the ICIJ’s power 
and decisionmaking:  First, the ICIJ presented the material in a searchable 
internet database.  This required it to format and organize the information 
and to specify search parameters.  The ICIJ also combined the Panama data 
with data from the BVI leak, and later added the Bahamas and Paradise 
Papers data.  This choice to combine the data may carry an implication that 
all of this leaked information falls under a broad rubric of “offshore secrets” 
or, perhaps more strongly, “offshore misconduct.” 
Second, the ICIJ released only “a fraction” of the leaked information.  This 
suggests that ICIJ had an underlying metric for deciding what to release.  Here, 
there are a number of possibilities.  One might choose to publish the most 
sensational or shocking information (for example, the names of celebrities); 
the largest dollar value transactions; the most recently created entities; the 
entities from the largest countries or countries with the most transactions; or 
the entities most likely to be in violation of the law (as determined by the 
ICIJ).  Regardless of the specific decisional metric, the important point is that 
the ICIJ has controlled what data was released and how to use data that was 
not released.  It is possible that these decisions have been made in conjunction 
with the leaker, whose identity has been withheld from the public, though we 
do not know for sure.220 
Third, the ICIJ did not release the underlying original documents.  This 
decision, though perhaps supported by journalistic standards and a desire to 
avert unjustified harms from full disclosure of identifying information, 
means that the ICIJ’s framing and characterization of data largely controls the 
picture received by the public. 
Fourth, it is important to note that the ICIJ publication of the Panama Papers 
database happened some time after the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung obtained 
the data (which occurred in 2014).  While Süddeutsche Zeitung announced in 
  
219. Marina Walker Guevara, ICIJ Releases Database Revealing Thousands of Secret Offshore 
Companies, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (May 9, 2016) 
https://panamapapers.icij.org/blog/20160509-offshore-database-release.html 
[https://perma.cc/YK9L-NWGU]. 
220. See Mortimer, supra note 187. 
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print that it was in possession of the data in February 2015, the database and 
accompanying stories were not released until April 2016.221  As such, the ICIJ 
Panama Papers release was not breaking news but rather was a carefully 
curated piece of investigative journalism by ICIJ, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and 
their media partners.  While there are clear advantages to comprehensively 
executed and in-depth investigative journalism stories, this time delay does 
raise questions about whether these media actors strategically timed the 
release of the databases, whether the delays were costly to certain countries, 
whether some actors named in the Panama Papers might have had time to 
prepare for and even avoid the fallout, and more generally, whether the 
information should have been released to tax authorities sooner. 
These observations highlight the series of organizational, selection, and 
framing decisions that the ICIJ made leading up to the release of the Panama 
Papers database, and they clear the way for thinking critically about the power 
exercised by the press in dictating how and when subsequent responses have 
unfolded.  These little-noticed decisions shape the ultimate delivery of the 
information to the public.  And these choices cannot help but be informed by 
the disseminating organization’s underlying agenda, no matter how benign. 
The degree of control that ICIJ has exercised in publication of the 
Panama Papers data is likely to be replicated in other contexts.  In an open 
statement to potential leakers and whistleblowers, the ICIJ notes: 
The [ICIJ] encourages whistleblowers everywhere to securely 
submit all forms of content that might be of public concern-
documents, photos, video clips as well as story tips. 
We accept all information that relates to potential 
wrongdoing by corporate, government or public service entities in 
any country, anywhere in the world.  We do our utmost to 
guarantee the confidentiality of our sources. 
Our motives are squarely aimed at uncovering important 
government and corporate activities that might otherwise go 
unreported, from corruption involving public officials to systemic 
failure to protect the rights of individuals.  Journalists from the 
relevant countries will evaluate and pursue all leads and content 
submitted and, if merited, report on these issues.222 
  
221. See Juliette Garside, Panama Papers: Inside the Guardian’s Investigation Into Offshore 
Secrets, GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news 
/2016/apr/16/panama-papers-inside-the-guardians-investigation-into-offshore-secrets 
[https://perma.cc/ 7BD7-T494]. 
222. Leak to Us, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij.org/ 
securedrop#_ga=1.6167091.1650826081.1483477096 [https://perma.cc/N5S2-PS29]. 
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This mission statement prioritizes confidentiality of sources, pledges to 
“evaluate” and “pursue” leads, and permits ICIJ to report on the issues “if 
merited,” all of which leaves much room for, and in fact absolutely requires 
the ICIJ to make important publication and framing decisions.  The process 
creates costs for the ICIJ;223 therefore, it must necessarily allocate limited 
resources in accordance with its underlying vision. 
Recognition that the ICIJ has a perspective or agenda is not a criticism.  
Rather it acknowledges the fact that the content of the leaked data as publicly 
presented and the resulting shifts in tax policy are neither random nor neutral.  
Media organizations like the ICIJ and WikiLeaks have immense power to 
influence the framing, timing, and content of a data leak, and thus exercise 
implicit control over the perceptions and responses of governments, 
international organizations, and the public.  And if the priorities embraced by 
these media organizations shift, or are captured by certain interests, we can 
expect the impacts of their actions to also change.224 
This power and control exercised by the media carries clear risks.  Media 
framing and publication choices, including choices regarding the timing of 
leaked data’s publication, may distort policy responses by causing 
governments to over- or underreact to a leak.  Furthermore, media 
organizations’ decisions regarding how much data to publish and what 
documents to release may also generate enforcement costs for tax authorities, 
like those incurred to supplement incomplete data.  Media organizations may 
also exert ongoing control over data they choose to withhold and may use it in 
ways not visible to tax authorities or the public. 
This is not to say that media intervention and intermediation is bad or 
harmful.  It is possible, likely even, that the gains to tax enforcement from 
work done by media actors outstrips the potential downsides and risks.  Our 
point, rather, is that these downsides, risks, and impacts inherent in the 
publication and editorial choices made by media intermediaries have not 
been sufficiently examined. 
  
223. As the ICIJ explains: 
The [ICIJ], together with the German newspaper Suddeutsche Zeitung and 
more than 100 other media partners, spent a year sifting through 11.5 million 
leaked files to expose the offshore holdings of world political leaders, links to global 
scandals, and details of the hidden financial dealings of fraudsters, drug traffickers, 
billionaires, celebrities, sports stars and more. 
 About This Project, supra note 113. 
224. See Ryle, supra note 216 (discussing ICIJ’s separation from the Center for Public 
Integrity based on a “strategic assessment” of its forward-looking priorities). 




Even before information reaches media organizations, leakers must 
gather it.225  Leakers have obvious discretion over whose information to 
collect, what kinds of information to collect, what date ranges to capture, and 
when to collect it.  These decisions may be driven by a variety of factors including 
the leaker’s proximity or access to data, desire for retribution, risk of detection or 
punishment, nature of personal relationships, level of technical skill, or moral 
views.  The decisional criteria employed by leakers effectively create the original 
data pool.  Unlike media organizations and journalists, the identities of the leakers 
may be anonymous (protected by journalists) or secret, rendering it more difficult 
to divine or question the leaker’s motivations. 
While many of the tax leaks to date have come from former employee-
whistleblowers, a few are by anonymous actors and at least two (Panama 
Papers and Paradise Papers) are widely thought to be the result of a hack.  
Hackers may be driven by different agendas than employee-whistleblowers.  
Thus, if hacks become more common with respect to tax data, tax authorities 
may need to be cognizant of a new array of hidden agendas that might start to 
drive leaked data. 
Leakers also control whom to approach with the data.  Currently, this is 
largely a choice between going to media organizations like ICIJ and 
WikiLeaks or to government agencies.  To the extent governments and the 
media have different agendas, protocols, and levels of transparency, the 
leaker’s choice of delivery may affect how leaked information is disseminated 
and consumed.  For example, a leak to the ICIJ, a media organization that will 
post some of the data publicly on the internet, could potentially trigger a more 
widespread set of responses than a leak to a single government agency.  In Subpart 
III.B, we outline one example of how the ICIJ’s intervention in publicizing leaked 
data led to a surge of interest and activity by countries that had not previously 
acted, by examining the case of the HSBC leak.226 
3. Secondary Users and Information Consumers 
A third category of agenda setters consists of secondary consumers, 
editorialists, and users of information gathered by leakers and disseminated 
by governments or primary media organizations.  Such consumers, including 
  
225. See supra notes 17, 187 and accompanying text. 
226. See Subpart III.B infra. 
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NGOs, nonprofits, international bodies, secondary media outlets, and the 
general public, also play an auxiliary role in controlling the agenda.  These 
actors process, digest, interpret, and opine on leaked data and government 
responses to leaks, and this creates a public conversation that can impact 
governments’ ultimate policy and enforcement reactions. 
For example, the Tax Justice Network (TJN) is an independent international 
research and advocacy network.  Its key activities include preparing reports, 
articles, and other materials, organizing research conferences, and engaging 
in advocacy work.227  One of the key topics attracting TJN’s attention is the 
issue of financial secrecy, in particular beneficial ownership of offshore 
entities, information exchange, and the mechanisms underlying tax secrecy.  
TJN has written multiple blog posts and research reports on offshore evasion, 
covering the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers, HSBC, and UBS leaks.228  In 
doing so, TJN has relied on data released by ICIJ as well as its own research. 
Oxfam, an international umbrella organization that works with local 
communities in over 90 countries to fight poverty, also episodically releases 
blog posts and updates about developments in the fight against tax evasion 
and its impacts on poverty and inequality.229  Organizations like TJN, Oxfam, 
and others such as Christian Aid and Global Financial Integrity play an 
influential role in shaping the public conversation about leaks and putting 
pressure on governments and tax authorities to respond.230 
  
227. Our Team and Structure, TAX JUST. NETWORK, http://www.taxjustice.net/about/who-
we-are/team-structure [https://perma.cc/VPX8-PL9P]. 
228. HSBC Leaks, TAX JUST. NETWORK, http://www.taxjustice.net/tag/hsbc-leaks 
[https://perma.cc/5NHB-BFYB] (publishing posts tagged “HSBC Leaks”); Panama Papers,  
TAX JUST. NETWORK, http://www.taxjustice.net/tag/panama-papers [https://perma.cc/ 7P2G-
T3GB]  (publishing posts tagged “Panama Papers”); Secrecy, TAX JUST. NETWORK, 
http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/secrecy [https://perma.cc/3RAY-FLMF] (publishing blog 
posts on offshore secrecy); UBS, TAX JUST. NETWORK, http://www.taxjustice.net/tag/ubs 
[https://perma.cc/UPJ6-FF8F] (publishing posts tagged “UBS”); George Turner, TJN Responds 
to the #ParadisePapers, TAX JUST. NETWORK (Nov. 5, 2017), 
https://www.taxjustice.net/2017/11/05/press-release-tjn-responds-paradisepapers 
[https://perma.cc/KH29-2DRR]. 
229. Tax Avoidance, OXFAM INT’L, https://www.oxfam.org/en/tags/tax-avoidance 
[https://perma.cc/AMX3-RCJH] (publishing posts tagged “tax avoidance”); Tax Evasion, 
OXFAM INT’L, https://www.oxfam.org/en/tags/tax-evasion [https://perma.cc/EZK5-
RRPT] (publishing posts tagged “tax evasion”).  Oxfam has 20 affiliates across countries.  
Our Governance, OXFAM INT’L, https://www.oxfam.org/en/our-governance 
[https://perma.cc/Z9DC-C6N7]; see also Countries Where We Work, OXFAM INT’L, 
https://www.oxfam.org/en/worldwide [https://perma.cc/KZV3-ZVN8] (listing the 90 
countries in which Oxfam operates). 
230. For examples, see CHRISTIAN AID, https://www.christianaid.org.uk/search/gss?keys=leaks 
[https://perma.cc/PT7W-ARY6], which displays search results for keyword “Leaks,” and 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, http://www.gfintegrity.org [https://perma.cc/2E3T-YNYP]. 
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These NGOs and nonprofits, together with secondary media outlets and 
reporters, raise public awareness about tax leaks and how governments have 
responded to them.  This public discourse may ultimately shape government 
actions.  For example, if journalists express outrage over offshore tax evasion, 
these sentiments may be passed on to the public, and may put pressure on 
governments to embrace strong (perhaps overly strong) policy responses. 
Ultimately, the full array of agenda setters—from media organizations to 
leakers to NGOs and other secondary users of leaked data—may have 
independent and potentially conflicting agendas that may shift over time and 
that may not be primarily about optimizing tax compliance or 
enforcement.231  For example, some agenda setters may be predominantly 
interested in transparency, poverty reduction, or perceived unfairness and 
may prioritize these concerns over the broader and more comprehensive goal 
of welfare-maximizing tax policy.  Others may be driven by a broader mission 
to expose systemic flaws and drive fundamental legal or political change. 
These disparate agendas may create agency costs for a country or tax 
authority that strives to optimize enforcement of existing tax laws but must 
rely on the work of media organizations and leakers to obtain information.  
To be sure, leaked data yields clear benefits to tax authorities and countries, 
who may be able to use leaked information concerning specific taxpayers and 
transactions to advance enforcement targets and reduce evasion.232  In 
particular, the work of media intermediaries and other actors may help offset 
the effects of insiders such as powerful lobbyists, thereby yielding 
distributional gains.  However, to the extent that the underlying agendas of 
external agents drive leaks, and leaks drive legal and regulatory responses, 
welfare-maximizing tax policymakers should be cognizant of how the 
agendas of various actors may inadvertently influence or consciously 
manipulate broader government priorities.  While the underlying interests of 
agenda setters may well lead to socially beneficial legal change, the risk is that 
governments may enact law and policy responses without a full 
understanding of how these agenda setters and their complex motives have 
influenced outcomes. 
  
231. See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 202, § 6.6.2.2 (exploring concerns regarding the limited 
accountability of NGOs in the international tax arena). 
232. See supra Subpart II.B.2. 
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B. The Messy Transmission of Leaked Data 
Leaked data does not necessarily reach governments and tax authorities 
quickly or effectively.  Instead, the transmission of leaked data is imperfect 
and messy. 
Transmission delays are by no means unique to leaks; they occur 
elsewhere in international tax information exchange and enforcement.  
However, there is reason to think that the exogenous nature of leaked data 
and the varied political interests and processing capabilities of the countries, 
intermediaries, and others that encounter it may exacerbate such delays in the 
context of leaks.  Perhaps more pertinently, the high salience of leaked data 
means that time lags and transmission failures in the leak context create 
distinctive risks, for example, by exacerbating perceptions that authorities are 
“doing nothing.” 
As discussed, there are currently two dominant transmission pathways 
by which data is leaked: First, data may be initially released to a government 
agency, after which its existence subsequently becomes known to the public.  
Second, data may be leaked directly to media organizations, which then 
publicize it broadly.233  These pathways are not mutually exclusive.  There is 
often an interplay among the actions of the media organizations, government 
actors, and secondary commentators in the messy process of data 
transmission.  Moreover, there is not necessarily uniformity in the 
approaches employed by either governments or the media.  Governments, for 
example, may employ a diversity of approaches in either encouraging or 
discouraging transmission of leaked data.  Some governments actively encourage 
leaks, for example, by expanding whistleblower protections or developing 
programs to leverage leaks into secondary information dumps.234  Others 
  
233. See supra Subparts I.C, III.A. 
234. For example, U.S. taxpayers who had engaged in offshore evasion could enter an OVDP 
and obtain protection against criminal prosecution by paying a penalty and agreeing to 
share information about other taxpayers, banks, and bankers.  Leandra Lederman, The 
Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 
VILL. L. REV. 499 (2012).  This strategy can be described as the facilitation of a secondary 
leak market.  Another example of such secondary leak facilitation is the United States’s 
pursuit of undeclared offshore assets in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Israel that may have 
moved to those jurisdictions from Switzerland after the UBS leak.  Kara Scannell, US 
Intensifies Fight Against Tax Evasion by Using Data Mining, FIN. TIMES (June 18, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/719544f6-529b-11e7-bfb8-997009366969 [https://perma.cc/ 
EX9K-792Q].  This follow-up government action reflects the strategy of using 
information received through the OVDPs to pursue offshore accounts in other 
jurisdictions.  Publicity about these enforcement actions in turn provides further 
impetus for more taxpayers to come forward voluntarily. See Oei, supra note 2 
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engage in censorship and denial to protect elites.  Still other governments, 
such as Germany, actively purchase leaked data from various sources, in 
order to use it in tax enforcement.  And of course, some governments use 
leaks as the political impetus for stronger enforcement or law reform.235 
The complicated interplay of how the actions of governments and media 
organizations interact to determine the ultimate transmission and use of 
leaked data on a global scale, and the costs and benefits of such transmission 
and use, are vividly illustrated in the tale of the HSBC “Swissleaks” scandal. 
1. France and the HSBC “Swissleaks” Episode 
The HSBC client data was originally obtained by bank employee Hervé 
Falciani in 2006–07.236  In January 2009, French authorities acquired the data 
in connection with a search of Falciani’s home (which had been requested by 
Swiss authorities) and began investigating it.237  This acquisition marks the 
first established transfer of the data from the leaker to someone else.  
Responding to Swiss criticisms of governments’ purchases of stolen data—a 
strategy employed by countries such as Germany—France maintained that 
they had not paid Falciani for the information.238 
Switzerland asked France for the HSBC data, and in December 2009,239 
the French agreed to share a copy but expressed their intent to continue using 
the data themselves.240  After receiving the leaked data from the French, the 
Swiss government shared the stolen data with HSBC in March 2010, 
reportedly assuring HSBC that it “‘[would] not support the use of the stolen 
  
(discussing in Section II.B these “cascading compliance” mechanisms that facilitate 
compliance). 
235. Examples include the United States’s FATCA legislation, the Common Reporting 
Standard, and the progress made towards exchange of tax rulings among EC member 
states.  See generally Oei, supra note 2 (analyzing U.S. offshore compliance efforts). 
236. See supra Subpart I.B.2. 
237. David D. Stewart, Swiss President Seeks to Delay Approval of French Treaty Protocol, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 18, 2009.  Reportedly, in mid-2008, Falciani and another 
HSBC employee sent anonymous emails to tax authorities in multiple European 
countries claiming to possess a large client list for a Swiss private bank along with access 
to its computers.  David Gauthier-Villars & Deborah Ball, Mass Leak of Client Data 
Rattles Swiss Banking, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704629804575324510662164360. 
238. Stewart, supra note 237. 
239. David D. Stewart, HSBC Private Bank Admits Data Theft Affected 24,000 Swiss Accounts, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Mar. 12, 2010. 
240. Id. (detailing events surrounding the leak of HSBC data); see also Gauthier-Villars & 
Ball, supra note 237 (also detailing events surrounding the leak of HSBC data). 
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data to answer requests from foreign authorities’ and that the French 
government [would] not use the data it obtained ‘inappropriately.’”241 
2. The German Purchase 
While this leaked data was making a round trip from France back 
through Switzerland to HSBC, Germany expressed interest in purchasing the 
data from Falciani.242  Ultimately, data on approximately 1500 German 
taxpayers was purchased not by the federal government but by the German state 
of North Rhine-Westphalia on February 26, 2010 for a reported price of €2.5 
million.243 
3. France Shares Data: The U.S. Mess and the “Lagarde List” 
By April 2010, France had decrypted the data and identified a total of 
127,000 accounts, representing 79,000 individuals from a variety of 
countries.244  Throughout 2010, France provided various countries with parts 
of the data pertaining to their taxpayers, including Italy, Spain, the United 
Kingdom,245 Canada,246 and the United States.247 
  
241. Stewart, supra note 239. 
242. See Randall Jackson, Germany Poised to Buy Swiss Bank Data, 57 TAX NOTES INT’L 487, 
487 (2010); Germany Will Buy ‘Tax Evaders’ List If Real, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2010, 3:26 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8491552.stm [https://perma.cc/56J3-JB9S]. 
243. Jackson, supra note 242; see also Hoke, SwissLeaks, supra note 55; Randall Jackson, 
German State Buys Data on Tax Cheats, 57 TAX NOTES INT’L 829 (2010). Rhine-
Westphalia subsequently bought more HSBC data. Stephanie Soong Johnston, German 
State Purchases More Data to Snare HSBC Account Holders, 64 TAX NOTES INT’L 260 
(2011). Apparently, the well-known fact that German tax authorities had and would be 
willing to buy Swiss financial account data to help identify tax evaders prompted an 
indirect response by the Swiss government.  In 2017, Germany detained a Swiss man 
(reportedly working for the Swiss Federal Intelligence Service) for spying on German 
tax authorities and trying to ascertain the identities of the German authorities who had 
been buying data on the Swiss accounts of foreigners.  William Hoke, Germany Detains 
Swiss Man Allegedly Spying on German Tax Authorities, 86 TAX NOTES INT’L 475, 475 
(2017).  As recently as July 4, 2017, Germany reported acquiring Panama Papers data for 
a fee that others have indicated reached approximately 5 million Euros.  See William 
Hoke, German Authorities Pay to Acquire Panama Papers, 87 TAX NOTES INT’L 115, 115 
(2017).  
244. Randall Jackson, France to Investigate Possible Tax Cheats Listed in Stolen HSBC Data, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Apr. 20, 2010. 
245. Gauthier-Villars & Ball, supra note 237 (reporting that France provided data to Italy, 
Spain and the United Kingdom). 
246. Kristen A. Parillo, U.K., Canada Authorities Targeting HSBC Clients, 60 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 74, 74 (2010) (indicating that the United Kingdom and Canada received HSBC 
data from France). 
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a. The United States Controversy 
In the case of the United States, the timing of its receipt of the data and 
its internal dissemination between U.S. government agencies have created 
controversy: In 2012, the DOJ had entered into a deferred prosecution 
agreement (DPA) with HSBC Bank USA, NA and HSBC Holdings regarding 
violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, the International Emergency Powers Act, 
and the Trading with the Enemy Act, along with other charges.  Although the 
DPA related to non-tax matters, the U.S. decision to enter into the DPA 
received significant criticism in light of the HSBC leak on grounds that it was 
too lenient.248  The main source of controversy was whether the DOJ knew of 
the HSBC data at the time it entered into the DPA.  If so, there was a plausible 
argument that the terms of the DPA were inappropriately generous. 
Loretta Lynch, who negotiated the DPA in her capacity as U.S. Attorney for 
the Eastern District of New York, later stated (when she was U.S. Attorney 
General): “To my knowledge, my office did not have access to the Falciani 
documents prior to the execution of the DPA.”249  She further observed: “I am 
not aware of whether or how the information was conveyed to the 
department, nor do I have information about why my office did not have 
access to it.”250  Given that the IRS reports having received the information in 
April 2010,251 two years before the DPA, this raised questions about whether 
the information was shared with the DOJ, and if so, why Lynch’s office did 
not have it.  Alternatively, if the information was not shared with DOJ, this 
would reflect a transmission failure between U.S. agencies and might raise 
questions about the validity or appropriateness of the DPA. 
More broadly, the debate over who within the U.S. government knew 
what and when illustrates the transmission issues, enforcement and potential 
agency costs, and inefficiencies that continue to arise even after one agency in 
  
247. Burow, supra note 57, at 556 (reporting that former deputy commissioner (international), 
IRS Large Business & International, Michael Danilack, stated that in April 2010, the IRS 
received information from France on U.S. taxpayers’ HSBC accounts via the France-
U.S. treaty). 
248. See Peter J. Henning, HSBC Case Tests Transparency of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/business 
/dealbook/hsbc-case-tests-transparency-of-deferred-prosecution-agreements.html 
(noting Judge Gleeson was initially hesitant to approve the DPA, concerned that it was too 
lenient given the conduct’s seriousness). 
249. Dan Roberts, Loretta Lynch Confirmation as Attorney General Dogged by HSBC Scandal, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2015, 1:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/20/ 
loretta-lynch-confirmation-attorney-general-hsbc-scandal [https://perma.cc/R5MU-H3XH]. 
250. Id. 
251. See Burow, supra note 57. 
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a jurisdiction has received leaked data.  For example, the DOJ’s prosecutorial 
decisions, paired with public knowledge of the existence of the highly salient 
HSBC data and the possible transmission failures between agencies, risks 
creating the impression that DOJ was either soft on banks, inept, or not 
serious about enforcement. 
b. Greece 
Greece also received HSBC accountholder information.  French Finance 
Minister Christine Lagarde shared information about Greek taxpayers with 
Greek Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou in 2010, the so-called 
“Lagarde list.”252  However, no action was taken, possibly because the list 
implicated some Greek elites.253  In 2012, Papaconstantinou’s successors in 
the Greek Finance Ministry became aware of the information, and the 
“Lagarde list” reappeared, mysteriously minus the names of three individuals 
who were relatives of Papaconstantinou.  As a result, Papaconstantinou was 
convicted in 2015 of tampering with evidence, although he was acquitted on 
charges of breach of duty for failing to take action on the Lagarde 
information.254 
The case of Greece illustrates some countries’ resistance to using leaked 
data to pursue tax offenders, as well as the agency costs that might arise where 
the interests of elites may not align with those of tax enforcement.  
Government officials may fail to act in order to protect certain interests (for 
example, politicians or their relatives named in a leak) or advance competing 
agendas (for example, international alliances with tax havens or other 
domestic priorities).255  In such cases, transmission and receipt of data may stall.  
If the data is salient and known to the public, stalled transmission may turn out to 
be particularly costly to governments in terms of public outrage and taxpayer 
morale.256 
  
252. Philip Pangalos & Nektaria Stamouli, Scandal Deepens Over Greece’s ‘Lagarde List’, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2012, 5:36 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles 
/SB10001424127887323984704578207920210424446. 
253. Hoke, SwissLeaks, supra note 55, at 973. 
254. Id.; see also Kerin Hope, Former Greek Finance Minister Found Guilty in ‘Lagarde List’ 
Case, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/3f284250-d257-11e4-
ae91-00144feab7de. 
255. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra Subpart II.C.2. 
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4. Enter the ICIJ 
The next notable event in the dissemination of the HSBC data occurred 
on February 8, 2015, when the ICIJ published information on approximately 
60,000 HSBC files.257  The data came to the ICIJ via the French newspaper, Le 
Monde, which had secured the files in early 2014 from French government 
sources.258  Le Monde shared the information with the ICIJ.  Over the 
remainder of 2014, journalists from more than 60 media outlets, in 
cooperation and coordination with the ICIJ, reviewed and processed the files.  
The ICIJ sent letters to the named account holders stating that they would be 
publishing some of the data.259 
a. Reverberations From ICIJ’s Data Publication: Dissemination to New 
Countries 
The ICIJ publication of significant amounts of HSBC data created a 
ripple effect across the global tax enforcement community.  First, countries 
that had not yet received or sought the leaked data now made information 
requests.  For example, Brazil, which does have a tax treaty with France, had 
not received any information directly from France.  The information published 
by the ICIJ was the first information the Brazilian authorities received, and 
according to a March 3, 2015 statement, Brazil thereafter sought from France a 
full list of Brazilian taxpayers with HSBC accounts.260 
Similarly, in February 2015, France provided information to Austria on 
513 accounts held by Austrian taxpayers after Austria had made a direct 
request upon learning that the list included “data relating to Austria.”261  
Several months later, in September 2015, France delivered a list of 80,000 
Cypriot taxpayers with HSBC accounts to Cyprus.262  Danish authorities 
announced on February 9, 2015 (one day after the ICIJ publication of the 
  
257. Burow, supra note 57, at 555. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Teri Sprackland, Brazil Expands Tax Probe to 7,000 HSBC Account Holders, 78 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 695, 695 (2015) (noting that the “worldwide distribution of [some of] the 
data by the ICIJ prompted calls for further investigations in countries that hadn’t been 
given prior access”); Teri Sprackland, Brazil Opens Tax Investigation of HSBC Clients, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Mar. 4, 2015. 
261. Teri Sprackland, France Delivers Austrian HSBC Data, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 342, 342 
(2015). 
262. Teri Sprackland, Cyprus Gets Its Share of Lagarde List, 79 TAX NOTES INT’L 925, 925 
(2015). 
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data), that they were seeking the names of Danish taxpayers who may have 
avoided taxes through the use of Swiss accounts.263  The ICIJ’s publication had 
apparently triggered news reports of Danes with assets hidden in Swiss 
accounts, which spurred Danish authorities to act.264  Danish tax authorities 
confirmed that prior to February 2015, they had not requested the 
information from the French, even though the HSBC lists had been shared 
with other countries.265 
In the case of India, although the government had received 
approximately 628 taxpayer names from France in 2011, the leaked files made 
available through the ICIJ and its network of news agencies (including the 
Indian newspaper, The Indian Express) resulted in the identification of 
almost double that number with HSBC accounts.266 
b. Expanded Ability of Some Countries to Use the Data 
A second collateral effect of the ICIJ’s publication was that some 
countries that had previously obtained the information were able to expand 
their ability to effectively use it.  For example, although the United Kingdom 
had obtained HSBC data concerning its taxpayers from France in 2010 via an 
exchange agreement, use of the data was apparently limited under the 
agreement to tax compliance purposes only.267  But in February 2015, Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) announced that French tax 
authorities had agreed to remove the “tax-only” restrictions on the United 
Kingdom’s use of the data, and to permit the United Kingdom to share the 
  




265. Id.  Danish Tax Minister, Benny Engelbrecht, requested the list from France and 
ordered an investigation into why the data had not been sought earlier.  Denmark 
Ignored Hidden Swiss Fortunes for Years, LOCAL DEN. (Feb. 9, 2015, 10:13 AM), 
http://www.thelocal.dk/20150209/denmark-ignored-information-on-hidden-swiss-
fortunes [https://perma.cc/MMD5-T2EE]. 
266. See Stephanie Soong Johnston, HSBC Faces Tax Evasion Charges in India, 81 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 737 (2016); Jerin Mathew, HSBC Leaked List: 1,195 Indians Including Country’s 
Richest Mukesh Ambani Have Swiss Accounts, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015, 7:54 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hsbc-leaked-list-1195-indians-including-countrys-richest-
mukesh-ambani-have-swiss-accounts-1487141 [https://perma.cc/936Z-ZBNC]. 
267. Margaret Burow, HMRC Secures Agreement With French Tax Authorities to Share Stolen 
HSBC Data, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Feb. 26, 2015; HM Revenue & Customs, HMRC 
Confirms HSBC Suisse Bank Data Can Now Be Shared, GOV.UK (Feb. 25, 2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hmrc-confirms-hsbc-suisse-bank-data-can-
now-be-shared [https://perma.cc/3NRE-ZJNB]. 
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information with other law enforcement agencies including the Serious Fraud 
Office, the Financial Conduct Authority, the City of London Police, the 
National Crime Agency, and Eurojust.  This agreement came after ICIJ had 
publicly released much of the stolen HSBC data on February 8, 2015.268 
5. Shifting Swiss Position 
A notable constraint on countries’ ability to effectively use data obtained 
by leak was Switzerland’s historic refusal to entertain treaty information 
exchange requests that were based on stolen data.269  For example, if leaked 
data provided preliminary indications of potential tax evasion by a country’s 
taxpayers using Swiss bank accounts, a standard course of action would be for 
that country to make a treaty request to Switzerland for further information 
based on the leaked data.  The Swiss refusal to entertain these requests 
thwarted countries’ ability to obtain more information and created barriers 
and costs to using leaked data.270 
In September 2015, Switzerland signaled a possible shift in its 
position:271 The Swiss Federal Council began a consultation process regarding 
a proposed amendment to its tax administration assistance act that would 
permit Switzerland to respond to those data requests that were based on 
  
268. See supra note 267.  French Finance Minister Michel Sapin has questioned the accuracy 
of the United Kingdom’s claim that its ability to use the data had been restricted by 
France.  See, e.g., Juliette Garside et al., France Says It Did Not Restrict UK From Using 
HSBC Files to Pursue Bank and Criminals, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:29 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/13/france-says-it-did-not-restrict-uk-
from-using-hsbc-files-to-pursue-bank-and-criminals [https://perma.cc/XT9N-NFNH]. 
269. Hoke, Swiss Court Convicts, supra note 55; see also Burow, supra note 57 (noting Indian 
Finance Minister Arun Jaitley reported that Switzerland demanded evidence other than 
the stolen HSBC data before it would cooperate in an exchange of information request); 
Stewart, supra note 239 (reporting that Switzerland assured HSBC that it would not 
“support the use of the stolen data to answer requests from foreign authorities”). 
270. See, e.g., William Hoke, Swiss Court Denies French Request for HSBC Data Based on 
Illegally Acquired Information, 86 TAX NOTES INT’L 134 (2017) (discussing how French 
inability to request additional information from the Swiss government based on leaked 
information limits the usefulness of the leaked data). 
271. See Hoke, Swiss Court Convicts, supra note 55; J.P. Finet, Swiss Considering Limited 
Assistance on Requests Based on Stolen Data, 2015 WTD171-2 (LEXIS).  We have seen a 
general shift in the Swiss perspective on information sharing.  See, e.g., William Hoke, 
Swiss Court Allows Sharing of HSBC Account Data With India, 87 TAX NOTES INT’L 312 
(2017) (“Swiss courts are increasingly in favor of information exchange.”).  For 
additional evidence of an evolving Swiss position, see id. (reporting that in deciding not 
to block India’s request for account information under the India-Switzerland tax treaty, 
the Swiss court noted that India obtained the information from the Lagarde list and not 
directly from Falciani, who had stolen it). 
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stolen data obtained either through standard administrative channels or from 
public sources.272  In June 2016, the Federal Council adopted the amendment, 
which is now continuing through the enactment process.273  The shifting 
Swiss position was no doubt triggered by the expanding march of the data 
across the globe, facilitated by France and the ICIJ.274  In July 2017, France 
and Switzerland ultimately reached agreement on the terms by which 
Switzerland will exchange financial account information (such as UBS 
account data) although some French account holders will likely challenge the 
agreement.275 
6. Lessons From the HSBC Story 
The foregoing description starkly illustrates how the HSBC data worked 
its way from the original data holder to multiple tax authorities and 
governments across the world, and to the public generally.  The tale of 
HSBC’s leaked data and the winding path it took across the globe shows that 
the transmission of leaked tax data is neither seamless nor costless. 
a. Time Lags 
Time lags at different stages in the process, including that experienced 
by various countries in obtaining the data, making treaty requests for 
information, bringing tax enforcement against evaders, and investigating 
financial intermediaries, resulted in limited action taken between 2010 and 
2016.  While time lags are not unique to leaks, the unique nature of leaked 
data may exacerbate such delays and transmission failures among countries 
and other stakeholders.  For example, the arrival of leaked data may be 
unexpected, and countries may be unprepared to react to it.  In addition, 
some countries may welcome the data (for example, France and the United 
  
272. Hoke, Swiss Court Convicts, supra note 55. 
273. Administrative and Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters, SWITZ. FED. DEP’T FIN. (July 2017), 
https://www.efd.admin.ch/efd/en/home/themen/steuern/steuern-
international/administrative-and-mutual-assistance-in-tax-matters/fb-amts-und-
rechtshilfe_steuerbereich.html [https://perma.cc/8EAZ-CRHZ]; Federal Council Adopts 
Dispatch on Amending Tax Administrative Assistance Act, FED. COUNCIL (June 10, 2016), 
https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-62129.html 
[https://perma.cc/5E44-FSDE].  
274. But in April 2017, a Swiss court rejected a request from France for HSBC data on the 
grounds that the request itself was based on information stolen by a bank employee 
working in Switzerland (and thus subject to Swiss law).  Hoke, supra note 270. 
275. William Hoke, France and Switzerland Reach Agreement on Sharing UBS Account 
Details, 87 TAX NOTES INT’L 208 (2017). 
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Kingdom) while others may condemn it (for example, Switzerland and 
Greece), triggering diplomatic negotiations and interactions that take time. 
Extended time lags risk signaling to taxpayers that a government is not 
serious about tax enforcement, particularly in cases where the public is aware 
of the data and the data is perceived as high impact.  Time lags may also signal 
to potential leakers and whistleblowers that authorities may not necessarily 
act on leaked information or data caches. 
b. Intra-Jurisdictional Sharing 
Intra-jurisdiction sharing of data was also an issue.  For example, the 
United Kingdom’s efforts to make the HSBC data available to its non-tax 
enforcement agencies initially faced potential legal hurdles based on the 
terms of the initial transfer of information from France.276  Another example 
is the unresolved questions surrounding the transmission of the HSBC data 
between the IRS and the DOJ in the United States, and its effects on the U.S.-
HSBC DPA.277 
Thus, inefficiencies in interagency transmission within a country can 
lead to failure to effectively share information between agencies.  Even an 
efficient system of interagency cooperation can encounter transmission 
barriers and costs due to legal constraints.  These barriers and inefficiencies 
constitute additional costs to using leaked data in tax enforcement and may 
create the perception of reduced benefits of leaking or blowing the whistle.  
While intra-jurisdictional information sharing failures are not unique to 
leaks, the high salience of leaked data may shine particular light on such 
failures in the context of leaks.  This may be beneficial in terms of encouraging 
reform and improvement, but it may also be costly in terms of tax morale and trust 
in government. 
c. Different Responses by Different Countries 
Across jurisdictions, tax authorities exhibited vastly uneven conduct and 
levels of commitment with respect to their initial acquisition of data, efforts to 
build on the data, willingness to use the data in enforcement and/or policy 
actions, and willingness to ignore or alter data.  This variety likely reflects a 
mix of factors including differing internal priorities, tax authority resources, 
  
276. See supra notes 267–268 and accompanying text. 
277. See supra notes 248–251 and accompanying text. 
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capture by agents with different agendas, and underlying national 
commitments to tax enforcement. 
Once again, while heterogeneity of interests and capabilities across 
countries is not a feature unique to leaks, leaked data’s salience is likely to 
illuminate these priorities and deficiencies.  Such heightened salience may 
yield the benefit of illuminating government failures and internal agendas 
and of spurring corrective action.  But it may also carry the risk of triggering 
less-than-rational reactions and unfair assessments of what might actually be 
reasoned policy choices. 
d. The Role of Media Organizations in Data Transmission 
Regardless of the specific mix of factors in play in each country, the very 
public nature of the 2015 ICIJ data publication led many countries to rethink 
their approach to the data’s existence.  Following the ICIJ’s publication, some 
jurisdictions sought information for the first time, others pushed harder to 
get a full picture of the data or to obtain supporting information, and still 
others undertook investigations of their own governments to determine why 
the matter had not been meaningfully pursued to date. 
The role played by media organization in widely disseminating the 
leaked HSBC data reveals the interplay between a tax or finance authority’s 
calculus on enforcement decisions and the influential power of media actors 
such as the ICIJ.  The ICIJ’s intervention in this case certainly increased the 
salience and impact of the leaked data and served as a wake-up call to some 
countries, particularly given the weight of public opinion.  But it is worth 
noting that ICIJ intervened on its own terms and timetable. 
Moreover, the ICIJ’s publication created a risk to some governments (for 
example, those that had not acquired the data or acted on it) of being 
perceived as incompetent or disinterested in punishing offshore offenders.  
While this might certainly have been true in some cases, government action 
in other cases (such as the United Kingdom) may have been stalled for legal 
or pragmatic reasons.278 
The uneven transmission of information across jurisdictions in the 
HSBC case shows that the effects of a data leak will likely be messy, costly and 
different for different countries.  Leaked data may yield clear and distinct 
benefits for some countries.  However, just because one country can harness 
leaked data in a relatively costless manner does not mean that other countries 
  
278. See supra notes 267–268 and accompanying text. 
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will be able to do so.  Some jurisdictions will have to incur larger costs to 
obtain, verify, and effectively use the data.  Others will incur costs due to time 
lags, declines in public confidence, or legal or political constraints on their 
ability to use the data.  These costs may be exacerbated by the very public and 
salient character of data leaks.  In summary, highly salient leaked data’s 
bumpy transmission pathway means that additional costs and distortions 
may be incurred in the lengthy process of turning leaks into government 
action. 
C. Leak-Driven Laws 
As discussed in Part II, a benefit of leaks is that they may provide an 
impetus for desirable legal change.  Conversely, though, a downside of leaks is 
that they may trigger reactionary responses by governments and other actors.  
We explore these dynamics in the context of the United States’s enactment of 
the 2008 FATCA legislation and other related offshore tax enforcement 
provisions in the aftermath of the UBS and LGT tax leaks.279 
1. U.S. Offshore Enforcement Responses to the UBS and LGT Leaks 
As discussed in Part I, the UBS and LGT leaks focused the world’s 
attention on high-net-worth American taxpayers who stashed assets offshore 
in Swiss bank accounts to avoid paying taxes.280  The United States responded 
by investigating and prosecuting the tax evaders and facilitators identified in 
the leak and by sanctioning UBS Bank, requiring it to enter into a deferred 
prosecution agreement under which it agreed to pay $780 million to the 
United States.281 
But the United States also went further: The DOJ prosecuted a few Swiss 
banks and entered into deferred and nonprosecution agreements with others 
through the “Swiss Bank Program,” waiving actual prosecution in exchange 
for certain concessions.282  It also used the information extracted from these 
Swiss banks and from UBS clients identified in the leak to obtain more 
  
279. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474 (2012).  See generally Oei, supra note 2 (discussing U.S. offshore 
tax enforcement initiatives). 
280. See supra Subpart I.B.1. 
281. See supra Subpart I.B.1; see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 41. 
282. Swiss Bank Program, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program 
[https://perma.cc/L6BG-VZE9] (last updated Feb. 6, 2017). 
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information about the holdings of other taxpayers with assets in other 
offshore banks.283 
By publicizing these investigatory and punitive strategies, the United 
States also pressured over 100,000 taxpayers to come forward and voluntarily 
disclose their non-compliance through the IRS’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure 
Programs (OVDPs), which allow taxpayers to resolve their offshore tax issues 
and declare previously undeclared offshore assets.  Taxpayers in OVDP pay a 
penalty and provide information regarding their offshore holdings and 
financial institutions, in exchange for the United States’s agreement not to 
prosecute them.284  Through these OVDPs, the United States has collected 
over $11.1 billion of unpaid taxes to date.285 
The United States also developed new legislation and tightened up 
enforcement of existing laws requiring foreign-asset reporting in the 
aftermath of the UBS and LGT leaks.  For example, it increased scrutiny of 
taxpayers who had failed to file the so-called FBAR or “Report of Foreign 
Bank and Financial Accounts” and broadened the reporting required of 
taxpayers holding interests in certain offshore entities.286  The capstone of the 
United States’s offshore tax enforcement initiatives was the enactment of the 
wide-reaching “Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act” or FATCA legislation 
in 2010.287  FATCA requires foreign financial institutions to conduct due 
diligence to identify and report to the United States (either directly or via 
their domestic tax authorities) the identities and account holdings of U.S. 
  
283. See supra notes 44, 234 and accompanying text. 
284. Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-
taxpayers/offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program [https://perma.cc/282V-YWW9] (last 
updated Aug. 3, 2017). In March 2018, the IRS announced that the program will end on 
September 28, 2018. IRS News Release IR-2018-52 (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-to-end-offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program-taxpayers-
with-undisclosed-foreign-assets-urged-to-come-forward-now 
285. IRS News Release IR-2018-52, supra note 284. See also Offshore Voluntary Compliance 
Efforts Top $10 Billion; More Than 100,000 Taxpayers Come Back Into Compliance, IRS 
(Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/offshore-voluntary-compliance-
efforts-top-10-billion-more-than-100000-taxpayers-come-back-into-compliance 
[https://perma.cc/9NFH-JCKQ] (reporting that as of October 2016, the regular and 
streamlined OVDPs had brought in $10 billion of unpaid taxes). 
286. See, e.g., Laura Saunders, IRS Gets Tougher on Offshore Tax Evaders, WALL STREET J. 
(July 20, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124804796387763807 
(“[Post-UBS] [t]he IRS [was] using a once-obscure tax form called the Foreign Bank 
Account Report, or FBAR, to force taxpayers to provide information on income they 
earn or bank accounts they hold overseas.”); see also Patrick J. McCormick, OVDP or 
Streamlined: Choosing an Offshore Disclosure Program, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 141 (2016) 
(exploring a taxpayer’s options for dealing with PFIC issues under the IRS’s OVDPs). 
287. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474 (2012). 
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taxpayers who hold assets with them; failure to comply with this due diligence 
yields an onerous withholding tax.288  FATCA also imposes reporting and 
disclosure requirements on individual U.S. taxpayers, requiring those with 
foreign financial assets over a certain de minimis threshold to file Form 8938 
annually with their tax return to disclose the assets.289  These new reporting 
requirements for individual taxpayers are in addition to the long-required 
FBAR filing. 
FATCA and the other U.S. offshore tax enforcement initiatives adopted 
in response to the UBS leak are complex, and describing all of their nuances is 
beyond the scope of this Article.290  The question, for our purposes, is whether 
these initiatives are a policy improvement, and whether there are ways in 
which they may be problematic. 
There is no doubt that the United States’s offshore tax enforcement 
initiatives have increased offshore revenues collected and improved offshore 
tax compliance more generally, doubling the number of FBAR reports filed, 
and bringing many taxpayers into compliance via the OVDPs.291  Thus, from 
a pure revenue perspective, FATCA has had benefits.  Yet FATCA remains a 
controversial law.  Many have criticized its costs and collateral consequences, 
as well as those generated by the other offshore tax enforcement initiatives.292  
  
288. Id. § 1471.  The FATCA withholding tax applies to all withholdable payments to that 
FFI, not just those related to U.S. account holders.  Id. 
289. Id. § 6038.  Individuals must report foreign financial assets on the relevant forms if the 
aggregate value of such assets exceeds $50,000 on the last day of the taxable year or 
$75,000 at any time during the taxable year ($100,000 and $150,000 for married filing 
jointly).  26 C.F.R. § 1.6038D-2(a)(1), (2) (2016).  The thresholds are higher for U.S. 
taxpayers living overseas: $200,000 on the last day of the taxable year or $300,000 at any 
time during the taxable year, or $400,000 and $600,000 for married filing jointly).  Id. 
§ 1.6038D-2(a)(3), (4). 
290. For a more extensive discussion of FATCA, see Blank & Mason, supra note 46; 
Christians, supra note 10; Mason, supra note 2; Morse, supra note 46; and Oei, supra 
note 2.  See also Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Transparency: A Tale of Two Countries, 39 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1153 (2016), which compares U.S. and Luxembourg responses to 
international tax evasion and avoidance. The critique of FACTA in this Subpart III.C 
draws on concurrent work by one of us. See Oei, supra note 2. 
291. See generally Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad: 
Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117, 146–61 (2014).  
292. For examples of critiques of the costs and collateral consequences from U.S. offshore tax 
enforcement efforts, see Allison Christians, The Dubious Legal Pedigree of IGAs (and 
Why It Matters), 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 565 (2013); Christians, supra note 10; Allison 
Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1403 (2013); Oei, 
supra note 2; Kirsch, supra note 291, at 161-70; Lee A. Sheppard, FATCA Is a Drone: 
What to Do About Compliance, 64 TAX NOTES INT’L 10 (2011); Frederic Behrens, Comment, 
Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Why FATCA Will Not Stand, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 205; 
Melissa A. Dizdarevic, Comment, The FATCA Provisions of the HIRE Act: Boldly Going 
Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2987 (2011); Allison 
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For example, in enacting FATCA, the United States may have failed to 
appropriately sort among differently situated taxpayers with offshore assets 
and may have also underestimated the costs to both the IRS and others of the 
new legislation.293 
2. Ensnaring the Wrong Taxpayers 
Commentators have noted that FATCA and the other offshore tax 
enforcement initiatives have affected not only tax evaders who willfully hid 
income and moved it offshore to evade taxes but also other taxpayers, including 
(1) Americans living abroad, (2) so-called “accidental Americans” who may have 
never lived in the United States, and (3) immigrants to the United States, 
including green card holders and foreign citizens working in the United 
States on long-term visas, who may have been unaware of their obligation to 
report and pay U.S. taxes on offshore assets.294 
All of these latter populations are U.S. taxpayers subject to U.S. tax on 
their worldwide income and to the reporting requirements of FATCA.  Many 
have or have had lives, livelihoods, and bank accounts abroad.  To be sure, 
some may not have complied with all of their tax reporting obligations 
perhaps out of ignorance or carelessness, for example, by failing to pay tax on 
interest earned in foreign bank accounts.  However, because these taxpayers 
have legitimate reasons for holding assets offshore other than tax evasion, one 
might argue that they may, as a whole, be less willful in their noncompliance 
than Americans who affirmatively choose to hide assets in tax havens to avoid 
paying taxes.  Some of these taxpayer populations and their representatives 
have complained about the high costs and burdens of FATCA compliance 
imposed on them since 2010.295  Some tax scholars have also noted the 
  
Christians & Arthur Cockfield, Submission to Finance Department on Implementation 
of FATCA in Canada (Mar. 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407264 
[https://perma.cc/WKR9-9YQJ]; and Arthur J. Cockfield, FATCA and the Erosion of 
Canadian Taxpayer Privacy (Apr. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2433198 [https://perma.cc/M7BR-
7G7X]. 
293. Christians, supra note 10, at 209; Oei, supra note 2. 
294. “Accidental Americans” refers to U.S. citizens who hold citizenship by birthright and 
are therefore subject to U.S. taxation, even if they have never lived in the United States.  
Christians, supra note 10, 193–94; see also Tessa Davis, The Tax-Immigration Nexus, 94 
DENV. L. REV. 195, 244–46 (2017). 
295. For example, the Democratic Party arm for Americans living abroad published in 2014 a 
research project documenting the hardships inflicted by FATCA on overseas Americans.  
DEMOCRATS ABROAD, FATCA: AFFECTING EVERYDAY AMERICANS EVERY DAY (2014), 
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potentially burdensome, unfair, or disproportionate impacts of FATCA 
reporting on those populations.296 
An additional point that must be kept in mind is the potentially different 
behavioral elasticities of various groups.  If the behaviors of willful taxpayers 
are elastic with respect to U.S. enforcement efforts (for example, if they find 
other ways to evade or simply stop holding foreign assets) then the burdens 
imposed by FATCA will ultimately not be borne by them.  One might argue 
that this outcome is not problematic, because it means that FATCA has 
effectively deterred the willful offshoring of undeclared assets.  A problem 
arises, however, if other taxpayer populations, including Americans living 
and working abroad and inbound immigrants with ties to other countries, are 
less able to readily divest themselves of their offshore holdings.  If so, these 
taxpayers will be stuck with FATCA’s onerous reporting requirements over the 
longer term.297  While FATCA’s high costs may have effectively deterred willful 
evaders from holding offshore assets, it may have done so at the expense of 
onerous burdens on less culpable taxpayers whose holdings are less elastic. 
The different impacts of FATCA and related provisions on 
heterogeneous taxpayer populations illustrate a possible downside of law 
driven by high salience tax leaks.  In the dramatic aftermath of the UBS and 
LGT leaks, those responsible for punishing egregious and willful offshore tax 
offenses and formulating the new FATCA regime may not have adequately 
considered the collateral burdens on other populations.  It is likely that the 
dominant issue of concern to tax authorities was the actions of those who 
willfully removed assets from the United States and hid them offshore.  The 
  
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Att%202%20Democrats%20Abroad%20201
4%20FATCA%20Research%20Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AXS-XPZR].  The report was 
submitted to Congress, the IRS, and Treasury.  Various nonprofit groups and other 
organizations representing the interests of Americans living abroad have also complained 
about FATCA’s burdens.  See, e.g., Joseph DiSciullo, AICPA Seeks to End Duplicative Reporting 
for Americans Abroad, 152 TAX NOTES 1237 (2016); The Right Way to U.S. Tax Compliance, 
AM. OVERSEAS, https://americansoverseas.org/en/tax-liability [https://perma.cc/2M9F-
XYDM]; Why FATCA Is Bad for America—Update, AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, 
https://www.americansabroad.org/why-fatca-is-bad-for-america-update 
[https://perma.cc/9FUS-6P42]. 
296. See Christians, supra note 10 at 209; Davis, supra note 294, at 244–46; S. Bruce Hiran, 
Overview of FATCA, 152 TAX NOTES 1297, 1302–03 (2016); Mason, supra note 2, at 213–
15; Oei, supra note 2. 
297. FATCA requires reporting not just of foreign bank accounts but also life insurance 
policies with cash value, certain retirement accounts, mutual funds, foreign securities 
holdings, and other foreign financial assets.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6038D(b) (2012); 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.6038D-3 (2016).  U.S. taxpayers with ties abroad may be more likely to hold these 
types of assets for non-evasion reasons, and may have less capacity to easily divest. See  
Oei, supra note 2 at 142 (analyzing the elasticities). 
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collateral impacts of the legislation on those taxpayers with actual offshore 
lives may well have received insufficient attention in the immediate aftermath 
of the leaks. 
3. FATCA’s High Costs 
Commentators have also pointed out that the costs to foreign financial 
institutions, foreign governments, and taxpayers of complying with FATCA’s 
reporting requirements are high, and they may be higher than the roughly 
$8.7 billion in revenue that FATCA was projected to raise over ten years.298  
FATCA was not subject to a formal cost-benefit analysis upon enactment, 
and the precise costs are hard to pin down.  However, some observers have 
ventured estimates.  In terms of costs to financial institutions, one estimate 
suggests that costs are perhaps up to $100 million per bank for major banks 
and could offset the revenue that FATCA is projected to raise.299  Other 
estimates are more modest.300  The compliance costs to individual taxpayers 
and the data-processing and enforcement costs to the United States must be 
factored in as well.301  Once all of these costs have been included, it seems 
  
298. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN SENATE AMENDMENT 3310, THE “HIRING INCENTIVES TO RESTORE EMPLOYMENT 
ACT,” UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE SENATE: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2020, at 1 (2010), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3649 [https://perma.cc/Y25T-
R838]; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Gil Savir, Find It and Tax It: From TIEAs to IGAs (U. of 
Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 443, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567646 [https://perma.cc/BLV9-
QE9V] (explaining how costs of FATCA could outweigh revenues collected); see also 
Christians, supra note 10, at 208 n.61; Hiran, supra note 296, at 1297–1301.  Many of 
FATCA’s compliance costs do not necessarily yield addition revenue but are simply to 
do with asset reporting.  See id. 
299. See Avi-Yonah & Savir, supra note 298, at 7; Robert W. Wood, FATCA Carries Fat Price Tag, 
FORBES (Nov. 30, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/11/30/fatca-
carries-fat-price-tag [https://perma.cc/JJ9C-FJN5]; US Tax Evasion Law ‘Could Cost Big Banks 
$100 Mln’, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2011, 7:46 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-tax/us-tax-
evasion-law-could-cost-big-banks-100-mln-idUSL5E7MI2DX20111118 
[https://perma.cc/KXZ8-43FF]. 
300. A survey of senior executives showed that 40 percent of survey respondents planned to spend 
$100,000 to $1 million on FATCA compliance, and only 4 percent planned on spending 
between $10 and $20 million.  FATCA and CRS: How Ready Are You?, THOMSON REUTERS, 
https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/wp-content/pdf/onesource/fatca-crs-readiness-survey.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QC4R-4VY7]. 
301. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-484, FOREIGN ACCOUNT REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS: IRS NEEDS TO FURTHER DEVELOP RISK, COMPLIANCE, AND COST PLANS 14 
(2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590142.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4T7-26K9].  
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plausible that even if the revenues collected by FATCA outweigh its costs, the 
externalized costs of the legislation on various parties are quite high.302 
Aggregate compliance costs aside, there are also questions about the 
distribution of costs and compliance burdens.  Cost distribution has been an 
issue, for example, with respect to the OVDPs.  The National Taxpayer 
Advocate has noted that the 2009 and 2011 OVDPs resulted in 
problematically regressive outcomes.  Taxpayers with lower values of 
undeclared offshore assets and those who were not represented by counsel 
paid disproportionally large penalties compared to those with higher value 
accounts and/or advisors representing them in the OVDP process.303 
It remains to be seen which populations will ultimately bear the cost of 
FATCA compliance.  For purposes of our discussion, it is sufficient to observe 
that the high costs of FATCA and the potentially problematic distribution of those 
costs may have paled in their salience as compared to the perception that there 
were egregious tax abuses that needed to be tackled.  Thus, there may have been 
insufficient attention paid to the potentially high externalized costs of the 
legislation. 
4. Proliferation of Flaws 
Any potentially negative effects of FATCA will likely not be confined 
to the United States.  The U.S. adoption of FATCA has led other countries 
to adopt FATCA-like laws as well, known as “mini-FATCAs.”304  
Additionally, various countries, coordinating under OECD auspices, have 
agreed on a “Common Reporting Standard” that will require information 
  
302. See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 243 (2013) (“By 
most measures, FATCA-related costs equal or exceed projected FATCA revenue.” 
(emphasis omitted)); see also Amanda Athanasiou, FATCA: Swatting Flies With Atom 
Bombs, 147 TAX NOTES 50, 51–52 (2015) (discussing large compliance costs to 
taxpayers); Tax Evasion: Dropping the Bomb, ECONOMIST (June 29, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21605911-americas-fierce-
campaign-against-tax-cheats-doing-more-harm-good-dropping 
[https://perma.cc/M9DN-3FHV] (“America’s fierce campaign against tax cheats is 
doing more harm than good.”). 
303. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 302, at 228–29 (noting that for taxpayers in the 
2009 OVDP, those with the smallest accounts paid offshore penalties six times the 
median unpaid tax (eight times for unrepresented taxpayers), but for those with largest 
accounts it was only three times); see also 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 86–91 (2014) (including similar observations). 
304. Blank & Mason, supra note 46, at 1247 (discussing adoption of “FATCA-like” legislation 
in other countries); see also Grinberg, supra note 46, at 364 (discussing emerging 
multilateral approaches). 
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exchange.305  Both the mini-FATCAs and CRS draw upon elements of 
FATCA in terms of design.  Thus, it is likely that FATCA’s flaws could be 
replicated internationally.  This suggests that even more care needs to be 
exercised to understand the costs, benefits, and consequences of this major 
piece of legislation. 
In summary, leaks may be credited with providing the impetus for the 
groundbreaking FATCA legislation.  By creating such political impetus, leaks 
may have yielded distributional gains by exposing the tax evasion strategies 
employed by high-net-worth taxpayers and holding such taxpayers 
accountable.  Yet, the high salience of the leaks and the egregious behaviors 
exposed may have simultaneously diverted attention away from the potential 
costs and pitfalls of FATCA, including the risks of ensnaring less willful 
populations, imposing high costs on various actors, and imposing such costs 
on persons not in the original target population. 
We do not claim that FATCA and the other U.S. enforcement initiatives 
embraced after the UBS and LGT leaks should not have been implemented.  
What is clear, though, is that these measures are imperfect and controversial.  
While FATCA may be an example of the enforcement gains that can follow 
from a leak, it may also illustrate the hazards and downsides associated with 
swift and reactionary government responses to leaked data. 
IV. LAW AFTER THE LEAK 
Reliance on data leaks to make tax law and enforcement decisions 
carries distinctive risks.  While the benefits and upsides of leaked data may 
outweigh these risks, it is nonetheless important to appreciate the downside 
hazards of reliance on leaked data, in order to avoid obvious pitfalls and make 
better policy decisions.  This Part offers suggestions for managing these 
hazards and flags four open questions concerning the future of leak-driven 
lawmaking. 
A. Suggestions for Managing Leak-Driven Lawmaking 
How should governments and tax authorities guard against the 
downsides of leak-driven lawmaking and navigate its hazards?  There are no 
  
305. See OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 
INFORMATION IN TAX MATTERS (2014), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-
for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-
matters_9789264216525-en [https://perma.cc/KTA6-33D5]. 
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simple answers, but the following suggestions may point governments in the 
right direction. 
1. Sophisticated Consumption of Leaked Data 
At the most basic level, governments and tax authorities should become 
more sophisticated consumers of leaked data.  This may seem obvious, but it 
requires a fundamental change in mindset: Rather than assuming that leaked 
data is simply a free audit or free information that lowers enforcement costs, 
tax authorities must be cognizant of the hidden risks inherent in using such 
data.  Governments should verify leaked data’s authenticity, understand how 
it has been curated and sorted, understand the motivations underlying the 
leak, and analyze the opportunity costs of responding to the particular data 
cache or issue highlighted by the leak. 
Understand the Sources.  Governments and tax authorities should 
become more informed about the motivations of the agenda setters behind a 
given leak and be more attuned to the politics and machinations behind the 
data’s dissemination.  As discussed, leakers and media platforms may have 
individual agendas that extend beyond optimizing tax enforcement, and they 
certainly have the ability to select, frame, and time data releases, thereby 
generating agency costs for policymakers seeking to use the data.306 
Some actors in the dissemination of leaks may be repeat players: the 
ICIJ, The Guardian, and Süddeutsche Zeitung, for example.  To the extent 
they are not already doing so, tax policymakers should familiarize themselves 
with the agendas and policy orientations of these actors, including how these 
agendas may have shifted, so that information or reporting that comes from 
these sources can be quickly parsed, evaluated, and used on a fast-track basis. 
Anticipate Potential Falsity.  Just because current releases of data have 
produced information that is widely viewed as accurate is no guarantee that 
future releases will also be accurate.  It is entirely possible for wholly or 
partially false data to be disseminated to advance underlying goals.  For 
example, leaked data may be falsified in the hope of creating short-term 
political or economic impacts.307 
The use of tax leaks in the 2017 French presidential election offers a 
window into how powerful the strategic misuse of tax leaks could be.  
During the May 2017 French presidential election, documents were 
  
306. See supra Subpart III.A. 
307. See, e.g., infra note 308. 
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anonymously posted on the internet that purported to show that eventual 
winner Emmanuel Macron had a Bahamas bank account.  Opponent 
Marine Le Pen then hinted during an election debate at the possibility that 
Macron had such an offshore bank account.  Macron countered that the 
claim was defamatory and false, and lodged a complaint with the French 
prosecutor’s office.308  In the immediate aftermath, France’s electoral 
commission warned the press and internet users that publishing or 
reposting the documents carried the risk of criminal prosecution,309 and 
French prosecutors opened an investigation into the suspected attempt to 
smear Macron’s name.310 
To be sure, the purported leak of the Macron documents did not cost 
Macron the election, and to the best of our knowledge, none of the other tax 
leaks that have occurred to date have consisted of data that was outright 
falsified.  However, the Macron leak story highlights the importance of 
anticipating future leaks that might be deliberately misleading or might not 
be wholly accurate. 
Anticipate Publicity.  Governments should be aware that even if they 
initially receive leaked data exclusively, that is, data not yet posted on ICIJ or 
WikiLeaks, there is a non-trivial chance that such data will eventually find its 
way into the public domain.  Thus, government responses to exclusively held 
data cannot be sloppy.  As the HSBC/Loretta Lynch episode demonstrates, 
  
308. See Jon Henley, Emmanuel Macron Files Complaint Over Le Pen Debate ‘Defamation,’ 
GUARDIAN (May 4, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017 
/may/04/emmanuel-macron-files-complaint-over-marine-le-pen-debate-remark 
[https://perma.cc/ CRV9-J5JS]; Sam Meredith, France’s Macron Takes Legal Action Over Le 
Pen ‘Defamation’ Debate Days Before Election, CNBC (May 5, 2017, 4:24 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/05/macron-le-pen-france-election-debate-fake-news-legal-
action-bank-bahamas.html [https://perma.cc/MX62-DARF].  Macron and his campaign 
subsequently outlined the spread of this assertion on various internet sites and argued that 
some of them were connected to “Russian interests.”  Henley, supra; Meredith, supra. 
309. Kim Willsher, French Media Warned Not to Publish Emmanuel Macron Leaks, GUARDIAN 
(May 6, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/06/french-warned-
not-to-publish-emmanuel-macron-leaks [https://perma.cc/Z2MA-BG4U]; see also Suites de 
L’attaque Informatique Qu’a Subie L’Équipe de Campagne de M. Macron [Following the 
Computer Attack on Macron’s Campaign Team], COMISSION NATIONALE DE CONTRÔLE 
DE LA CAMPAGNE ÉLECTORALE EN VUE DE L’ÉLECTION PRÉSIDENTIELLE [NAT’L COMM’N 
CONTROL ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION] (May 6, 2017), 
http://www.cnccep.fr/communiques/cp15.html [https://perma.cc/92AY-S2VF] (calling 
on press and internet users to refrain from reposting or disseminating this leaked 
information). 
310. Matthew Dalton, French Open Probe Into Suspected Attempt to Tar Emmanuel Macron, 
WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2017, 4:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/french-open-probe-
into-suspected-attempt-to-tar-emmanuel-macron-1493915360 
[https://perma.cc/PGE9-A8V2]. 
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slow or insufficient government responses will usually come to public notice 
in due course and are likely to have political consequences.311 
2. Keeping Responses Rational 
It is possible that publicly posted leaked data will create significant 
outrage and pressures for governments to take certain enforcement 
actions, which may result in populist or overreactionary policies.312  The 
legal and enforcement changes that occur in response to leaks may be 
socially and economically beneficial, but this is not guaranteed. 
We therefore recommend that tax authorities carefully evaluate the 
impacts of any laws and enforcement policies they embrace in response to a 
tax leak.  As noted, leaks may be motivated by agendas unrelated to a desire to 
optimize tax enforcement, such as normative commitments to transparency, 
perceptions of unfairness, or revenge.  In addition, public outrage and 
populist sentiments generated by a leak may drive lawmakers to embrace 
socially costly policies.  Fully analyzing the potential costs and downsides ex 
ante may prove an antidote to such unintended social costs.  Some concrete 
safeguards a tax authority could adopt include: (1) conducting detailed 
analysis of the policy’s collateral effects, including whether it will in fact catch 
the intended targets and who is likely to be hurt beyond the originally 
intended targets; (2) analyzing whether a given policy that makes expressive 
political sense is likely to achieve the stated goals; and (3) thinking through 
possible less costly or less invasive alternatives. 
Because the conduct that is revealed by a leak may be more salient to tax 
authorities than the costs, impacts, or collateral consequences of a post-leak 
policy change, more comprehensive clarification of goals and analysis of 
impacts before passing laws may serve to check reactionary leak-driven 
lawmaking. 
  
311. For discussion of a Canadian example of bureaucracy impeding effective use of 
whistleblower data in the tax leaks context, see William Hoke, Whistleblower’s Attempts 
to Aid Canadian Authorities Ignored, 84 TAX NOTES INT’L 360 (2016). 
312. Again, this risk is of a different magnitude than that encountered in the case of 
traditional information tips.  Highly public and curated leaks can garner widespread, 
even global, support for specific responses, actions and reforms in a way that is less 
likely with discrete tips to government. 
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3. A Commitment to First Enforcement Principles 
Tax authorities should also ensure that leaked data does not overwhelm 
broader enforcement agendas or principles.  Due to the risks of agenda 
capture and heighted salience that we have flagged in this Article, leaks may 
drive government to deviate from pre-existing enforcement priorities and 
areas of focus that have been carefully developed and to reallocate scarce 
resources to high-salience areas illuminated by the leak.  We urge, however, 
that tax authorities continue to independently assess their enforcement goals, 
paying attention to non-leak issues and not hyperfocusing on what has been 
leaked.  This will ensure that sunshine in one place does not cast larger 
shadows in others. 
To the extent that tax authorities have a pre-existing, well-reasoned 
enforcement approach to revenue collection, they should not be so quick to 
abandon those priorities.  Tax policymakers should regularly revisit whether 
their overall enforcement agenda remains on track, notwithstanding the 
effects of high-salience leaks. 
B. The Road Ahead: Four Open Questions 
This Article’s analysis is based on the tax data leaks and responses that 
have occurred so far.  The landscape may change over time as the world 
becomes more familiar with data leaks.  Here, we pose four open questions 
concerning how leak-driven lawmaking may unfold in the future. 
1. Entrenchment vs. Upheaval 
An important open question is whether later-occurring data leaks will 
have different impacts from earlier ones.  Once a significant leak or cluster of 
leaks has occurred exposing a particular tax abuse, it is possible that the 
legislative or enforcement responses of a country or the EU will become 
entrenched and that subsequent leaks will generate fewer systemic changes in 
law and policy, though they may continue to affect individual taxpayers.  
Thus, later leaks may have less resonance than earlier ones due to 
entrenchment and path dependence.  This may in turn impact the willingness 
of leakers to leak. 
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For example, leaks about secret offshore accounts have led to convulsive 
changes such as FATCA and the Common Reporting Standard.313  It is 
unclear whether subsequent leaks of offshore accountholder data will have 
comparable impacts on legislation, or whether they will simply lead to 
sanctions against discrete individuals. 
The degree to which later-occurring leaks continue to trigger dramatic 
legal change remains to be seen.  The impact of a tax leak is unlikely ever to be 
zero, but if leaks do have less systematic impacts going forward, this will likely 
affect the decision of leakers, media platforms, and other actors. 
2. Transparency vs. Privacy 
Another open question is how the debate over transparency and privacy 
will play out and what this might mean for leaks going forward.314  After a 
long period of tax privacy, there has been a recent push in international tax 
towards transparency and exchange of information to facilitate enforcement 
and compliance, with respect to both individuals and multinationals.315  The 
push to transparency has not stopped at disclosure to governments.  
Controversially, some have argued that asset and tax return information 
should be transparent to the public.316  However, there are risks to 
transparency, including concerns about privacy, cybersecurity, data and 
identity theft, fraud, and hacking. 
The increase in transparency mechanisms has prompted concern by 
both individual and business taxpayers.  For example, multinationals have 
actively raised confidentiality concerns in response to the CbC reporting 
embraced by the OECD317  and its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
  
313. See supra notes 3–5, 305. 
314. See generally Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. 265 
(2011) (examining effects of publication of tax return information); Joshua D. Blank, 
Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31 (2014) (offering 
guidelines for making corporate tax return information public); Joshua D. Blank, The 
Timing of Tax Transparency, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 449 (2017) (advocating increased 
transparency for documents reflecting “ex ante tax administration” determinations by 
the IRS); Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 1407 (2012) (discussing role 
of taxpayer privacy in international tax). 
315. William Hoke, The Year in Review: Demands for Greater Tax Transparency Escalate in 
2016, 85 TAX NOTES INT’L 27 (2017) (noting developments in corporate and individual 
tax transparency). 
316. Id. 
317. OECD, supra note 192. 
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Project.318  Moreover, as the EU has explored publication of CbC data and more 
public access to beneficial ownership registries, some taxpayers and jurisdictions 
have expressed disapproval.319  In February 2016, the German Finance 
Ministry stated, despite criticism that Germany was not sufficiently engaged 
in combating tax evasion, that the country would not support such 
transparency measures.320  Instead, he noted Germany’s concern for 
“personal and corporate privacy.”321  In contrast, the Swiss Federal Council 
announced in August 2015 its rejection of the “Yes to the protection of 
privacy” initiative that had received popular support.322  The measure, 
promoted in 2013, would prevent third parties from sharing the tax data of 
individual and corporate taxpayers with the Swiss authorities in domestic tax 
contexts except in limited circumstances. 
The future of tax transparency and privacy will not turn exclusively on 
the debates taking place within tax circles.323  Rather the tax debate will also be 
shaped by larger public conversations on transparency and privacy, and by 
leaks far beyond the tax world.324  Over the longer term, the questions will be 
whether we eventually reach an equilibrium between the dueling concerns of 
transparency and privacy, where that equilibrium will fall, and how stable it 
will be.  If the equilibrium is more on the side of transparency, then leaks may 
become less relevant, because much information is already known.325  
  
318. See, e.g.,  Letter from PWC, to OECD (Feb. 23, 2014) (arguing that the reporting 
template and obligations on tax authorities who receive data should be revised to better 
protect confidentiality). 
319. See, e.g., Teri Sprackland, MOF Defends Privacy Before Transparency Advocates, 81 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 648 (2016). 
320. Id. at 648. 
321. Id. 
322. Stephanie Soong Johnston, Swiss Government Pushes to Scrap Popular Privacy Proposal, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Aug. 27, 2015.  
323. For an example of debate within the tax field, see Teri Sprackland, Privacy Concerns 
May Hinder Transparency Movement, Panelists Say, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 19, 2015), 
which discusses how “public demands for tax transparency have grown quickly in recent 
years” but also notes privacy rights may prove a constraint on implementation.  For an 
example of a tax conference discussing taxpayer privacy in the transparency age, see 
2015 Conference Materials: Washington, D.C., INT’L CONF. ON TAXPAYER RTS., 
https://taxpayerrightsconference.com/2015-archive/2015-conference-materials 
[https://perma.cc/7N8T-R6EE]. 
324. One commentator has questioned whether the trend toward tax transparency is 
“misguided,” noting highly publicized non-tax data breaches including those by Edward 
Snowden and Chelsea Manning and the reality that “[w]e are living in a world where 
internal safeguards are easily undermined.”  Sprackland, supra note 323 (arguing that 
transferred data can be “exploit[ed] for political vendettas [or] other dangers”). 
325. See, e.g., Hugo Miller, France Must Discourage Tax Data Theft, Macron Swiss MP Says, 
BLOOMBERG (July 14, 2017, 6:22 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-
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However, if the resting point tends towards privacy, then there may be a continued 
role for leaks as an enforcement tool for governments and as a behavioral control 
on taxpayers.  The stability of the equilibrium point will also matter: If 
entrenchment impulses do not dominate, then any perceived equilibrium 
may be temporary and unstable, and it is possible that subsequent leaks may 
upset the equilibrium and once again lead to convulsive reform. 
3. Monopolies vs. Competitive Markets for Leaked Data 
A third open question is how markets for leaked data will change, and in 
particular whether they will trend towards information monopolies or 
become more competitive over time. 
At present, there are two main pathways via which tax data is leaked: 
(1) directly to government authorities, and then subsequently to the public, 
or (2) through the ICIJ as media repository and disseminator (WikiLeaks 
functions as a distant second alternative).  Thus, there is some market 
competition for leaked data, and there may be different reasons to choose one 
over the other.  A leak to a government may yield a monetary reward (such as 
that available under the U.S. whistleblower law), asylum for the leaker (such 
as what the HSBC whistleblower extracted from France), or a more tangible 
pathway towards enforcement action by that government.326  A leak to the 
ICIJ may have a wider global impact, lead to swifter action, and create more 
pressure on multiple governments to act.  Thus, it is possible that each 
pathway will yield systematic differences in the selection, transmission, 
reception, and thus the ultimate effects of the leak. 
Looking forward, we must ask how market factors will affect the 
provision, transmission, and use of leaked data.  One possibility is that 
markets may create competing alternatives to the two dominant existing 
pathways.  For example, members of the European Parliament established a 
competing “EUleaks” website to allow whistleblowers another platform for 
submitting leaked information securely.327  Part of the impetus for EUleaks 
  
14/france-must-discourage-bank-data-theft-macron-s-swiss-man-says 
[https://perma.cc/7GB8-ACVU] (“France should discourage the theft of banking data on 
its own citizens who have kept money abroad and instead foster better legal exchanges 
of information with its neighbors, says . . . French Parliamentarian [Joachim Son-
Forget].”). 
326. See generally supra Subparts I.B, I.C (discussing notable characteristics of various leaks).   
327. See Teri Sprackland, European Parliament Group Sets Up Secure ‘EUleaks’ Website, 84 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 27, 27 (2016); Nicholas Shaxson, EU Leaks—A New Platform for Whistleblowers, 
TAX JUST. NETWORK (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.taxjustice.net/2016/09/28/eu-leaks-new-
platform-whistleblowers [https://perma.cc/LJE6-7CLD]. 
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and other platforms like it may be a desire to more effectively control data 
leaks rather than relying on WikiLeaks or ICIJ.  Of course, it is also possible 
that markets for leaked data might disintegrate, either because heightened 
transparency has rendered leaks unnecessary, or because attempts at shutting 
down existing or potential pathways for leaks have been successful.328 On 
balance, though, it seems unlikely that the market for leaked data will 
disappear. It is worth noting that more news outlets are now actively 
soliciting leakers and whistleblowers through encrypted online submission 
systems and other avenues, such as SecureDrop.329  Though not tax specific, 
these invitations to leak may provide additional disclosure avenues for tax 
leakers and increase competition for leaked tax data. 
Another possible market development is that each existing pathway will 
develop distinct and enhanced bundles of incentives to attract leakers to 
choose one over the other.  For example, increased whistleblower rewards, 
government-sanctioned purchases of data, and government guarantees of 
criminal amnesty for the leaker may compete with carrots offered by media 
organizations, such as agreements to preserve anonymity more strongly, to 
disseminate data more widely, or to act more quickly. 
How markets for leaked data change going forward—and in particular, 
whether they develop more competitive elements or whether a few key players 
continue to monopolize the release, transmission, and packaging of leaked data—
will help determine the ultimate winners and losers of a data leak, the extent of 
continued leaks, and the ultimate impacts of leaks.  It is possible, though 
certainly not assured, that the availability of multiple transmission pathways 
may create incentives for media organizations and governments to act swiftly 
  
328. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 325 (discussing French MP’s representation of French 
expatriates in Switzerland, expressing preference for legal information exchanges as 
opposed to data thefts). 
329. SECUREDROP, https://securedrop.org [https://perma.cc/D6EC-7V5S] (describing itself as an 
“open-source whistleblower submission system that media organizations can use to securely 
accept documents from and communicate with anonymous sources”); see GLOBALEAKS, 
https://www.globaleaks.org [https://perma.cc/PTQ7-K6H5] (describing itself similarly); see 
also Philip Bump, Here’s How to Leak Government Documents to The Post, WASH. POST (Jan. 
25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/01/25/heres-how-to-
leak-government-documents-to-the-post [https://perma.cc/4YWP-LFA8] (soliciting leaks via 
SecureDrop); Matthew Keys, New York Times to Whistleblowers: Please Leak to Us, THEBLOT 
MAG. (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.theblot.com/new-york-times-to-whistleblowers-please-
leak-to-us-7734112 [https://perma.cc/T25H-GK47]; How to Leak to ProPublica, PROPUBLICA 
(Jan. 25, 2017, 5:47 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-to-leak-to-propublica 
[https://perma.cc/6ZXS-H92B]; To Federal Employees: If You See Something, Leak Something, 
POPULAR RESISTANCE (Jan 14, 2017), https://popularresistance.org/to-federal-employees-if-
you-see-something-leak-something [https://perma.cc/E8W8-C8NJ]. 
Leak-Driven Law 617 
	
	
and reduce time lags or provide more comprehensive data to the public.  
Policymakers might consider how to improve the design of existing markets 
for leaked data, in order to increase the probability that a leak will ultimately 
produce positive results. 
4. Other Unanticipated Future Shifts 
Finally, it bears emphasizing that tax leaks and their effects are not static.  
Even assuming that tax leaks as currently constituted are on the whole useful 
and beneficial from a tax policy and enforcement perspective, there is no 
guarantee that this outcome will persist.  As technology, privacy, and data 
leaks evolve, it is entirely possible that data leaks may develop in different 
directions. 
For example, future information brokers and intermediaries may have 
less established professional integrity than current intermediaries, or they 
may develop non-tax motives that are at odds with tax governance.  Data 
provided may not always be as accurate or as unadulterated as current 
caches.330  Government actors may figure out different ways to spin or 
otherwise abuse leaked data to advance non-tax agendas (for example, by 
discrediting or persecuting political opponents).331  Conversely, govern-ment 
actors may attempt to suppress leaks that some might otherwise find socially 
beneficial, for example, by prosecuting and investigating leakers.332 
In short, any analysis of the effects of tax leaks must account for the 
possibility of future shifts.  Developments in non-tax arenas have clearly 
illustrated the different directions in which data leaks can go.  Tax scholars 
and policymakers should be attentive to these non-tax developments and how 
they can inform internal conversations in the tax field about data leaks. 
  
330. In non-tax arenas, for example, others have alluded to the possibility that leaked data 
might have been doctored or modified.  See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 179; Gibney, supra 
note 179. 
331. See, e.g., supra note 308–310 and accompanying discussion (discussing the unfolding of 
the Macron tax leak during the French presidential election campaign). 
332. See Charlie Savage & Eric Lichtblau, Trump Directs Justice Department to Investigate ‘Criminal 
Leaks’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/justice-
department-leak-investigation-trump.html; Michael D. Shear, After Election, Trump’s 
Professed Love for Leaks Quickly Faded, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/us/politics/leaks-donald-trump.html. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conventional wisdom has it that leaks are socially beneficial in the battle 
against cross-border tax evasion by individuals and abusive tax structuring by 
multinationals.  This Article has shown, for the first time in the legal 
literature, that the conventional wisdom is too simplistic. 
By providing tax authorities with information about tax evasion and 
abusive structuring, data leaks can serve an important function in cross-
border tax law and policymaking and may well lead to positive enforcement 
outcomes.  They can highlight disparities between different populations of 
taxpayers, force governments to confront rules and practices historically 
favorable to elites, help ferret out corruption and evasion by public officials 
and the wealthy, discourage tax evasion, and create political impetus for new 
laws and enforcement actions.  But leaks also come with distinctive risks.  
They may allow leakers, hackers, media organizations, and other interests 
significant control over government enforcement agendas.  And the high 
salience of leaked data may lead to less than rational responses by both 
governments and the public. 
It is time for the scholarly conversation about tax and other leaks to 
advance beyond its current state.  The question is not simply how 
governments can use information from leaks to sanction bad behavior, make 
decisions, and design laws.  Rather, the question is how the actions and 
responses of leakers, private citizens, governments, and the media work 
together to create and promote certain policy outcomes, and how those 
outcomes should be evaluated, supported, or resisted. 
